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Journal of Economic Perspectives: Vol. 16 No. 2 (Spring 2002)
JEP Volume. 16, Issue 2 | 
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Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection
Article Citation
Bergstrom, Theodore C. 2002. "Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection."
The Journal of Economic Perspectives,
16(2): 67-88.
DOI: 10.1257/0895330027265
DOI: 10.1257/0895330027265
Abstract
How selfish does our evolutionary history suggest that humans will be? We explore models in which groups are formed and dissolved and where reproduction of individuals is determined by their payoffs in a game played within groups. If groups are formed "randomly " and reproductive success of group founders is determined by a multiperson prisoners' dilemma game, then selfish behavior will prevail over maximization of group payoffs. However, interesting models exist in which "group selection "sustains cooperative behavior. Forces that support cooperative behavior include assortative matching in groups, group longevity and punishment-based group norms.
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Authors
Bergstrom, Theodore C. (University of California at Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, California, USA)
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