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American Economic Review: Vol. 100 No. 5 (December 2010)
AER Volume. 100, Issue 5 | 
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Early Admissions at Selective Colleges
Article Citation
Avery, Christopher, and
Jonathan Levin. 2010. "Early Admissions at Selective Colleges."
American Economic Review,
100(5): 2125-56.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2125
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2125
Abstract
Early admissions are widely used by selective colleges and universities. We identify some basic facts about early admissions policies, including the admissions advantage enjoyed by early applicants and patterns in application behavior, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches these facts. The key feature of the model is that colleges want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, and early admissions programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm. (JEL C78, I23)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (16.94 KB) | Online Appendix (119.20 KB)
Authors
Avery, Christopher (Harvard U)
Levin, Jonathan (Stanford U)
Levin, Jonathan (Stanford U)
JEL Classifications
C78: Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
I23: Higher Education and Research Institutions
I23: Higher Education and Research Institutions
