American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Journal Article Front Matter i vi Includes "Ronald W. Jones: Distinguished Fellow 2010" http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.i 10.1257/aer.100.3.i American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems ElinorOstromIN U and Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, AZ State U 641 72 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.641 10.1257/aer.100.3.641 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression Oliver E.WilliamsonU CA, Berkeley 673 90 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.673 10.1257/aer.100.3.673 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles Product Creation and Destruction: Evidence and Price Implications ChristianBrodaU Chicago David E.WeinsteinColumbia U 691 723 This paper describes the extent of product creation and destruction in a large sector of the US economy. We find four times more entry and exit in product markets than is found in labor markets because most product turnover happens within firms. Net product creation is strongly procyclical and primarily driven by creation rather than destruction. We find that a cost-of-living index that takes product turnover into account is 0.8 percentage points per year lower than a "fixed goods" price index like the CPI. The procyclicality of the bias implies that business cycles are more volatile than indicated by official statistics. (JEL E31, E32, L11, O31) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.691 10.1257/aer.100.3.691 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20070334_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel JohnAskerNYU 724 62 This paper examines bidding in over 1,700 knockout auctions used by a bidding cartel (or ring) of stamp dealers in the 1990s. The knockout was conducted using a variant of the model studied by Daniel Graham, Robert Marshall, and Jean-Francois Richard (1990). Following a reduced form examination of these data, damages, induced inefficiency, and the ring's benefit from colluding are estimated using a structural model in the spirit of Emmanuel Guerre, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong (2000). A notable finding is that nonring bidders suffered damages that were of the same order of magnitude as those of the sellers. (JEL D43, D44, L12) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.724 10.1257/aer.100.3.724 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20071457_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks Christina D.RomerU CA, Berkeley David H.RomerU CA, Berkeley 763 801 This paper investigates the impact of tax changes on economic activity. We use the narrative record, such as presidential speeches and Congressional reports, to identify the size, timing, and principal motivation for all major postwar tax policy actions. This analysis allows us to separate legislated changes into those taken for reasons related to prospective economic conditions and those taken for more exogenous reasons. The behavior of output following these more exogenous changes indicates that tax increases are highly contractionary. The effects are strongly significant, highly robust, and much larger than those obtained using broader measures of tax changes. (JEL E32, E62, H20, N12) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.763 10.1257/aer.100.3.763 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20080421_data.zip http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20080421_app.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders WilliamFuchsU CA, Berkeley AndrzejSkrzypaczStanford U 802 36 We study dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and arrival of exogenous events, which represent arrival of traders or information. We characterize the unique limit of stationary equilibria with frequent offers. The possibility of arrivals changes equilibrium dynamics. There is delay in equilibrium, and the seller slowly screens out buyers with higher valuations. The seller payoff equals what he can achieve by simply awaiting an arrival. In applications, when buyer valuations fall, average prices drop and delay increases. Surplus division depends on relative arrival rates of buyers/sellers and expected time to trade is a nonmonotonic function of the arrival rate. (JEL C78, D82) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.802 10.1257/aer.100.3.802 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20070795_app.pdf American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles Emissions Trading, Electricity Restructuring, and Investment in Pollution Abatement MeredithFowlieU CA, Berkeley 837 69 This paper analyzes an emissions trading program that was introduced to reduce smog-causing pollution from large stationary sources. Using variation in state level electricity industry restructuring activity, I identify the effect of economic regulation on pollution permit market outcomes. There are two main findings. First, deregulated plants in restructured electricity markets were less likely to adopt more capital intensive environmental compliance options as compared to regulated or publicly owned plants. Second, as a consequence of heterogeneity in electricity market regulations, a larger share of the permitted pollution is being emitted in states where air quality problems tend to be more severe. (JEL L51, L94, L98, Q53, Q58) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.837 10.1257/aer.100.3.837 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20061121_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles Infrequent Portfolio Decisions: A Solution to the Forward Discount Puzzle PhilippeBacchettaU Lausanne and Swiss Finance Institute Ericvan WincoopU VA 870 904 A major puzzle in international finance is that high interest rate currencies tend to appreciate (forward discount puzzle). Motivated by the fact that only a small fraction of foreign currency holdings is actively managed, we calibrate a two-country model in which agents make infrequent portfolio decisions. We show that the model can account for the forward discount puzzle. It can also account for several related empirical phenomena, including that of "delayed overshooting." We also show that making infrequent portfolio decisions is optimal as the welfare gain from active currency management is smaller than the corresponding fees. (JEL F31, G11, G15) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.870 