<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Social Security</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Peter</gnm><snm>Diamond</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1</ppf>
<ppl>24</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=1&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970670</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Torsten</gnm><snm>Persson</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Guido</gnm><snm>Tabellini</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>25</ppf>
<ppl>45</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We investigate the effect of electoral rules and forms of government on fiscal policy outcomes in a large sample of democracies. We rely on different estimation methods to address prospective problems of statistical inference, due to nonrandom selection of these constitutional rules. The findings are consistent with our theoretical priors: presidential regimes induce smaller governments than parliamentary democracies, while majoritarian elections lead to smaller governments and smaller welfare programs than proportional elections. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=2&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970689</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/march2004_tabellini_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Bidder Discounts and Target Premia in Takeovers</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Boyan</gnm><snm>Jovanovic</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Serguey</gnm><snm>Braguinsky</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>46</ppf>
<ppl>56</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>On news of a takeover, the sum of the stock market values of the firms involved often falls, and the value of the acquirer almost always does. Does this mean that takeovers do not raise the values of the firms involved? Not necessarily. We set up a model in which the equilibrium number of takeovers is constrained efficient. Yet upon news of a takeover, a target's price rises, the bidder's price falls, and most of the time the joint value of the target and acquirer also falls. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=3&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970698</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Costly Voting</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Tilman</gnm><snm>Borgers</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>57</ppf>
<ppl>66</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>What are good voting rules if voting is costly? We analyze this question for the case that an electorate chooses among two alternatives. In a symmetric private value model of voting we show that majority voting with voluntary participation Paretodominates majority voting with compulsory participation as well as random decision-making. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=4&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970706</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Factor Proportions and the Structure of Commodity Trade</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>John</gnm><snm>Romalis</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>67</ppf>
<ppl>97</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper examines how factor proportions determine the structure of commodity trade. It integrates a many-country version of a Heckscher-Ohlin model with a continuum of goods with Paul R. Krugman's (1980) model of monopolistic competition and transport costs. The commodity structure of production and bilateral trade is fully determined. Two main predictions emerge. Countries capture larger shares of world production and trade of commodities that more intensively use their abundant factors. Countries that rapidly accumulate a factor see their production and export structures systematically shift towards industries that intensively use that factor. Both predictions receive support from detailed trade data. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=5&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970715</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Andrew K.</gnm><snm>Rose</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>98</ppf>
<ppl>114</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper estimates the effect on international trade of multilateral trade agreements - the World Trade Organization (WTO), its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) extended from rich countries to developing countries. I use a standard "gravity" model of bilateral merchandise trade and a large panel data set covering over 50 years and 175 countries. An extensive search reveals little evidence that countries joining or belonging to the GATT/WTO have different trade patterns from outsiders, though the GSP seems to have a strong effect. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=6&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970724</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/march2004_rose_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Do Police Reduce Crime? Estimates Using the Allocation of Police Forces After a Terrorist Attack</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Rafael</gnm><snm>Di Tella</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Ernesto</gnm><snm>Schargrodsky</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>115</ppf>
<ppl>133</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>An important challenge in the crime literature is to isolate causal effects of police on crime. Following a terrorist attack on the main Jewish center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in July 1994, all Jewish institutions received police protection. Thus, this hideous event induced a geographical allocation of police forces that can be presumed exogenous in a crime regression. Using data on the location of car thefts before and after the attack, we find a large deterrent effect of observable police on crime. The effect is local, with no appreciable impact outside the narrow area in which the police are deployed. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=7&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970733</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/march2004_ditella_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Antidumping Policy: Theory and Evidence</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Bruce A.</gnm><snm>Blonigen</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Jee-Hyeong</gnm><snm>Park</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>134</ppf>
<ppl>154</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Antidumping (AD) trade protection policies allow government agencies to recalculate AD duties based on foreign firms' most recent pricing behavior. We examine the resulting dynamic pricing problem of a foreign firm facing such policy. We show that the expected pattern of AD duty recalculations over time crucially depends on the foreign firm's ex ante expectations of possible outcomes of AD policy enforcement. Our empirical analysis then confirms the role of ex ante expectations in explaining observed patterns of AD recalculations. Many of our model's results are applicable to other situations where enforcement of policy is tied to the subject's behavior. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=8&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970742</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Lance</gnm><snm>Lochner</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Enrico</gnm><snm>Moretti</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>155</ppf>
<ppl>189</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We estimate the effect of education on participation in criminal activity using changes in state compulsory schooling laws over time to account for the endogeneity of schooling decisions. Using Census and FBI data, we find that schooling significantly reduces the probability of incarceration and arrest. NLSY data indicate that our results are caused by changes in criminal behavior and not differences in the probability of arrest or incarceration conditional on crime. We estimate that the social savings from crime reduction associated with high school graduation (for men) is about 14 -26 percent of the private return. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=9&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970751</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Testing for Indeterminacy: An Application to U.S. Monetary Policy</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Thomas A.</gnm><snm>Lubik</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Frank</gnm><snm>Schorfheide</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>190</ppf>
