The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence

Dal Bó, Pedro; Fréchette, Guillaume R.

doi:10.1257/aer.101.1.411

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American Economic Review: Vol. 101 No. 1 (February 2011)

AER Volume. 101, Issue 1 | left

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The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence

Article Citation

Dal Bó, Pedro, and Guillaume R. Fréchette. 2011. "The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence." American Economic Review, 101(1): 411-29.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.1.411

Abstract

A usual criticism of the theory of infinitely repeated games is that it does not provide sharp predictions since there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. To address this issue, we present experimental evidence on the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games as subjects gain experience. We show that cooperation may prevail in infinitely repeated games, but the conditions under which this occurs are more stringent than the subgame perfect conditions usually considered or even a condition based on risk dominance. (JEL C71, C73)

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Authors

Dal Bó, Pedro (Brown U)
Fréchette, Guillaume R. (NYU)

JEL Classifications

C71: Cooperative Games
C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games