10.1257/aer.100.3.870 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20060918_data.zip http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20060918_app.pdf American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles A New Approach to Estimating the Production Function for Housing DennisEppleCarnegie Mellon U BrettGordonColumbia U HolgerSiegCarnegie Mellon U 905 24 Dating to the classic works of Alonso, Mills, and Muth, the production function for housing has played a central role in urban economics and local public finance. This paper provides a new flexible approach for estimating the housing production function which treats housing quantities and prices as latent variables. The empirical analysis is based on a comprehensive database of recently built properties in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. We find that the new method proposed in this paper works well in the application and provides reasonable estimates for the underlying production function. (JEL C51, D24, R11, R31) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.905 10.1257/aer.100.3.905 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20070499_data.zip http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20070499_app.pdf American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles Technology Adoption with Exit in Imperfectly Informed Equity Markets KatrinTinnU Essex 925 57 This paper focuses on the importance of equity markets in facilitating the exit of entrepreneurs investing in technology. Entrepreneurs' willingness to invest and aggregate output is affected in two opposite ways. First, uncertainty about equity price or lack of market liquidity discourages technology adoption. This can explain slow technology adoption and limited participation by venture capitalists in underdeveloped equity markets. Second, fast adoption is a positive signal to imperfectly informed equity market participants. This provides a rational explanation for overpricing technology stocks and overinvestment in developed markets. Fast adoption is most probable at an intermediate quality of information. (JEL D82, E23, G12, G31, G32, O33) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.925 10.1257/aer.100.3.925 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles Is a Donor in Hand Better Than Two in the Bush? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment Craig E.LandryEast Carolina U AndreasLangeU MD John A.ListU Chicago Michael K.PriceU TN Nicholas G.RuppEast Carolina U 958 83 This study examines why people initially give to charities, why they remain committed to the cause, and what factors attenuate these influences. Using an experimental design that links donations across distinct treatments separated in time, we present several results. For example, previous donors are more likely to give, and contribute more, than other donor types. Yet, how previous donors were acquired is critical: agents initially attracted by an economic mechanism are more likely to continue giving than agents attracted by a nonmechanism factor. From a methodological viewpoint, our study showcases the benefit of moving beyond an experimental design that focuses on short-run substitution effects. (JEL C93, D64, D82, H41, L31, Z12) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.958 10.1257/aer.100.3.958 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20071036_data.zip http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20071036_app.pdf American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth Telling and Deception in Sender-Receiver Games Joseph Tao-yiWangNational Taiwan U MichaelSpezioCA Institute of Technology and Scripps College Colin F.CamererCA Institute of Technology 984 1007 We report experiments on sender-receiver games with an incentive for senders to exaggerate. Subjects "overcommunicate" -- messages are more informative of the true state than they should be, in equilibrium. Eyetracking shows that senders look at payoffs in a way that is consistent with a level-k model. A combination of sender messages and lookup patterns predicts the true state about twice as often as predicted by equilibrium. Using these measures to infer the state would enable receiver subjects to hypothetically earn 16-21 percent more than they actually do, an economic value of 60 percent of the maximum increment. (JEL C72, C91, D82, Z13) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.984 10.1257/aer.100.3.984 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20060468_data.zip http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20060468_app.pdf American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles Trade Shocks and Labor Adjustment: A Structural Empirical Approach ErhanArtuçKoc U ShubhamChaudhuriWorld Bank JohnMcLarenU VA 1008 45 The welfare effects of trade shocks turn on the nature and magnitude of the costs workers face in moving between sectors. Using an Euler-type equilibrium condition derived from a rational expectations model of dynamic labor adjustment, we estimate the mean and variance of workers' switching costs from the US CPS. We estimate high values of both parameters, implying slow adjustment of the economy and sharp movements in wages in response to trade shocks. However, import-competing workers can still benefit from tariff removal; liberalization lowers their wages in the short and long run but raises their option value.(JEL E24, F13, F16) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.1008 10.1257/aer.100.3.1008 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20071369_data.zip http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20071369_app.pdf American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles Investment and Usage of New Technologies: Evidence from a Shared ATM Network StijnFerrariCatholic U Leuven and National Bank of Belgium FrankVerbovenCatholic U Leuven HansDegryseTilburg U 1046 79 The success of new technologies depends on both the firms' investment and consumers' usage decisions. We study this problem in a shared ATM network. Inefficiencies may arise because banks coordinate investment, and consumers may not make proper use of the network. Based on an empirical model of ATM investment and demand, we find that banks substantially underinvested in ATMs, in contrast with earlier findings of strategic overinvestment in the United States. Furthermore, ATM usage was too low, because