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American Economic Review: Vol. 100 No. 2 (May 2010)
AER Volume. 100, Issue 2 | 
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Online Appendix (121.55 KB)
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AER Forthcoming Articles
Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions
Article Citation
Edelman, Benjamin, and
Michael Schwarz. 2010. "Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions."
American Economic Review,
100(2): 597-602.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.2.597
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.2.597
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Additional Materials
Online Appendix (121.55 KB)
Authors
Edelman, Benjamin (Harvard U)
Schwarz, Michael (Yahoo! Labs, Berkeley, CA)
Schwarz, Michael (Yahoo! Labs, Berkeley, CA)
JEL Classifications
D44: Auctions
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
M37: Advertising
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
M37: Advertising
