American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Articles The Speed of Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation YoellaBereby-Meyer Alvin E.Roth 1029 1042 In an experiment, players’ ability to learn to cooperate in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma was substantially diminished when the payoffs were noisy, even though players could monitor one another’s past actions perfectly. In contrast, in one-time play against a succession of opponents, noisy payoffs increased cooperation, by slowing the rate at which cooperation decays. These observations are consistent with the robust observation from the psychology literature that partial reinforcement (adding randomness to the link between an action and its consequences while holding expected payoffs constant) slows learning. This effect is magnified in the repeated game: when others are slow to learn to cooperate, the benefits of cooperation are reduced, which further hampers cooperation. These results show that a small change in the payoff environment, which changes the speed of individual learning, can have a large effect on collective behavior. And they show that there may be interesting comparative dynamics that can be derived from careful attention to the fact that at least some economic behavior is learned from experience. (JEL C71, C72, C73, D83) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=6&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1029 http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20030187_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Articles Taxes, Cigarette Consumption, and Smoking Intensity JérômeAdda FrancescaCornaglia 1013 1028 This paper analyses the compensatory behavior of smokers. Exploiting data on cotinine concentration—a metabolite of nicotine—measured in a large population of smokers over time, we show that smokers compensate for tax hikes by extracting more nicotine per cigarette. Our study makes two important contributions. First, as smoking a given cigarette more intensively is detrimental to health, our results question the usefulness of tax increases. Second, we develop a model of rational addiction where agents can also adjust their intensity of smoking, and we show that the previous empirical results suffer from estimation biases. (JEL D12, H25, I12) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=5&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1013 http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20040645_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Articles What Mean Impacts Miss: Distributional Effects of Welfare Reform Experiments Marianne P.Bitler Jonah B.Gelbach Hilary W.Hoynes 988 1012 Labor supply theory predicts systematic heterogeneity in the impact of recent welfare reforms on earnings, transfers, and income. Yet most welfare reform research focuses on mean impacts. We investigate the importance of heterogeneity using randomassignment data from Connecticut’s Jobs First waiver, which features key elements of post-1996 welfare programs. Estimated quantile treatment effects exhibit the substantial heterogeneity predicted by labor supply theory. Thus mean impacts miss a great deal. Looking separately at samples of dropouts and other women does not improve the performance of mean impacts. We conclude that welfare reform’s effects are likely both more varied and more extensive than has been recognized. (JEL D31, I38, J31) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=4&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.988 http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20031127_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Articles Higher-Education Policies and the College Wage Premium: Cross-State Evidence from the 1990s Nicole M.Fortin 959 987 Exploiting differences across U.S. states, this paper demonstrates that there is a tight link between higher education policies, past enrollment rates, and recent changes in the college wage premium among labor market entrants. The analysis reveals, however, that this relationship is much weaker in states with high private enrollment rates, high levels of interstate mobility, or interstate trade. The withinstate estimates of the own-cohort relative supply effect shed some light on the extent to which the U.S. labor market can be characterized as a single national market or a collection of state-specific labor markets. (JEL I21, I28, J22, J24, J31, R23) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=3&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.959 http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20040314_data.zip http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20040314_app.pdf American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Articles An Astonishing Sixty Years: The Legacy of Hiroshima Thomas C.Schelling 929 937 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=1&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.929 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Articles Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market AmyFinkelstein KathleenMcGarry 938 958 We demonstrate the existence of multiple dimensions of private information in the long-term care insurance market. Two types of people purchase insurance: individuals with private information that they are high risk and individuals with private information that they have strong taste for insurance. Ex post, the former are higher risk than insurance companies expect, while the latter are lower risk. In aggregate, those with more insurance are not higher risk. Our results demonstrate that insurance markets may suffer from asymmetric information even absent a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence. The results also suggest a general test for asymmetric information. (JEL A82, G22, I11) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=2&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.938 http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20040787_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Articles Costly Information Acquisition: Experimental Analysis of a Boundedly Rational Model XavierGabaix DavidLaibson GuillermoMoloche StephenWeinberg 1043 1068 The directed cognition model assumes that agents use partially myopic option-value calculations to select their next cognitive operation. The current paper tests this model by studying information acquisition in two experiments. In the first experiment, information acquisition has an explicit financial cost. In the second experiment, information acquisition is costly because time is scarce. The directed cognition model successfully predicts aggregate information acquisition patterns in these experiments. When the directed cognition model and the fully rational model make demonstrably different predictions, the directed cognition model better matches the laboratory evidence. (JEL D83) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=7&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1043 http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20030922_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Articles Individual Preferences, Monetary Gambles, and Stock Market Participation: A Case for Narrow Framing NicholasBarberis MingHuang Richard H.Thaler 1069 1090 We argue that “narrow framing,” whereby an agent who is offered a new gamble evaluates that gamble in isolation, may be a more important feature of decisionmaking than previously realized. Our starting point is the evidence that people are often averse to a small, independent gamble, even when the gamble is actuarially favorable. We find that a surprisingly wide range of utility functions, including many nonexpected utility specifications, have trouble explaining this