regulation prohibited fees for cash withdrawals. A direct promotion of investment improves welfare, but fees for branch cash withdrawals would be more effective. (JEL G21, G31, O33) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.1046 10.1257/aer.100.3.1046 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20071405_data.zip http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20071405_app.pdf American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles Intertemporal Consumption and Credit Constraints: Does Total Expenditure Respond to an Exogenous Shock to Credit? SørenLeth-PetersenU Copenhagen 1080 1103 There is continuing controversy over the importance of credit constraints. This paper investigates whether total household expenditure and debt is affected by an exogenous increase in access to credit provided by a credit market reform that enabled Danish house owners to use housing equity as collateral for consumption loans. We find that the magnitude of the response is correlated with the amount of equity released by the reform and that the effect is strongest for younger households. Even for this group, the response was moderate. The aggregate effect of the reform was significant but small. (JEL D14, D91, E21) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.1080 10.1257/aer.100.3.1080 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20041006_data.zip http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20041006_app.pdf American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles A Theory of Optimal Random Crackdowns JanEeckhoutICREA-Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona NicolaPersicoNYU Petra E.ToddU PA 1104 35 An incentives based theory of policing is developed which can explain the phenomenon of random "crackdowns," i.e., intermittent periods of high interdiction/ surveillance. For a variety of police objective functions, random crackdowns can be part of the optimal monitoring strategy. We demonstrate support for implications of the crackdown theory using traffic data gathered by the Belgian Police Department and use the model to estimate the deterrence effect of additional resources spent on speeding interdiction. (JEL K42, R41) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.1104 10.1257/aer.100.3.1104 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20080323_data.zip http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20080323_app.pdf American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles Peddling Influence through Intermediaries WeiLiU CA, Riverside and U British Columbia 1136 62 A sender may communicate with a decision maker through intermediaries. In this model, an objective sender and intermediary pass on information truthfully, while biased ones favor a particular agenda but also have reputational concerns. I show that the biased sender and the biased intermediary's reporting truthfulness are strategic complements. The biased sender is less likely to use an intermediary than an objective sender if his reputational concerns are low, but more likely to do so if his reputational concerns are moderate. Moreover, the biased sender may be more likely to use an intermediary perceived to be more biased. (JEL D82, D83) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.1136 10.1257/aer.100.3.1136 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20071322_app.pdf American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles The Burden of the Nondiversifiable Risk of Entrepreneurship Robert E.HallStanford U Susan E.WoodwardSand Hill Econometrics, Palo Alto, CA 1163 94 Entrepreneurship is risky. We study the risk facing a well-documented and important class of entrepreneurs, those backed by venture capital. Using a dynamic program, we calculate the certainty-equivalent of the difference between the cash rewards that entrepreneurs actually received over the past 20 years and the cash that entrepreneurs would have received from a risk-free salaried job. The payoff to a venture-backed entrepreneur comprises a below-market salary and a share of the equity value of the company when it goes public or is acquired. We find that the typical venture-backed entrepreneur received an average of $5.8 million in exit cash. Almost three-quarters of entrepreneurs receive nothing at exit and a few receive over a billion dollars. Because of the extreme dispersion of payoffs, an entrepreneur with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of two places a certainty equivalent value only slightly greater than zero on the distribution of outcomes she faces at the time of her company's launch. (JEL G24, G32, L26, M13) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.1163 10.1257/aer.100.3.1163 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20080777_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Articles What Causes Industry Agglomeration? Evidence from Coagglomeration Patterns GlennEllisonMIT Edward L.GlaeserHarvard U William R.KerrHarvard U 1195 1213 Why do firms cluster near one another? We test Marshall's theories of industrial agglomeration by examining which industries locate near one another, or coagglomerate. We construct pairwise coagglomeration indices for US manufacturing industries from the Economic Census. We then relate coagglomeration levels to the degree to which industry pairs share goods, labor, or ideas. To reduce reverse causality, where collocation drives input-output linkages or hiring patterns, we use data from UK industries and from US areas where the two industries are not collocated. All three of Marshall's theories of agglomeration are supported, with input-output linkages particularly important. (JEL L14, L60, O33, R23, R32) http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.1195 10.1257/aer.100.3.1195 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20070331_data.zip http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20070331_app.pdf American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Shorter Papers Specific Capital and Vintage Effects on the Dynamics of Unemployment and Vacancies BurcuEyigungorKoc U 1214 37 In a reasonably calibrated Mortensen and Pissarides matching model, shocks to average labor productivity can account for a small portion of the fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies (Shimer (2005)). I add heterogeneity in jobs (matches) with respect to the time the job is created in the form of different embodied technology levels. I also introduce specific capital that, once adapted for a match, has less value in another match. I show that the augmented model can account for fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies, and that specific capital is important to decreasing the volatility of the destruction rate of existing matches. