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American Economic Review: Vol. 100 No. 5 (December 2010)
AER Volume. 100, Issue 5 |
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AER Forthcoming Articles
The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis
Article Citation
Mian, Atif,
Amir Sufi, and
Francesco Trebbi. 2010. "The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis."
American Economic Review,
100(5): 1967-98.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.1967
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.1967
Abstract
We examine the effects of constituents, special interests, and ideology on congressional voting on two of the most significant pieces of legislation in US economic history. Representatives whose constituents experience a sharp increase
in mortgage defaults are more likely to support the Foreclosure Prevention Act, especially in competitive districts. Interestingly, representatives are more sensitive to defaults of their own-party constituents. Special interests in the form ofhigher campaign contributions from the financial industry increase the likelihood
of supporting the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. However, ideologically conservative representatives are less responsive to both constituent and special interests. (JEL D72, G21, G28)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (125.05 KB) | Online Appendix (851.04 KB)
Authors
Mian, Atif (U CA, Berkeley)
Sufi, Amir (U Chicago)
Trebbi, Francesco (U British Columbia)
Sufi, Amir (U Chicago)
Trebbi, Francesco (U British Columbia)
JEL Classifications
D72: Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
G21: Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
G28: Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
G21: Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
G28: Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation

