This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window

American Economic Review: Vol. 100 No. 3 (June 2010)

Expand

Quick Tools:

Print Article Summary
Export Citation
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter

Explore:

AER - All Issues

AER Forthcoming Articles

Peddling Influence through Intermediaries

Article Citation

Li, Wei. 2010. "Peddling Influence through Intermediaries." American Economic Review, 100(3): 1136-62.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.3.1136

Abstract

A sender may communicate with a decision maker through intermediaries. In this model, an objective sender and intermediary pass on information truthfully, while biased ones favor a particular agenda but also have reputational concerns. I show that the biased sender and the biased intermediary's reporting truthfulness are strategic complements. The biased sender is less likely to use an intermediary than an objective sender if his reputational concerns are low, but more likely to do so if his reputational concerns are moderate. Moreover, the biased sender may be more likely to use an intermediary perceived to be more biased. (JEL D82, D83)

Article Full-Text Access

Full-text Article

Additional Materials

Online Appendix (115.19 KB)

Authors

Li, Wei (U CA, Riverside and U British Columbia)

JEL Classifications

D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief


American Economic Review


Quick Tools:

Sign up for Email Alerts

Follow us on Twitter

Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)

Explore:

AER - All Issues

AER - Forthcoming Articles

Virtual Field Journals


AEA Member Login:


AEAweb | AEA Journals | Contact Us