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American Economic Review: Vol. 100 No. 3 (June 2010)
AER Volume. 100, Issue 3 | 
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A Theory of Optimal Random Crackdowns
Article Citation
Eeckhout, Jan,
Nicola Persico, and
Petra E. Todd. 2010. "A Theory of Optimal Random Crackdowns."
American Economic Review,
100(3): 1104-35.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.3.1104
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.3.1104
Abstract
An incentives based theory of policing is developed which can explain the phenomenon of random "crackdowns," i.e., intermittent periods of high interdiction/
surveillance. For a variety of police objective functions, random crackdowns
can be part of the optimal monitoring strategy. We demonstrate support for implications of the crackdown theory using traffic data gathered by the
Belgian Police Department and use the model to estimate the deterrence effect
of additional resources spent on speeding interdiction. (JEL K42, R41)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Download Data Set (265.54 KB) | Online Appendix (543.14 KB)
Authors
Eeckhout, Jan (ICREA-Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona)
Persico, Nicola (NYU)
Todd, Petra E. (U PA)
Persico, Nicola (NYU)
Todd, Petra E. (U PA)
JEL Classifications
K42: Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
R41: Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise
R41: Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise