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.1214 10.1257/aer.100.3.1214 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20080246_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Shorter Papers Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability? ThomasDohmenResearch Centre for Education and the Labour Market, Maastricht U ArminFalkU Bonn DavidHuffmanSwarthmore College UweSundeU St Gallen 1238 60 This paper investigates whether there is a link between cognitive ability, risk aversion, and impatience, using a representative sample of roughly 1,000 German adults. Subjects participate in choice experiments with monetary incentives measuring risk aversion, and impatience over an annual horizon, and conduct two different, widely used, tests of cognitive ability. We find that lower cognitive ability is associated with greater risk aversion, and more pronounced impatience. These relationships are significant, and robust to controlling for personal characteristics, education, income, and measures of credit constraints. We perform a series of additional robustness checks, which help rule out other possible confounds. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.1238 10.1257/aer.100.3.1238 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20080180_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Shorter Papers Policy Reversal Espen R.MoenNorwegian School of Management ChristianRiisNorwegian School of Management 1261 68 We analyze the existence of policy reversal, the phenomenon sometimes observed that a certain policy (say extreme left-wing) is implemented by the "unlikely" (right-wing) party. We formulate a Downsian signaling model where the incumbent government, through its choice of policy, reveals information both regarding own preferences and external circumstances that may call for a particular policy. We show that policy reversal may indeed exist as an equilibrium phenomenon. This is partly because the incumbent party has superior opportunities to reveal information, and partly because its reputation protects a left-wing incumbent when advertising a right-wing policy. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.1261 10.1257/aer.100.3.1261 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Shorter Papers Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets: Empirical Evidence from Contract Changes in Southern California: Comment Christopher T.TaylorUS Federal Trade Commission Nicholas M.KreisleUS Federal Trade Commission Paul R.ZimmermanUS Federal Trade Commission 1269 76 In a paper in the March 2004 AER, Justine Hastings concludes that the acquisition of an independent gasoline retailer, Thrifty, by a vertically integrated firm, ARCO, is associated with sizable price increases at competing stations. To better understand the mechanism to which she attributes this effect -- which combines vertical integration and rebranding -- we attempted but ultimately failed to reproduce the results using alternative data. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.1269 10.1257/aer.100.3.1269 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Shorter Papers Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets: Empirical Evidence from Contract Changes in Southern California: Reply JustineHastingsYale U 1277 79 In their comment, Taylor, Kreisle and Zimmerman use gasoline price data taken from fleet card transactions at selected gasoline stations to re-examine a subset of results presented in Hastings (2004). Bringing new data to re-examine the question is a helpful contribution. Both data sets have limitations, potentially causing differences in the estimated effect. I worked with the authors to explore and understand the differences in the data sets and how they impact the estimates in both analyses, and conclude that the effects sizes are likely smaller in areas of overlap between the two data sets. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.1277 10.1257/aer.100.3.1277 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20071200_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Shorter Papers Antidumping Investigations and the Pass-Through of Antidumping Duties and Exchange Rates: Comment Brian D.KellySeattle U 1280 82 Blonigen and Haynes (2002) calculated that pass-through of antidumping duty estimates to U.S. pricing of 200% would be required to eliminate potential antidumping duties. However, this calculation was based on an error in interpretation of U.S. antidumping practice, that antidumping duties themselves are subtracted in an antidumping calculation. In fact there is no such subtraction, and a pass-through of 100% theoretically suffices to eliminate potential antidumping duties. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.1280 10.1257/aer.100.3.1280 American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Shorter Papers Antidumping Investigations and the Pass-Through of Antidumping Duties and Exchange Rates: Reply Bruce A.BlonigenU OR Stephen E.HaynesU OR 1283 84 This reply responds to a comment that correctly identifies an invalid assumption in our original article that antidumping (AD) duties are subtracted from the U.S. price when calculating AD duties in administrative reviews. While this point invalidates our theoretical explanation and empirical evidence on the magnitude of AD duty pass-through, it does not affect our original article's theory or empirical evidence on the magnitude of exchange rate pass-through, or the presence of structural breaks in both the AD duty and exchange-rate pass-through coefficients stemming from AD investigations and orders. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.1283 10.1257/aer.100.3.1283 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2010/20090962_data.zip American Economic Association Nashville, TN 0002-8282 American Economic Review http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ 100 3 June 2010 http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=3 Reports Independent Auditor's Report 1285 1293 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3.1285 10.1257/aer.100.3.1285