American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics Vernon L.Smith 465 508 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=1&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322156954 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand IlyaSegal 509 529 The standard profit-maximizing multiunit auction intersects the submitted demand curve with a preset reservation supply curve, which is determined using the distribution from which the buyers' valuations are drawn. However, when this distribution is unknown, a preset supply curve cannot maximize monopoly profits. The optimal pricing mechanism in this situation sets a price for each buyer on the basis of the demand distribution inferred statistically from other buyers' bids. The resulting profit converges to the optimal monopoly profit with known demand as the number of buyers goes to infinity, and convergence can be substantially faster than with sequential price experimentation. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=2&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322156963 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Animal Spirits Through Creative Destruction PatrickFrancois HuwLloyd-Ellis 530 550 We show how a Schumpeterian process of creative destruction can induce rational, herd behavior by entrepreneurs across diverse sectors as if fueled by "animal spirits." Consequently, a multisector economy, in which productivity improvements are made by independent, profit-seeking entrepreneurs, exhibits regular booms, slowdowns, and downturns as part of the long-run growth process. Our cyclical equilibrium has higher average growth, but lower welfare than the corresponding acyclical one. We show how a negative relationship can emerge between volatility and growth across cycling economies, and assess the extent to which our model matches several features of actual business cycles. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=3&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322156972 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Make Versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information George P.Baker Thomas N.Hubbard 551 572 Explaining patterns of asset ownership is a central goal of both organizational economics and industrial organization. We develop a model of asset ownership in trucking, which we test by examining how the adoption of different classes of on-board computers (OBCs) between 1987 and 1997 influenced whether shippers use their own trucks for hauls or contract with for-hire carriers. We find that OBCs' incentive-improving features pushed hauls toward private carriage, but their resource-allocation-improving features pushed them toward for-hire carriage. We conclude that ownership patterns in trucking reflect the importance of both incomplete contracts and of job design and measurement issues. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=4&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322156981 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Wages and Employment in the United States and Germany: What Explains the Differences? PaulBeaudry David A.Green 573 602 Over the last 20 years the wage-education relationships in the United States and Germany have evolved very differently, while the education compositions of employment have evolved in a parallel fashion. In this paper, we show how these patterns shed light on the nature of recent technological change and highlight the importance of taking into account movements in the ratio of human capital to physical capital when examining changes in the returns to skill. Our analysis indicates that the United States could have prevented the increase in wage inequality observed in the 1980's by a faster accumulation of physical capital. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=5&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322156990 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Dynamic Speculative Attacks ChristopheChamley 603 621 This paper presents a model of rational Bayesian agents with speculative attacks in a regime of exchange rate which is pegged within a band. Speculators learn from the observation of the exchange rate within the band whether their mass is sufficiently large for a successful attack. Multiple periods are necessary for the existence of speculative attacks. Various defense policies are analyzed. A trading policy by the central bank may defend the peg if it is unobserved and diminishes the market's information for the coordination of speculators. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=6&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157007 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article The Performance of Forecast-Based Monetary Policy Rules Under Model Uncertainty AndrewLevin VolkerWieland John C.Williams 622 645 We investigate the performance of forecast-based monetary policy rules using five macroeconomic models that reflect a wide range of views on aggregate dynamics. We identify the key characteristics of rules that are robust to model uncertainty; such rules respond to the one-year-ahead inflation forecast and to the current output gap and incorporate a substantial degree of policy inertia. In contrast, rules with longer forecast horizons are less robust and are prone to generating indeterminacy. Finally, we identify a robust benchmark rule that performs very well in all five models over a wide range of policy preferences. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=7&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157016 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Optimal Design of Research Contests Yeon-KooChe IanGale 646 671 Procurement of an innovation often requires substantial effort by potential suppliers. Motivating effort may be difficult if the level of effort and quality of the resulting innovation are unverifiable, if innovators cannot benefit directly by marketing their innovations, and if the buyer cannot extract up-front payments from suppliers. We study the use of contests to procure an innovation in such an environment. An auction in which two suppliers are invited to innovate and then bid their prizes is optimal in a large class of contests. If contestants are asymmetric, it is optimal to handicap the most efficient one. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=8&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157025 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article What Do Bargainers' Preferences Look Like? Experiments with a Convex Ultimatum Game JamesAndreoni MarcoCastillo RaganPetrie 672 685 The ultimatum game, by its all-or-nothing nature, makes it difficult to discern what kind of preferences may be generating choices. We explore a game that convexifies the decisions, allowing us a better look at the indifference curves of bargainers while maintaining the subgame-perfect equilibrium. We conclude that bargainers' preferences are convex and regular but not always monotonic. Money-maximization is the sole concern for about half of the subjects, while the other half reveal a preference for fairness. We also found, unexpectedly, the importance of risk aversion among money-maximizing proposers, which in turn generates significant bargaining power for fair-minded responders. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=9&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157034 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article One Size Fits All? Heckscher-Ohlin Specialization in Global Production Peter K.Schott 686 708 This paper introduces a new technique for testing the Heckscher-Ohlin model that allows for the possibility that countries with sufficiently disparate endowments specialize in unique subsets of goods. Results based upon industry-level data reject one-size-fits-all homogeneity in favor of Heckscher-Ohlin specialization. Results also reveal that industry-level data hide substantial intra-industry heterogeneity, violating the assumptions of the model and complicating the interpretation of results from earlier research. A methodology for adjusting industry output to reflect underlying product variation is introduced. Reestimation of the model using adjusted aggregates in place of standard industry classifications provides strong support for Heckscher-Ohlin specialization. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=10&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157043 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article A Theory of Defensive Skill-Biased Innovation and Globalization MathiasThoenig ThierryVerdier 709 728 This paper considers a dynamic model of innovations in which firms can endogenously bias the direction of technological change. Both in a North-North and North-South context, we show that, when globalization triggers an increased threat of technological leapfrogging or imitation, firms tend to respond to that threat by biasing the direction of their innovations towards skilled-labor-intensive technologies. We show that this process of defensive skill-biased innovations generates an increase in wage inequalities in both regions. We then discuss suggestive empirical evidence of the existence of defensive skill-biased technical change. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=11&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157052 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach AtilaAbdulkadiroglu TayfunSönmez 729 747 A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism. Education literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does not offer specific mechanisms. The flaws in the existing school choice plans result in appeals by unsatisfied parents. We formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle. We show that these existing plans have serious shortcomings, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=12&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157061 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Multiproduct Quality Competition: Fighting Brands and Product Line Pruning Justin P.Johnson David P.Myatt 748 774 Firms selling multiple quality-differentiated products frequently alter their product lines when a competitor enters the market. We present a model of multiproduct monopoly and duopoly using a general "upgrades" approach that yields a powerful analytical framework. We provide an explanation for the common strategies of using "fighting brands" and of product line "pruning." The optimal strategy depends on whether entry prompts an incumbent to expand or contract its total output. We also present a general condition that guarantees that a monopolist will sell but a single product. Our model addresses other issues, including intertemporal price discrimination and "damaged goods." http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=13&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157070 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Information, International Substitutability, and Globalization James E.Rauch VitorTrindade 775 791 Improved information allows home firms to rule out more potential foreign trade partners in advance of attempting to form a match. The increased responsiveness to country wage or goods price differentials resulting from this better first cut causes the general-equilibrium elasticity of substitution between national labor forces or the Armington elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported output to increase. Further results include an increase in the elasticity of domestic labor demand, an increase in the extent to which reductions in conventional trade barriers equalize national wages, and reduced "natural protection" for domestic producers. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=14&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157089 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Do Government Grants to Private Charities Crowd Out Giving or Fund-raising? JamesAndreoni A. AbigailPayne 792 812 Economists have long observed that crowding out of government grants to private charities is incomplete. The accepted belief is that givers treat the grants as imperfect substitutes for private giving. We theoretically and empirically investigate a second reason: the strategic response of a charity will be to reduce fund-raising efforts after receiving a grant. Employing panel data from arts and social service organizations, we find that government grants cause significant reductions in fund-raising. This adds a new dimension to the policy discussions - analysts should account for the behavioral responses of the charity, as well as the donors, to government grants. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=15&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157098 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: Why Is Social Security Good for the Environment? AntonioRangel 813 834 This paper studies the ability of nonmarket institutions to invest optimally in forward intergenerational goods (FIGs), such as education and the environment, when agents are selfish or exhibit paternalistic altruism. We show that backward intergenerational goods (BIGs), such as social security, play a crucial role in sustaining investment in FIGs: without them investment is inefficiently low, but with them optimal investment is possible. We also show that making the provision of BIGs mandatory crowds out the voluntary provision of FIGs, and that population aging can increase investment in FIGs. