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American Economic Review: Vol. 100 No. 4 (September 2010)
AER Volume. 100, Issue 4 | 
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Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship
Article Citation
Hamman, John R.,
George Loewenstein, and
Roberto A. Weber. 2010. "Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship."
American Economic Review,
100(4): 1826-46.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.4.1826
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.4.1826
Abstract
Principal-agent relationships are typically assumed to be motivated by efficiency gains from comparative advantage. However, principals may also delegate tasks to avoid taking direct responsibility for selfish or unethical behavior. We report three laboratory experiments in which principals repeatedly either decide how much money to share with a recipient or hire agents to make sharing decisions on their behalf. Across several experimental treatments, recipients receive significantly less, and in many cases close to nothing, when allocation decisions are made by agents. (JEL D82)
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Authors
Hamman, John R. (FL State U)
Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon U)
Weber, Roberto A. (Carnegie Mellon U)
Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon U)
Weber, Roberto A. (Carnegie Mellon U)
JEL Classifications
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
