This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window

American Economic Review: Vol. 100 No. 1 (March 2010)


Quick Tools:

Print Article Summary
Export Citation
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter


AER - All Issues

AER Forthcoming Articles

All-or-Nothing Monitoring: Comment

Article Citation

Chen, Bo. 2010. "All-or-Nothing Monitoring: Comment." American Economic Review, 100(1): 625-27.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.1.625


Zhao (2008) presents an interesting "all-or-nothing monitoring" result for a multitask moral hazard agency problem with partial effort observation. We argue that the optimal contract based on the non-verifiable observation of the agent's effort in Zhao (2008) can be regarded as a limitation on the incentive schemes available to the principal. I then propose some arguably more appropriate approaches for analyzing such agency problems. (D82, D86, M54)

Article Full-Text Access

Full-text Article


Chen, Bo (Southern Methodist U)

JEL Classifications

D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
M54: Personnel Economics: Labor Management

American Economic Review

Quick Tools:

Sign up for Email Alerts

Follow us on Twitter

Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)


AER - All Issues

AER - Forthcoming Articles

Virtual Field Journals

AEA Member Login:

AEAweb | AEA Journals | Contact Us