<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Front Matter</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>i</ppf>
<ppl>viii</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Includes: Daniel Kahneman: Distinguished Fellow 2011</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.i</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.i</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Collateral Channel: How Real Estate Shocks Affect Corporate Investment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Thomas</gnm><snm>Chaney</snm><aff>U Chicago</aff></au>
<au><gnm>David</gnm><snm>Sraer</snm><aff>Bendheim Center for Finance, Princeton U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>David</gnm><snm>Thesmar</snm><aff>HEC Paris</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2381</ppf>
<ppl>2409</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>What is the impact of real estate prices on corporate investment? In
the presence of financing frictions, firms use pledgeable assets as collateral to finance new projects. Through this collateral channel, shocks to the value of real estate can have a large impact on aggregate investment. To compute the sensitivity of investment to collateral value, we use local variations in real estate prices as shocks to the collateral value of firms that own real estate. Over the 1993-2007 period, the representative US corporation invests $0.06 out of each
$1 of collateral. (JEL D22, G31, R30)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2381</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2381</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20091306_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Modeling the Change of Paradigm: Non-Bayesian Reactions to Unexpected News</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Pietro</gnm><snm>Ortoleva</snm><aff>CA Institute of Technology</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2410</ppf>
<ppl>36</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Bayes' rule has two well-known limitations: 1) it does not model the
reaction to zero-probability events; 2) a sizable empirical evidence documents systematic violations of it. We characterize axiomatically an alternative updating rule, the Hypothesis Testing model. According
to it, the agent follows Bayes' rule if she receives information to which she assigned a probability above a threshold. Otherwise, she looks at a prior over priors, updates it using Bayes' rule for second-order
priors, and chooses the prior to which the updated prior over priors assigns the highest likelihood. We also present an application to equilibrium refinement in game theory. (JEL D11, D81, D83)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2410</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2410</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Markups and Firm-Level Export Status</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Jan</gnm><snm>De Loecker</snm><aff>Princeton U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Frederic</gnm><snm>Warzynski</snm><aff>Aarhus U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2437</ppf>
<ppl>71</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>In this paper, we develop a method to estimate markups using plant-level
production data. Our approach relies on cost-minimizing producers and the existence of at least one variable input of production. The suggested empirical framework relies on the estimation of a production function and provides estimates of plant-level markups without specifying how firms compete in the product market. We rely on our method to explore the relationship between markups and export behavior. We find that markups are estimated significantly higher when controlling for unobserved productivity; that exporters charge, on average, higher markups and that markups increase upon export entry. (JEL D22, D24, F14, L11, L60)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2437</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2437</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20090747_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20090747_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Evolution of Brand Preferences: Evidence from Consumer Migration</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Bart J.</gnm><snm>Bronnenberg</snm><aff>Tilburg U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Jean-Pierre H.</gnm><snm>Dube</snm><aff>U Chicago</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Matthew</gnm><snm>Gentzkow</snm><aff>U Chicago</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2472</ppf>
<ppl>2508</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We study the long-run evolution of brand preferences, using new data on consumers' life histories and purchases of consumer packaged goods. Variation in where consumers have lived in the past allows us to isolate the causal effect of past experiences on current purchases, holding constant contemporaneous supply-side factors. We
show that brand preferences form endogenously, are highly persistent, and explain 40 percent of geographic variation in market shares. Counterfactuals suggest that brand preferences create large entry barriers and durable advantages for incumbent firms and can explain the persistence of early-mover advantage over long periods. (JEL D12, L11, M31, M37)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2472</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2472</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20100941_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20100941_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Contribution of Large and Small Employers to Job Creation in Times of High and Low Unemployment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Giuseppe</gnm><snm>Moscarini</snm><aff>Yale U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Fabien</gnm><snm>Postel-Vinay</snm><aff>U Bristol</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2509</ppf>
