This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Open in New Tab
Open in same window
Journal of Economic Perspectives: Vol. 16 No. 1 (Winter 2002)
JEP Volume. 16, Issue 1 | 
Previous ArticleNext Article
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Full-text Article (Complimentary)
View Comments on This Article (0) | Login to post a comment
Previous ArticleNext Article
Expand
Quick Tools:
Print Article Summary Email Link to this Article Export CitationSign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter
Explore:
What Really Matters in Auction Design
Article Citation
Klemperer, Paul. 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design."
The Journal of Economic Perspectives,
16(1): 169-189.
DOI: 10.1257/0895330027166
DOI: 10.1257/0895330027166
Abstract
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behavior. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems. The Anglo-Dutch auction - a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions - may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable fiascoes in auctioning mobile-phone licenses, television franchises, companies, eletricty, etc., and especially the European "third-generation" (UMTS) spectrum auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction design is not "one size fits all."
Article Full-Text Access
Full-text Article (Complimentary)
Authors
Klemperer, Paul (Oxford University, England)
Comments
View Comments on This Article (0) | Login to post a comment
