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American Economic Review: Vol. 93 No. 2 (May 2003)
AER Volume. 93, Issue 2 | 
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Models of Thinking, Learning, and Teaching in Games
Article Citation
Camerer, Colin,
Teck Ho, and
Kuan Chong. 2003. "Models of Thinking, Learning, and Teaching in Games ."
The American Economic Review,
93(2): 192-195.
DOI: 10.1257/000282803321947038
DOI: 10.1257/000282803321947038
Abstract
Noncooperative game theory combines strategic thinking, best-response, and mutual consistency of beliefs and choices (equilibrium). Hundreds of experiments show that in actual behavior these three forces are limited, even when subjects are highly motivated and analytically skilled (Camerer, 2003). The challenge is to create models that are as general, precise, and parsimonious as equilibrium, but which also use cognitive details to explain experimental evidence more accurately and to predict new regularities. This paper describes three exemplar models of behavior in one-shot games (thinking), learning over time, and how repeated "partner" matching affects behavior (teaching) (see Camerer et al., 2002b).
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Authors
Camerer, Colin
Ho, Teck
Chong, Kuan
Ho, Teck
Chong, Kuan
