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American Economic Review: Vol. 100 No. 1 (March 2010)
AER Volume. 100, Issue 1 | 
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All-or-Nothing Monitoring: Comment
Article Citation
Chen, Bo. 2010. "All-or-Nothing Monitoring: Comment."
American Economic Review,
100(1): 625-27.
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.1.625
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.1.625
Abstract
Zhao (2008) presents an interesting "all-or-nothing monitoring" result for a multitask moral hazard agency problem with partial effort observation. We argue that the optimal contract based on the non-verifiable observation of the agent's effort in Zhao (2008) can be regarded as a limitation on the incentive schemes available to the principal. I then propose some arguably more appropriate approaches for analyzing such agency problems. (D82, D86, M54)
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article
Authors
Chen, Bo (Southern Methodist U)
JEL Classifications
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
M54: Personnel Economics: Labor Management
D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
M54: Personnel Economics: Labor Management