evidence, but that this difficulty can be overcome by allowing for narrow framing. Our analysis makes predictions as to what kinds of preferences can most easily address the stock market participation puzzle. (JEL D81, G11) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=8&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1069 http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20031011_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Articles A Model of Forum Shopping JoshLerner JeanTirole 1091 1113 Owners of intellectual property or mere sponsors of an idea (e.g., authors, security issuers, sponsors of standards) resort to more or less independent certifiers to persuade potential users (buyers or adopters) of the worth of their property or idea. We analyze the sponsor’s choices of certifier and design, social preferences regarding these choices, and the impacts thereon of multiple categories of users, of a downstream presence of the sponsor, and of certifier market power. Finally, we study strategic forum shopping by sponsors of competing ideas. (JEL D82, 031, 034) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=9&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1091 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Articles Cardinality versus Ordinality: A Suggested Compromise MichaelMandler 1114 1136 By taking sets of utility functions as primitive, we define an ordering over assumptions on utility functions that gauges their measurement requirements. Cardinal and ordinal assumptions constitute two levels of measurability, but other assumptions lie between these extremes. We apply the ordering to explanations of why preferences should be convex. The assumption that utility is concave qualifies as a compromise between cardinality and ordinality, while the Arrow-Koopmans explanation, supposedly an ordinal theory, relies on utilities in the cardinal measurement class. In social choice theory, a concavity compromise between ordinality and cardinality is also possible and rationalizes the core utilitarian policies. (JEL D01) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=10&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1114 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Articles Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations GiovanniMaggi MassimoMorelli 1137 1158 Some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule, others by (simple or qualified) majority rules. Standard voting models, which assume that the decisions made by voting are perfectly enforceable, have a hard time explaining the observed variation in governance mode, and in particular the widespread occurrence of the unanimity system. We present a model whose main departure from standard voting models is that the organization cannot rely on external enforcement mechanisms: each country is sovereign and cannot be forced to comply with the collective decision or, in other words, the voting system must be self-enforcing. The model identifies conditions under which the organization adopts the unanimity rule, and yields rich comparative-statics predictions on the determinants of the mode of governance. (JEL D72, F53) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=11&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1137 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Articles Speculative Growth: Hints from the U.S. Economy Ricardo J.Caballero EmmanuelFarhi Mohamad L.Hammour 1159 1192 We propose a framework for understanding episodes of vigorous economic expansion and extreme asset valuations. We interpret this phenomenon as a highvaluation equilibrium with a low cost of capital based on optimism about future funding. The key ingredient for such equilibrium is feedback from increased growth to a decline in the long-run cost of capital. This feedback arises when an expansion comes with technological progress in the capital sector, when fiscal rules generate procyclical fiscal surpluses, when the rest of the world has lower expansion potential or high saving needs, and when financial constraints are relaxed by the expansion itself. (JEL E22, O33, O41) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=12&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1159 http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20040445_app.pdf American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Articles Shocks and Government Beliefs: The Rise and Fall of American Inflation ThomasSargent NoahWilliams TaoZha 1193 1224 We use a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm to estimate the parameters of a “true” data-generating mechanism and those of a sequence of approximating models that a monetary authority uses to guide its decisions. Gaps between a true expectational Phillips curve and the monetary authority’s approximating nonexpectational Phillips curve models unleash inflation that a monetary authority that knows the true model would avoid. A sequence of dynamic programming problems implies that the monetary authority’s inflation target evolves as its estimated Phillips curve moves. Our estimates attribute the rise and fall of post- WWII inflation in the United States to an intricate interaction between the monetary authority’s beliefs and economic shocks. Shocks in the 1970s made the monetary authority perceive a tradeoff between inflation and unemployment which ignited big inflation. The monetary authority’s beliefs about the Phillips curve changed in ways that account for former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker’s conquest of U.S. inflation. (JEL E24, E31, E52, N12) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=13&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1193 http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20040850_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Articles Traditional Institutions Meet the Modern World: Caste, Gender, and Schooling Choice in a Globalizing Economy KaivanMunshi MarkRosenzweig 1225 1252 This paper addresses the question of how traditional institutions interact with the forces of globalization to shape the economic mobility and welfare of particular groups of individuals in the new economy. We explore the role of one such traditional institution—the caste system—in shaping career choices by gender in Bombay using new survey data on school enrollment and income over the past 20 years. We find that male working-class—lower-caste—networks continue to channel boys into local language schools that lead to the traditional occupation, despite the fact that returns to nontraditional white-collar occupations rose substantially in the 1990s, suggesting the possibility of a dynamic inefficiency. In contrast, lower-caste girls, who historically had low labor market participation rates and so did not benefit from the network, are taking full advantage of the opportunities that became available in the new economy by switching rapidly to English schools. (JEL I21, J16, O15, Z13) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=14&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1225 http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20030775_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Articles $1,000 Cash Back: The Pass-Through of Auto Manufacturer Promotions MeghanBusse JorgeSilva-Risso FlorianZettelmeyer 1253 1270 Automobile manufacturers frequently use promotions involving cash incentives. While payments are nominally directed to either customers or dealers, the ultimate beneficiary of the promotion depends on the outcome of price negotiation. We use program evaluation methods to compare the incidence of these two types of promotions. Customers obtain 70 to 90 percent of a customer rebate, but only 30 to 40 percent of a dealer discount promotion, a $500 difference