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American Economic Review: Vol. 100 No. 5 (December 2010)

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Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments

Article Citation

Siegel, Ron. 2010. "Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments." American Economic Review, 100(5): 2230-60.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2230

Abstract

This paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asymmetric competitions with unconditional and conditional investments. Such competitions include lobbying settings, labor-market tournaments, and R& races, among others. I provide an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium in these games and apply it to study competitions in which a fraction of each competitor's investment is sunk and the rest is paid only by the winners. Complete-information all-pay auctions are a special case. (JEL D44, D72, D82)

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Authors

Siegel, Ron (Northwestern U)

JEL Classifications

D44: Auctions
D72: Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information


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