<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Front Matter</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>i</ppf>
<ppl>iv</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Front Matter includes photograph of Angus S. Deaton as part of a series of photographs of past presidents of the Association.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.i</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.i</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Price Indexes, Inequality, and the Measurement of World Poverty</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Angus</gnm><snm>Deaton</snm><aff>Princeton U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>5</ppf>
<ppl>34</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>I discuss the measurement of world poverty and inequality, with particular
attention to the role of purchasing power parity (PPP) price indexes from the
International Comparison Project. Global inequality increased with the latest
revision of the ICP, and this reduced the global poverty line relative to the
US dollar. The recent large increase of nearly half a billion poor people came
from an inappropriate updating of the global poverty line, not from the ICP
revisions. Even so, PPP comparisons between widely different countries rest
on weak theoretical and empirical foundations. I argue for wider use of self-reports
from international monitoring surveys, and for a global poverty line
that is truly denominated in US dollars. (JEL C43, D31, I31, I32, F31)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.5</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.5</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Learning about a New Technology: Pineapple in Ghana</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Timothy G.</gnm><snm>Conley</snm><aff>U Chicago</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Christopher R.</gnm><snm>Udry</snm><aff>Yale U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>35</ppf>
<ppl>69</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper investigates the role of social learning in the diffusion of a new agricultural
technology in Ghana. We use unique data on farmers' communication
patterns to define each individual's information neighborhood. Conditional on
many potentially confounding variables, we find evidence that farmers adjust
their inputs to align with those of their information neighbors who were surprisingly
successful in previous periods. The relationship of these input adjustments
to experience further indicates the presence of social learning. In addition,
applying the same method to input choices for another crop, of known technology,
correctly indicates an absence of social learning effects. (JEL D83, O13,
O33, Q16)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.35</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.35</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20050697_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Multiple-Product Firms and Product Switching</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Andrew B.</gnm><snm>Bernard</snm><aff>Dartmouth College</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Stephen J.</gnm><snm>Redding</snm><aff>London School of Economics</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Peter K.</gnm><snm>Schott</snm><aff>Yale U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>70</ppf>
<ppl>97</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper examines the frequency, pervasiveness, and determinants of product
switching by US manufacturing firms. We find that one-half of firms alter
their mix of five-digit SIC products every five years, that product switching is
correlated with both firm- and firm-product attributes, and that product adding
and dropping induce large changes in firm scope. The behavior we observe is
consistent with a natural generalization of existing theories of industry dynamics
that incorporates endogenous product selection within firms. Our findings
suggest that product switching contributes to a reallocation of resources within
firms toward their most efficient use. (JEL L11, L21, L25, L60)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.70</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.70</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20060523_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20060523_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>"Momma's Got the Pill": How Anthony Comstock and Griswold v. Connecticut Shaped US Childbearing</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Martha J.</gnm><snm>Bailey</snm><aff>U MI</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>98</ppf>
<ppl>129</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The 1960s ushered in a new era in US demographic history characterized by
significantly lower fertility rates and smaller family sizes. What catalyzed these
changes remains a matter of considerable debate. This paper exploits idiosyncratic
variation in the language of "Comstock" statutes, enacted in the late
1800s, to quantify the role of the birth control pill in this transition. Almost 50
years after the contraceptive pill appeared on the US market, this analysis provides
new evidence that it accelerated the post-1960 decline in marital fertility.
(JEL J12, J13, K10, N31, N32)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.98</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.98</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20071025_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20071025_app.zip</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Matching and Sorting in Online Dating</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Gunter J.</gnm><snm>Hitsch</snm><aff>U Chicago</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Ali</gnm><snm>Horta&ccedil;su</snm><aff>U Chicago</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Dan</gnm><snm>Ariely</snm><aff>Duke U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>130</ppf>
<ppl>63</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Using data on user attributes and interactions from an online dating site, we
estimate mate preferences, and use the Gale-Shapley algorithm to predict stable
matches. The predicted matches are similar to the actual matches achieved
by the dating site, and the actual matches are approximately efficient. Out-of-
sample predictions of offline matches, i.e., marriages, exhibit assortative
mating patterns similar to those observed in actual marriages. Thus, mate preferences,
without resort to search frictions, can generate sorting in marriages.
However, we underpredict some of the correlation patterns; search frictions
may play a role in explaining the discrepancy. (JEL C78, J12)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.130</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.130</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20080317_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Entry, Exit, and Investment-Specific Technical Change</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Roberto M.</gnm><snm>Samaniego</snm><aff>George Washington U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>164</ppf>
<ppl>92</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Using European data, this paper finds that (i) industry entry and exit rates
are positively related to industry rates of investment-specific technical change
(ISTC); and (ii) the sensitivity of industry entry and exit rates to cross-country
differences in entry costs depends on industry rates of ISTC. The paper constructs
a general equilibrium model in which the rate of ISTC varies across
industries and new investment-specific technologies can be introduced by
entrants or by incumbents. In the calibrated model, equilibrium behavior is
consistent with stylized facts (i) and (ii), provided the cost of technology adoption
is increasing in the rate of ISTC. (JEL G31, L11, O31, O33)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.164</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.164</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20071415_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Patient Cost-Sharing and Hospitalization Offsets in the Elderly</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Amitabh</gnm><snm>Chandra</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Jonathan</gnm><snm>Gruber</snm><aff>MIT</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Robin</gnm><snm>McKnight</snm><aff>Wellesley College</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>193</ppf>
<ppl>213</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>In the Medicare program, increases in cost sharing by a supplemental insurer
can exert financial externalities. We study a policy change that raised patient
cost sharing for the supplemental insurer for retired public employees in
California. We find that physician visits and prescription drug usage have elasticities
that are similar to those of the RAND Health Insurance Experiment
(HIE). Unlike the HIE, however, we find substantial "offset" effects in terms of
increased hospital utilization. The savings from increased cost sharing accrue
mostly to the supplemental insurer, while the costs of increased hospitalization
accrue mostly to Medicare. (JEL G22, I12, I18, J14)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.193</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.193</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20070254_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Contractibility and the Design of Research Agreements</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Josh</gnm><snm>Lerner</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Ulrike</gnm><snm>Malmendier</snm><aff>U CA, Berkeley</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>214</ppf>
<ppl>46</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We analyze how contractibility affects contract design. A major concern when
designing research agreements is that researchers use their funding to subsidize
other projects. We show that, when research activities are not contractible, an
option contract is optimal. The financing firm obtains the option to terminate
the agreement and, in case of termination, broad property rights. The threat
of termination deters researchers from cross-subsidization, and the cost of
exercising the termination option deters the financing firm from opportunistic
termination. We test this prediction using 580 biotechnology research agreements.
Contracts with termination options are more common when research is
non-contractible. (JEL D86, L65, O31, O34)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.214</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.214</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20050382_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20050382_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Multinationals and Anti-sweatshop Activism</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Ann</gnm><snm>Harrison</snm><aff>World Bank and U CA, Berkeley</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Jason</gnm><snm>Scorse</snm><aff>Monterey Institute of International Studies</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>247</ppf>
<ppl>73</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>During the 1990s, anti-sweatshop activists campaigned to improve conditions
for workers in developing countries. This paper analyzes the impact of anti-sweatshop
campaigns in Indonesia on wages and employment. Identification is
based on comparing the wage growth of workers in foreign-owned and exporting
firms in targeted regions or sectors before and after the initiation of anti-sweatshop
campaigns. We find the campaigns led to large real wage increases
for targeted enterprises. There were some costs in terms of reduced investment,
falling profits, and increased probability of closure for smaller plants, but we
fail to find significant effects on employment. (JEL F23, J31, J81, L67, O14, O15)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.247</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.247</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20051333_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Robustly Optimal Monetary Policy with Near-Rational Expectations</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Michael</gnm><snm>Woodford</snm><aff>Columbia U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>274</ppf>
<ppl>303</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The paper considers optimal monetary stabilization policy in a forward-looking
model, when the central bank recognizes that private sector expectations
need not be precisely model-consistent, and wishes to choose a policy that will
be as good as possible in the case of any beliefs that are close enough to model-consistency.
It is found that commitment continues to be important for optimal
policy, that the optimal long-run inflation target is unaffected by the degree of
potential distortion of beliefs, and that optimal policy is even more history-dependent
than if rational expectations are assumed. (JEL C62, D84, E13, E31,
E32, E52)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.274</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.274</doi>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20060096_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Currency Choice and Exchange Rate Pass-Through</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Gita</gnm><snm>Gopinath</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Oleg</gnm><snm>Itskhoki</snm><aff>Princeton U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Roberto</gnm><snm>Rigobon</snm><aff>MIT</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>304</ppf>
<ppl>36</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We show, using novel data on currency and prices for US imports, that even
conditional on a price change, there is a large difference in the exchange
rate pass-through of the average good priced in dollars (25 percent) versus
nondollars
(95 percent). We document this to be the case across countries and
within disaggregated sectors. This finding contradicts the assumption in an
important class of models that the currency of pricing is exogenous. We present
a model of endogenous currency choice in a dynamic price setting environment
and show that the predictions of the model are strongly supported by the data.
(JEL E31, F14, F31)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.304</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.304</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20071160_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Demographics and the Politics of Capital Taxation in a Life-Cycle Economy</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Xavier</gnm><snm>Mateos-Planas</snm><aff>U Southampton</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>337</ppf>
<ppl>63</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This article studies the effects of demographics on the mix of tax rates on labor
and capital. It uses a quantitative general-equilibrium, overlapping-generations
model where tax rates are voted without past commitments in every period
and characterized as a Markov equilibrium. In the United States, the younger
voting-age population in 1990 compared to 1965 accounts for the observed
decline in the relative capital tax rate between those two years. A younger population
raises the net return to capital, leads voters to increase their savings,
and results in a preference for lower taxes on capital. Conversely, aging might
increase capital taxation. (JEL E13, H24, H25, J11)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.337</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.337</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20031131_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20031131_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Can Multistage Production Explain the Home Bias in Trade?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Kei-Mu</gnm><snm>Yi</snm><aff>Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>364</ppf>
<ppl>93</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>A large empirical literature finds that there is too little international trade
and too much intranational trade to be rationalized by observed international
trade costs, such as tariffs and transport costs. This paper investigates whether
a model in which the nature of production can change in response to trade
costs -- a framework with multistage production -- can better explain the home
bias in trade. The calibrated model can explain about two-fifths of the Canada
border effect, about two-and-one-half times that of a model with one production
stage. The model also explains a significant fraction of Canada-US "back-and-
forth," or vertical specialization, trade. (JEL F11, F13, F14)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.364</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.364</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20051057_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Henrik</gnm><snm>Horn</snm><aff>Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Giovanni</gnm><snm>Maggi</snm><aff>Yale U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Robert W.</gnm><snm>Staiger</snm><aff>Stanford U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>394</ppf>
<ppl>419</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We propose a model of trade agreements in which contracting is costly, and as
a consequence the optimal agreement may be incomplete. In spite of its simplicity,
the model yields rich predictions on the structure of the optimal trade
agreement and how this depends on the fundamentals of the contracting environment.
We argue that taking contracting costs explicitly into account can
help explain a number of key features of real trade agreements. (JEL D86, F13)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.394</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.394</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Intergroup Conflict and Intra-group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Klaus</gnm><snm>Abbink</snm><aff>CBESS, U East Anglia</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Jordi</gnm><snm>Brandts</snm><aff>U Autonoma de Barcelona and CSIC</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Benedikt</gnm><snm>Herrmann</snm><aff>U Nottingham</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Henrik</gnm><snm>Orzen</snm><aff>U Mannheim</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>420</ppf>
<ppl>47</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being
groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation
stems from the analysis of sociopolitical conflict. The theoretical prediction
is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether
punishment is available. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are
substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above equilibrium.