<ppl>39</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We document a negative correlation, at business cycle frequencies, between the net job creation rate of large employers and the level of aggregate unemployment that is much stronger than for small employers. The differential growth rate of employment between initially large and small employers has an unconditional correlation of -0.5 with the unemployment rate, and varies by about 5 percent over the business cycle. We exploit several datasets from the United States, Denmark, and France, both repeated cross sections and job flows with employer longitudinal information, spanning the last four decades and several business cycles. We discuss implications for theories of factor demand. (JEL D22, E23, E32, J23, L25)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2509</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2509</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20091077_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20091077_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Rise of the Service Economy</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Francisco J.</gnm><snm>Buera</snm><aff>Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and UCLA</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Joseph P.</gnm><snm>Kaboski</snm><aff>U Notre Dame</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2540</ppf>
<ppl>69</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper analyzes the role of specialized high-skilled labor in the disproportionate growth of the service sector. Empirically, the importance of skill-intensive services has risen during a period of increasing relative wages and quantities of high-skilled labor. We develop a theory in which demand shifts toward more skill-
intensive output as productivity rises, increasing the importance of market services relative to home production. Consistent with the data, the theory predicts a rising level of skill, skill premium, and relative price of services that is linked to this skill premium. (JEL J24, L80, L90)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2540</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2540</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20070991_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20070991_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Liquidity, Monetary Policy, and the Financial Crisis: A New Monetarist Approach</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Stephen D.</gnm><snm>Williamson</snm><aff>Washington U in St Louis and Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2570</ppf>
<ppl>2605</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>A model of public and private liquidity integrates financial intermediation
theory with a New Monetarist monetary framework. Non-passive fiscal policy and costs of operating a currency system imply that an optimal policy deviates from the Friedman rule. A liquidity trap can exist in equilibrium away from the Friedman rule, and there exists a permanent nonneutrality of money, driven by an illiquidity effect. Financial frictions can produce a financial-crisis phenomenon that can be mitigated by conventional open market operations working in an unconventional manner. Private asset purchases by the central bank are either irrelevant or they reallocate credit and redistribute income. (JEL E13, E44, E52, E62, G01)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2570</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2570</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>How General Are Risk Preferences? Choices under Uncertainty in Different Domains</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Liran</gnm><snm>Einav</snm><aff>Stanford U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Amy</gnm><snm>Finkelstein</snm><aff>MIT</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Iuliana</gnm><snm>Pascu</snm><aff>MIT</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Mark R.</gnm><snm>Cullen</snm><aff>Stanford U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2606</ppf>
<ppl>38</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We analyze the extent to which individuals' choices over five employer-provided insurance coverage decisions and one 401(k) investment decision exhibit systematic patterns, as would be implied by a general utility component of risk preferences. We provide evidence consistent with an important domain-general component that operates across all insurance choices. We find a considerably weaker relationship between one's insurance decisions and 401(k) asset allocation, although this relationship appears larger for more "financially sophisticated" individuals. Estimates from a stylized coverage choice model suggest that up to 30 percent of our sample makes choices that may be consistent across all 6 domains. (JEL D12, D14, D81, G22, J33)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2606</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2606</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20100050_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20100050_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Sinking, Swimming, or Learning to Swim in Medicare Part D</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Jonathan D.</gnm><snm>Ketcham</snm><aff>AZ State U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Claudio</gnm><snm>Lucarelli</snm><aff>Cornell U and LDI, U PA</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Eugenio J.</gnm><snm>Miravete</snm><aff>U TX</aff></au>
<au><gnm>M. Christopher</gnm><snm>Roebuck</snm><aff>RXEconomics, Hunt Valley, MD</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2639</ppf>
<ppl>73</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Under Medicare Part D, senior citizens choose prescription drug insurance offered by numerous private insurers. We examine nonpoor enrollees- actions in 2006 and 2007 using panel data. Our sample reduced overspending by $298 on average, with gains by 81 percent of them. The greatest improvements were by those who overspent most in 2006 and by those who switched plans. Decisions to switch depended on individuals' overspending in 2006 and on individual-specific effects of changes in their current plans. The oldest consumers and those initiating medications for Alzheimer's disease improved by more than average, suggesting that real-world institutions help overcome cognitive limitations. (JEL D14, G22, H51, I13, I18)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2639</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2639</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20100605_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Maturity, Indebtedness, and Default Risk</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Satyajit</gnm><snm>Chatterjee</snm><aff>Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Burcu</gnm><snm>Eyigungor</snm><aff>Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2674</ppf>
<ppl>99</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We advance quantitative-theoretic models of sovereign debt by proving
