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American Economic Review: Vol. 100 No. 5 (December 2010)
AER Volume. 100, Issue 5 |
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Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts
Article Citation
Cabrales, Antonio,
Raffaele Miniaci,
Marco Piovesan, and
Giovanni Ponti. 2010. "Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts."
American Economic Review,
100(5): 2261-78.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2261
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2261
Abstract
This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from a fixed menu. Then, agents "choose to work" for a principal by selecting one of the available contracts. We find that (i) (heterogeneous) social preferences are significant determinants of choices, (ii) for both principals and agents, strategic uncertainty aversion is a stronger determinant of choices than fairness, and (iii) agents display a marked propensity to work for principals with similar distributional concerns. (JEL D82, D86, J41)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (1.64 MB) | Download Additional Materials (516.19 KB)
Authors
Cabrales, Antonio (U Carlos III de Madrid)
Miniaci, Raffaele (U Brescia)
Piovesan, Marco (U Copenhagen)
Ponti, Giovanni (LUISS Guido Carli and U Alicante)
Miniaci, Raffaele (U Brescia)
Piovesan, Marco (U Copenhagen)
Ponti, Giovanni (LUISS Guido Carli and U Alicante)
JEL Classifications
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
J41: Labor Contracts
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
J41: Labor Contracts