Second, allowing group members to punish each other leads to even larger conflict
expenditures. These results contrast with those from public goods experiments
where punishment enhances efficiency. (JEL C72, D74, H41)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.420</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.420</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20071485_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Sylvain</gnm><snm>Chassang</snm><aff>Princeton U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>448</ppf>
<ppl>65</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper studies how agents with conflicting interests learn to cooperate
when the details of cooperation are not common knowledge. It considers a
repeated game in which one player has incomplete information about when
and how her partner can provide benefits. Initially, monitoring is imperfect
and cooperation requires inefficient punishment. As the players' common history
grows, the uninformed player can learn to monitor her partner's actions,
which allows players to establish more efficient cooperative routines. Because
revealing information is costly, it may be optimal not to reveal all the existing
information, and efficient equilibria can be path-dependent. (JEL C73, D82,
D83, D86)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.448</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.448</doi>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20080226_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Interpersonal Authority in a Theory of the Firm</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Eric</gnm><snm>Van den Steen</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>466</ppf>
<ppl>90</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper develops a theory of the firm in which a firm's centralized asset
ownership and low-powered incentives give the manager, as an equilibrium
outcome, interpersonal authority over employees (in a world with open disagreement).
The paper thus provides micro-foundations for the idea that bringing
a project inside the firm gives the manager control over that project, while
explaining concentrated asset ownership, low-powered incentives, and centralized
authority as typical characteristics of firms. The paper also leads to new
perspectives on the firm as a legal entity and on the relationship between the
Knightian and Coasian views of the firm. (JEL D23, L20)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.466</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.466</doi>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20070558_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Some New Evidence</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Sophocles</gnm><snm>Mavroeidis</snm><aff>Brown U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>491</ppf>
<ppl>503</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>I revisit the question of indeterminacy in US monetary policy using limited-information identification-robust methods. I find that the conclusions of Clarida, Gal&iacute;, and Gernter (2000) that policy was inactive before 1979 are robust, but the evidence over the Volcker-Greenspan periods is inconclusive. I show that this is in fact consistent with policy being active over that period. Problems of identification also arise because policy reaction has been more gradual recently. At a methodological level, the paper demonstrates that identification issues should be taken seriously, and that identification-robust methods can be informative even when they produce wide confidence sets. (E31, E32, E52, E65,)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.491</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.491</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20071447_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20071447_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Jeffrey</gnm><snm>Carpenter</snm><aff>Middlebury College and IZA</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Peter Hans</gnm><snm>Matthews</snm><aff>Middlebury College and IZA</aff></au>
<au><gnm>John</gnm><snm>Schirm</snm><aff>Google, San Francisco, CA</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>504</ppf>
<ppl>17</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Tournaments can elicit more effort but sabotage may attenuate the effect of competition. Because it is hard to separate effort and ability, the evidence on tournaments is thin. There is even less evidence on sabotage because these acts often consist of subjective peer evaluation or "office politics." We discuss real effort experiments in which quality adjusted output and office politics are compared under piece rates and tournaments and find that tournaments increase effort only in the absence of office politics. Competitors subvert each other more in tournaments, and as a result, workers produce less because they expect to be sabotaged. (D82, M54)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.504</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.504</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20071123_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20071123_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Financial Exchange Rates and International Currency Exposures</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Philip R.</gnm><snm>Lane</snm><aff>Trinity College Dublin</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Jay C.</gnm><snm>Shambaugh</snm><aff>Dartmouth College</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>518</ppf>
<ppl>40</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>In order to gain a better empirical understanding of the international financial implications of currency movements, we construct a database of international currency exposures for a large panel of countries over 1990-2004. We show that trade-weighted exchange rate indices are insufficient to understand the financial impact of currency movements and that our currency measures have high explanatory power for the