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=16&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157106 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Relational Incentive Contracts JonathanLevin 835 857 Standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced. This paper studies the design of self-enforced relational contracts. I show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form, but that self-enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision. With hidden information, it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions. With moral hazard, optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation. This is true even if performance measures are subjective, in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=17&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157115 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Does Banning Affirmative Action Lower College Student Quality? JimmyChan ErikEyster 858 872 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=18&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157124 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Verifying the Solution from a Nonlinear Solver: A Case Study B. D.McCullough H. D.Vinod 873 892 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=19&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157133 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation JamesAndreoni WilliamHarbaugh LiseVesterlund 893 902 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=20&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157142 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Risk Sharing and Industrial Specialization: Regional and International Evidence SebnemKalemli-Ozcan Bent E.Sørensen OvedYosha 903 918 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=21&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157151 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement and Regulation William P.Rogerson 919 926 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=22&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157160 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Caballero Meets Bewley: The Permanent-Income Hypothesis in General Equilibrium NengWang 927 936 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=23&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157179 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Consequences of Bank Distress During the Great Depression Charles W.Calomiris Joseph R.Mason 937 947 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=24&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157188 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article An Empirical Analysis of the Risk Properties of Human Capital Returns IgnacioPalacios-Huerta 948 964 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=25&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157197 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Collusive Practices in Repeated English Auctions: Experimental Evidence on Bidding Rings Owen R.Phillips Dale J.Menkhaus Kalyn T.Coatney 965 979 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=26&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157205 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Estimating the Knowledge-Capital Model of the Multinational Enterprise: Comment Bruce A.Blonigen Ronald B.Davies KeithHead 980 994 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=27&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157214 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Estimating the Knowledge-Capital Model of the Multinational Enterprise: Reply David L.Carr James R.Markusen Keith E.Maskus 995 1001 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=28&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157223 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article An Asset Allocation Puzzle: Comment HaimShalit ShlomoYitzhaki 1002 1008 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=29&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157232 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Endogenous Growth Without Scale Effects: Comment Chol-WonLi 1009 1017 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=30&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157241 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 93 3 June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003 Journal Article Auditors' Report/Audited Financial Statements 1018 1025 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=31&issue_date=June 2003 10.1257/000282803322157250 b.org/aer/ 92 2 May 2002 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=92&issue=2&issue_date=May 2002 Journal Article The Case Against Intellectual Property MicheleBoldrinDepartment of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455 DavidLevineDepartment of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90024 209 212 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=92&issue=2&article=38&issue_date=May 2002 10.1257/000282802320189267 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 92 2 May 2002 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=92&issue=2&issue_date=May 2002 Journal Article When Should We Use Intellectual Property Rights? PaulRomerGraduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94035 213 216 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=92&issue=2&article=39&issue_date=May 2002 10.1257/000282802320189276 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 92 2 May 2002 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=92&issue=2&issue_date=May 2002 Journal Article On the Supply of Creative Work: Evidence from the Movies Kai-LungHuiSchool of Computing, National University of Singapore, 3 Science Drive 2, Singapore 117543, Singapore I. P. L.PngSchool of Computing, National University of Singapore, 3 Science Drive 2, Singapore 117543, Singapore 217 220 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=92&issue=2&article=40&issue_date=May 2002 10.1257/000282802320189285 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 92 2 May 2002 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=92&issue=2&issue_date=May 2002 Journal Article 150 Years of Patent Protection JoshL