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American Economic Review: Vol. 100 No. 3 (June 2010)
AER Volume. 100, Issue 3 | 
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Peddling Influence through Intermediaries
Article Citation
Li, Wei. 2010. "Peddling Influence through Intermediaries."
American Economic Review,
100(3): 1136-62.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.3.1136
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.3.1136
Abstract
A sender may communicate with a decision maker through intermediaries. In this model, an objective sender and intermediary pass on information truthfully, while biased ones favor a particular agenda but also have reputational concerns. I show that the biased sender and the biased intermediary's reporting truthfulness are strategic complements. The biased sender is less likely to use an intermediary than an objective sender if his reputational concerns are low,
but more likely to do so if his reputational concerns are moderate. Moreover, the biased sender may be more likely to use an intermediary perceived to be more biased. (JEL D82, D83)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Online Appendix (115.19 KB)
Authors
Li, Wei (U CA, Riverside and U British Columbia)
JEL Classifications
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