for a typical promotion. Our leading hypothesis is that pass-through rates differ because of information asymmetries: customer rebates are well-publicized to customers, while dealer discount promotions are not. (JEL D82, L11, L15, L62, L81, M31) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=15&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1253 http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20041005_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Shorter Papers A Theory of Participation in Elections TimothyFeddersen AlvaroSandroni 1271 1282 We analyze a model of participation in elections in which voting is costly and no vote is pivotal. Ethical agents are motivated to participate when they determine that agents of their type are obligated to do so. Unlike previous duty-based models of participation, in our model an ethical agent\'s obligation to vote is determined endogenously as a function of the behavior of other agents. Our model predicts high turnout and comparative statics that are consistent with strategic behavior. (JEL D72) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=16&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1271 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Shorter Papers What is Discrimination? Gender in the American Economic Association, 1935-2004 Stephen G.Donald Daniel S.Hamermesh 1283 1292 We illustrate problems of measuring discrimination using elections to AEA offices. With a new econometric technique, we find female candidates have a much better than random chance of victory. This advantage is either reverse discrimination or reflects beliefs that women are more productive. The former interpretation could be explained by an unchanging median voter whose preferences were not satisfied by suppliers of candidates; but there was a structural change in voting behavior in the mid-1970s. The results suggest it is generally impossible to claim differences in rewards, for different groups measure the extent of discrimination or even its direction. (JEL A11, D72, J16) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=17&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1283 http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20040699_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Shorter Papers Stock Prices, News, and Economic Fluctuations PaulBeaudry FranckPortier 1293 1307 We show that the joint behavior of stock prices and TFP favors a view of business cycles driven largely by a shock that does not affect productivity in the short run – and therefore does not look like a standard technology shock – but affects productivity with substantial delay – and therefore does not look like a monetary shock. One structural interpretation for this shock is that it represents news about future technological opportunities which is first captured in stock prices. This shock causes a boom in consumption, investment, and hours worked that precedes productivity growth by a few years, and explains about 50 percent of business cycle fluctuations. (JEL G12, E32, E44) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=18&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1293 http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20030282_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Shorter Papers Life-Cycle Variation in the Association between Current and Lifetime Earnings StevenHaider GarySolon 1308 1320 Researchers in a variety of important economic literatures have assumed that current income variables as proxies for lifetime income variables follow the textbook errors-in-variables model. In our analysis of Social Security records containing nearly career-long earnings histories for the Health and Retirement Study sample, we find that the relationship between current and lifetime earnings departs substantially from the textbook model in ways that vary systematically over the life cycle. Our results can enable more appropriate analysis of, and correction for, errors-in-variables bias in any research that uses current earnings to proxy for lifetime earnings. (JEL D31, D91) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=19&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1308 http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20040284_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Shorter Papers Choice Shifts in Groups: A Decision-Theoretic Basis KfirEliaz DebrajRay RonnyRazin 1321 1332 The phenomenon of choice shifts in group decision-making has received attention in the social psychology literature. Faced with a risky group decision, individuals appear to support more extreme choices relative to those they would make on their own. This paper demonstrates that from a decision-theoretic perspective, choice shifts are intimately connected to failures of expected utility theory. In the model studied here, the Allais paradox is equivalent to a well-studied configuration of choice shifts. Thus, our results marry two well-known behavioral regularities, one in individual decision theory and another in the social psychology of groups. (JEL D71, D81) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=20&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1321 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Shorter Papers Good Principals or Good Peers? Parental Valuation of School Characteristics, Tiebout Equilibrium, and the Incentive Effects of Competition among Jurisdictions Jesse M.Rothstein 1333 1350 In a multicommunity model, high-income families cluster together in any equilibrium, and cluster near effective schools if effectiveness is an important component of community desirability. Governmental fragmentation facilitates this residential sorting. Thus, if parents prefer effective schools, income correlates with effectiveness in high-choice-market equilibrium. I examine the distribution of student background and test scores across schools within metropolitan areas that differ in the structure of educational governance. I find little indication of the “effectiveness sorting” that is predicted if parents choose neighborhoods for the efficacy of the local schools. This suggests caution about the productivity implications of school choice policies. (JEL H73, I21, R21, R23) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=21&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1333 http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20031260_data.zip http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20031260_app.pdf American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Shorter Papers Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment Todd R.Kaplan DavidWettstein 1351 1354 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=22&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1351 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Shorter Papers Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply Yeon-KooChe Ian L.Gale 1355 1360 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=23&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1355 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Shorter Papers Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation: Comment JohnDriffill ZenoRotondi 1361 1366 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=24&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1361 http://www.e-aer.org/data/sept06/20040796_app.pdf American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 96 4 September 2006 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&issue_date=September 2006 Corrigendum Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly: Corrigendum ChaimFershtman Kenneth L.Judd 1367 1367 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=4&article=25&issue_date=September 2006 10.1257/aer.96.4.1367