<ppl>217</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper considers a prototypical New Keynesian model, in which the equilibrium is undetermined if monetary policy is "passive." The likelihood-based estimation of dynamic equilibrium models is extended to allow for indeterminacies and sunspot fluctuations. We construct posterior weights for the determinacy and indeterminacy region of the parameter space and estimates for the propagation of fundamental and sunspot shocks. According to the estimated model, U.S. monetary policy post-1982 is consistent with determinacy, whereas the pre-Volcker policy is not. We find that before 1979 indeterminacy substantially altered the propagation of shocks. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=10&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970760</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Internet Job Search and Unemployment Durations</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Peter</gnm><snm>Kuhn</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Mikal</gnm><snm>Skuterud</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>218</ppf>
<ppl>232</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Using the December 1998 and August 2000 CPS Computer and Internet Supplements matched with subsequent CPS files, we ask which types of unemployed workers looked for work on line and whether Internet searchers became reemployed more quickly. In our data, Internet searchers have observed characteristics that are typically associated with shorter unemployment spells, and do spend less time unemployed. This unemployment differential is however eliminated and in some cases reversed when we hold observable characteristics constant. We conclude that either Internet job search is ineffective in reducing unemployment durations, or Internet job searchers are negatively selected on unobservables. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=11&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970779</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Public Housing, Housing Vouchers, and Student Achievement: Evidence from Public Housing Demolitions in Chicago</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Brian A.</gnm><snm>Jacob</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>233</ppf>
<ppl>258</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper utilizes a plausibly exogenous source of variation in housing assistance generated by public housing demolitions in Chicago to examine the impact of high-rise public housing on student outcomes. I find that children in households affected by the demolitions do no better or worse than their peers on a wide variety of achievement measures. Because the majority of households that leave high-rise public housing in response to the demolitions move to neighborhoods and schools that closely resemble those they left, the zero effect of the demolitions may be interpreted as the independent impact of public housing. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=12&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970788</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Pareto-Efficient International Taxation</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Michael</gnm><snm>Keen</snm></au>
<au><gnm>David</gnm><snm>Wildasin</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>259</ppf>
<ppl>275</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper analyzes Pareto-efficient international tax regimes. Because every country faces its own national budget constraint, the Diamond-Mirrlees production-efficiency theorem, which underlies key tenets of policy advice in international taxation - the desirability of destination basis for commodity taxation, of the residence principle for capital income taxation, and of free trade - does not apply. The paper establishes conditions - relating to the availability of explicit or implicit devices for reallocating tax revenues across countries - under which production efficiency is nevertheless desirable, and characterizes the precise ways in which Pareto-efficient international taxation may require violation of established tenets. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=13&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970797</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Understanding Trend and Cycle in Asset Values: Reevaluating the Wealth Effect on Consumption</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Martin</gnm><snm>Lettau</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Sydney C.</gnm><snm>Ludvigson</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>276</ppf>
<ppl>299</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=14&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970805</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Export Versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Elhanan</gnm><snm>Helpman</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Marc J.</gnm><snm>Melitz</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Stephen R.</gnm><snm>Yeaple</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>300</ppf>
<ppl>316</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=15&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970814</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets: Empirical Evidence from Contract Changes in Southern California</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Justine S.</gnm><snm>Hastings</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>317</ppf>
<ppl>328</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=16&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970823</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>How Will 401(k) Pension Plans Affect Retirement Income?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Andrew A.</gnm><snm>Samwick</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Jonathan</gnm><snm>Skinner</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>329</ppf>
<ppl>343</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=17&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970832</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Impact of Labor Strikes on Consumer Demand: An Application to Professional Sports</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Martin B.</gnm><snm>Schmidt</snm></au>
<au><gnm>David J.</gnm><snm>Berri</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>344</ppf>
<ppl>357</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=18&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970841</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/march2004_schmidt_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Estimating the Effect of Mother's Schooling on Children's Schooling Using a Sample of Adoptees</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Erik</gnm><snm>Plug</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>358</ppf>
<ppl>368</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=19&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970850</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/march2004_plug_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>On A Political Solution to the NIMBY Conflict</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Eli</gnm><snm>Feinerman</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Israel</gnm><snm>Finkelshtain</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Iddo</gnm><snm>Kan</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>369</ppf>
<ppl>381</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=20&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970869</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Verifying the Solution from a Nonlinear Solver: A Case Study: Comment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Ron</gnm><snm>Shachar</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Barry</gnm><snm>Nalebuff</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>382</ppf>
<ppl>390</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=21&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970878</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/march2004_shachar_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Verifying the Solution from a Nonlinear Solver: A Case Study: Reply</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm> B. D.</gnm><snm>McCullough</snm></au>
<au><gnm> H. D.</gnm><snm>Vinod</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>391</ppf>
<ppl>396</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=22&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970887</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Verifying the Solution from a Nonlinear Solver: A Case Study: Comment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>David M.</gnm><snm>Drukker</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Vince</gnm><snm>Wiggins</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>397</ppf>
<ppl>399</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=23&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970896</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>94</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2004</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&issue_date=March 2004</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Verifying the Solution from a Nonlinear Solver: A Case Study: Reply</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm> B. D.</gnm><snm>McCullough</snm></au>
<au><gnm> H. D.</gnm><snm>Vinod</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>400</ppf>
<ppl>406</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=94&issue=1&article=24&issue_date=March 2004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282804322970904</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