the existence of a downward sloping equilibrium price function for long-term debt and implementing a novel method to accurately compute it. We show that incorporating long-term debt allows the model to match Argentina's average external debt-to-output ratio,
average spread on external debt, the standard deviation of spreads, and simultaneously improve upon the model's ability to account for Argentina's other cyclical facts. We also investigated the welfare properties of maturity length and showed that if the possibility of self-fulfilling rollover crises is taken into account, long-term debt is superior to short-term debt. (JEL E23, E32, F34, O11, O19)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2674</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2674</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20090138_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20090138_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Trade Costs, Asset Market Frictions, and Risk Sharing</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Doireann</gnm><snm>Fitzgerald</snm><aff>Stanford U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2700</ppf>
<ppl>2733</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>I use bilateral import data to test for and quantify the importance of trade costs and asset market frictions in explaining the failure of perfect international consumption risk sharing. I find that while frictions in international asset markets significantly impede optimal consumption risk sharing between developed and developing countries
over the period 1970-2000, developed countries are close to optimal risk sharing with each other. Trade costs, in contrast, significantly impede risk sharing for all countries. (JEL E21, E44, F14, F41, G15)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2700</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2700</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20070490_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20070490_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Disaster Risk and Business Cycles</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Francois</gnm><snm>Gourio</snm><aff>Boston U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2734</ppf>
<ppl>66</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Motivated by the evidence that risk premia are large and countercyclical,
this paper studies a tractable real business cycle model with a small risk of economic disaster, such as the Great Depression. An increase in disaster risk leads to a decline of employment, output, investment, stock prices, and interest rates, and an increase in the
expected return on risky assets. The model matches well data on quantities, asset prices, and particularly the relations between quantities and prices, suggesting that variation in aggregate risk plays a significant role in some business cycles. (JEL E13, E32, E44, G32)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2734</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2734</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20100375_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20100375_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>David</gnm><snm>Rahman</snm><aff>U MN</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2767</ppf>
<ppl>97</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Suppose that providing incentives for a group of individuals in a strategic context requires a monitor to detect their deviations. What about the monitor's deviations? To address this question, I propose a contract that makes the monitor responsible for monitoring, and thereby provides incentives even when the monitor's observations are not only private, but costly, too. I also characterize exactly when such a contract can provide monitors with the right incentives to perform. In doing so, I emphasize virtual enforcement and suggest its implications for the theory of repeated games. (JEL C78, D23, D82, D86)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2767</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2767</doi>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20090980_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Reset Price Inflation and the Impact of Monetary Policy Shocks</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Mark</gnm><snm>Bils</snm><aff>U Rochester</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Peter J.</gnm><snm>Klenow</snm><aff>Stanford U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Benjamin A.</gnm><snm>Malin</snm><aff>Federal Reserve Board</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2798</ppf>
<ppl>2825</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Many business cycle models use a flat short-run Phillips curve, due to time-dependent pricing and strategic complementarities, to explain fluctuations in real output. But, in doing so, these models predict unrealistically high persistence and stability of US inflation in recent decades. We calculate "reset price inflation"--based on new prices chosen by the subsample of price changers--to dissect this discrepancy. We find that the models generate too much persistence and stability both in reset price inflation and in the way reset price inflation is converted into actual inflation. Our findings present a challenge to existing explanations for business cycles. (JEL E31, E52)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2798</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2798</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20090247_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20090247_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Physician Agency and Adoption of Generic Pharmaceuticals</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Toshiaki</gnm><snm>Iizuka</snm><aff>U Tokyo</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2826</ppf>
<ppl>58</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>I examine physician agency in health care services in the context of the choice between brand-name and generic pharmaceuticals. I examine micro-panel data from Japan, where physicians can legally make profits by prescribing and dispensing drugs. The results indicate
that physicians often fail to internalize patient costs, explaining
why cheaper generics are infrequently adopted. Doctors respond to markup differentials between the two versions, indicating another agency problem. However, generics' markup advantages are shortlived, which limits their impact on increasing generic adoption.
