This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
American Economic Review: Vol. 100 No. 3 (June 2010)
AER Volume. 100, Issue 3 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
AER Forthcoming Articles
Full-text Article
Download Data Set (338.29 KB)
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Explore:
AER Forthcoming Articles
A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel
Article Citation
Asker, John. 2010. "A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel."
American Economic Review,
100(3): 724-62.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.3.724
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.3.724
Abstract
This paper examines bidding in over 1,700 knockout auctions used by a bidding cartel (or ring) of stamp dealers in the 1990s. The knockout was conducted using a variant of the model studied by Daniel Graham, Robert Marshall, and Jean-Francois Richard (1990). Following a reduced form examination of these data, damages, induced inefficiency, and the ring's benefit from colluding are estimated using a structural model in the spirit of Emmanuel Guerre, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong (2000). A notable finding is that nonring bidders
suffered damages that were of the same order of magnitude as those of the sellers. (JEL D43, D44, L12)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (338.29 KB)
Authors
Asker, John (NYU)
JEL Classifications
D43: Market Structure and Pricing: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D44: Auctions
L12: Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
D44: Auctions
L12: Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