Additionally, state dependence and heterogeneous doctor preferences
affected generics' adoption. Policy makers can target these factors to improve static efficiency. (JEL D82, I11, J44, L65)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2826</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2826</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20090599_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20090599_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Is the Volatility of the Market Price of Risk Due to Intermittent Portfolio Rebalancing?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>YiLi</gnm><snm>Chien</snm><aff>Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Harold</gnm><snm>Cole</snm><aff>U PA</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Hanno</gnm><snm>Lustig</snm><aff>UCLA</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2859</ppf>
<ppl>96</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Our paper examines whether the failure of unsophisticated investors to rebalance their portfolios can help to explain the countercyclical volatility of aggregate risk compensation in financial markets. To answer this question, we set up a model in which a large mass of investors do not rebalance their portfolio shares in response to aggregate shocks, while a smaller mass of active investors do. We find that intermittent rebalancers more than double the effect of aggregate shocks on the time variation in risk premia by forcing active traders to sell more shares in good times and buy more shares in bad times. (JEL D14, E32, G11, G12)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2859</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2859</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20100568_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20100568_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Sandeep</gnm><snm>Baliga</snm><aff>Northwestern U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Tomas</gnm><snm>Sjostrom</snm><aff>Rutgers U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2897</ppf>
<ppl>2922</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Two players choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. An "extremist," who can either be a hawk or a dove, attempts to manipulate decision making. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist increases the likelihood of conflict, and reduces welfare, by sending a public message
which triggers hawkish behavior from both players. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist instead sends a public message which causes one player to become more dovish and the other more hawkish. A hawkish (dovish) extremist is unable to manipulate decision making if actions are strategic substitutes (complements). (JEL D74, D82)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2897</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2897</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Xavier</gnm><snm>Gine</snm><aff>World Bank and BREAD, Washington, DC</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Jessica</gnm><snm>Goldberg</snm><aff>U MD</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Dean</gnm><snm>Yang</snm><aff>U MI and BREAD, Ann Arbor, MI</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2923</ppf>
<ppl>54</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We implemented a randomized field experiment in Malawi examining borrower responses to being fingerprinted when applying for loans. This intervention improved the lender's ability to implement dynamic repayment incentives, allowing it to withhold future loans from past defaulters while rewarding good borrowers with better loan terms. As predicted by a simple model, fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk, but had no effect for the rest of the borrowers. We provide unique evidence that this improvement in repayment rates is accompanied by behaviors consistent with less adverse selection and lower moral hazard. (JEL D14, D82, G21, O12, O16)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2923</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2923</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20101090_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20101090_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Testing Models of Consumer Search Using Data on Web Browsing and Purchasing Behavior</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Babur</gnm><snm>De Los Santos</snm><aff>IN U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Ali</gnm><snm>Hortacsu</snm><aff>U Chicago</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Matthijs R.</gnm><snm>Wildenbeest</snm><aff>IN U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2955</ppf>
<ppl>80</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Using a large dataset on web browsing and purchasing behavior we test to what extent consumers are searching in accordance to various search models. We find that the benchmark model of sequential search with a known price distribution can be rejected based on recall patterns found in the data as well as the absence of dependence of search decisions on prices. Our findings suggest fixed sample size search provides a more accurate description of search behavior. We then utilize the fixed sample size search model to estimate demand elasticities of online bookstores in an environment where store preferences are heterogeneous. (JEL D12, D83, L81)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2955</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2955</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20100200_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Inequality at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>David</gnm><snm>Card</snm><aff>U CA, Berkeley</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Alexandre</gnm><snm>Mas</snm><aff>Princeton U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Enrico</gnm><snm>Moretti</snm><aff>U CA, Berkeley</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Emmanuel</gnm><snm>Saez</snm><aff>U CA, Berkeley</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2981</ppf>
<ppl>3003</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We study the effect of disclosing information on peers' salaries on workers' job satisfaction and job search intentions. A randomly chosen subset of University of California employees was informed about a new website listing the pay of University employees. All employees were then surveyed about their job satisfaction and job search intentions. Workers with salaries below the median for their pay unit and occupation report lower pay and job satisfaction and a significant increase in the likelihood of looking for a new job. Above-median earners are unaffected. Differences in pay rank matter more than differences in pay levels. (JEL I23, J28, J31, J64)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.2981</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.2981</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20110453_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20110453_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Credit Traps</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Efraim</gnm><snm>Benmelech</snm><aff>Northwestern U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Nittai K.</gnm><snm>Bergman</snm><aff>MIT</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>3004</ppf>
<ppl>32</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper studies the limitations of monetary policy in stimulating credit and investment. We show that, under certain circumstances, unconventional monetary policies fail in that liquidity
injections into the banking sector are hoarded and not lent out. We use the term "credit traps" to describe such situations and show how they can arise due to the interplay between financing
frictions, liquidity, and collateral values. We show that small contractions in monetary policy can lead to a collapse in lending. Our analysis demonstrates how quantitative easing may be useful in increasing collateral prices, bank lending, and aggregate investment. (JEL E44, E52, E58, G01)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.3004</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.3004</doi>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20100818_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Economic Growth with Bubbles</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Alberto</gnm><snm>Martin</snm><aff>CREI, U Pompeu Fabra</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Jaume</gnm><snm>Ventura</snm><aff>CREI, U Pompeu Fabra</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>3033</ppf>
<ppl>58</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We develop a stylized model of economic growth with bubbles in which changes in investor sentiment lead to the appearance and collapse of macroeconomic bubbles or pyramid schemes. These bubbles mitigate the effects of financial frictions. During bubbly episodes, unproductive investors demand bubbles while productive investors supply them. These transfers of resources improve economic efficiency thereby expanding consumption, the capital stock and output. When bubbly episodes end, there is a fall in consumption, the capital stock and output. We argue that the stochastic equilibria of the model provide a natural way of introducing bubble shocks into business cycle models. (JEL E22, E23, E32, E44, O41)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.3033</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.3033</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>David Y.</gnm><snm>Albouy</snm><aff>U MI</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>3059</ppf>
<ppl>76</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson's (2001) seminal article argues property-rights institutions powerfully affect national income, using estimated mortality rates of early European settlers to instrument capital expropriation risk. However, 36 of the 64 countries in the sample are assigned
mortality rates from other countries, often based on mistaken or conflicting evidence. Also, incomparable mortality rates from populations of laborers, bishops, and soldiers--often on campaign--are combined in a manner that favors the hypothesis. When these data issues are controlled for, the relationship between mortality and expropriation risk lacks robustness, and
instrumental-variable estimates become unreliable, often with infinite confidence intervals. (JEL D02, E23, F54, I12, N40, O43, P14)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.3059</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.3059</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20041216_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>102</vol>
<iss>6</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=102&issue=6</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Daron</gnm><snm>Acemoglu</snm><aff>MIT</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Simon</gnm><snm>Johnson</snm><aff>MIT</aff></au>
<au><gnm>James A.</gnm><snm>Robinson</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>3077</ppf>
<ppl>3110</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) established that economic institutions today are correlated with expected mortality of European colonialists. David Albouy argues this relationship is not robust. He drops all data from Latin America and much of the data from
Africa, making up almost 60 percent of our sample, despite much information on the mortality of Europeans in those places during the colonial period. He also includes a "campaign" dummy that
is coded inconsistently; even modest corrections undermine his claims. We also show that limiting the effect of outliers strengthens our results, making them robust to even extreme versions of Albouy's critiques. (JEL D02, E23, F54, I12, N40, O43, P14)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.6.3077</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.102.6.3077</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/oct2012/20110390_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