valuation term in net foreign asset dynamics. Exchange rate valuation shocks are sizable, not quickly reversed, and may entail substantial wealth redistributions. Further, we show that many developing countries have substantially reduced their negative foreign currency positions over the last decade. (F31, F32, G15)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.518</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.518</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20071105_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Urs</gnm><snm>Fischbacher</snm><aff>U Konstanz and Thurgau Institute of Economics</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Simon</gnm><snm>Gachter</snm><aff>CESifo and IZA</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>541</ppf>
<ppl>56</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contributions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-world settings. We show that the decline of cooperation is driven by individual preferences for imperfect conditional cooperation. Many people's desire to contribute less than others, rather than changing beliefs of what others will contribute over time or people's heterogeneity in preferences makes voluntary cooperation fragile. Universal free riding thus eventually emerges, despite the fact that most people are not selfish. (D12, D 83, H41, Z13)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.541</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.541</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20060029_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20060029_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Risk and Time Preferences: Linking Experimental and Household Survey Data from Vietnam</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Tomomi</gnm><snm>Tanaka</snm><aff>AZ State U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Colin F.</gnm><snm>Camerer</snm><aff>CA Institute of Technology</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Quang</gnm><snm>Nguyen</snm><aff>U Lumiere Lyon II</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>557</ppf>
<ppl>71</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We conducted experiments in Vietnamese villages to determine the predictors of risk and time preferences. In villages with higher mean income, people are less loss-averse and more patient. Household income is correlated with patience but not with risk. We expand measurements of risk and time preferences beyond expected utility and exponential discounting, replacing those models with prospect theory and a three-parameter hyperbolic discounting model. Comparable risk parameter estimates have been found for Chinese farmers, using our method. (C83, D12, O12, P38)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.557</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.557</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20060431_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20060431_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers Revisited</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Kenneth A.</gnm><snm>Couch</snm><aff>U CT</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Dana W.</gnm><snm>Placzek</snm><aff>State of CT Department of Labor</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>572</ppf>
<ppl>89</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Earnings losses of Connecticut workers affected by mass layoff are calculated using administrative data. Estimated reductions are initially more than 30 percent and six years later, as much as 15 percent. The Connecticut estimates are smaller than comparable ones from Pennsylvania administrative data but similar to those from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and Department of Workforce Services (DWS). Earnings reductions in Connecticut and Pennsylvania are concentrated among Unemployment Insurance recipients. An unusually high proportion of Unemployment Insurance beneficiaries in Pennsylvania explains the larger estimated losses relative to other studies. Fixed-effects, random growth, and matching estimators produced similar earnings loss estimates suggesting each is relatively unbiased in this context. (J31, J 63, J65, R23)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.572</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.572</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20060515_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20060515_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Effect of Medicare Part D on Pharmaceutical Prices and Utilization</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Mark</gnm><snm>Duggan</snm><aff>U MD</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Fiona</gnm><snm>Scott Morton</snm><aff>Yale U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>590</ppf>
<ppl>607</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Medicare Part D began coverage of prescription drugs in 2006. Rather than setting pharmaceutical prices, the government contracted with private insurers to provide drug coverage. Theory suggests that additional insured consumers will raise the optimal price of a branded drug, while the insurer's ability to move demand to substitute treatments may lower prices. We estimate the program's effect on the price and utilization of pharmaceutical treatments. We find that Part D enrollees paid substantially lower prices than while uninsured, and increased their utilization of prescription drugs. We find relative price declines only for drugs with significant therapeutic competition.  (L18, L11, L65)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.590</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.590</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20080264_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Generalizing the Taylor Principle: Comment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Roger E. A.</gnm><snm>Farmer</snm><aff>UCLA</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Daniel F.</gnm><snm>Waggoner</snm><aff>Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Tao</gnm><snm>Zha</snm><aff>Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and Emory U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>608</ppf>
<ppl>17</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Troy Davig and Eric Leeper (2007) have proposed a condition they call the generalized Taylor principle to rule out indeterminate equilibria in a version of the new-Keynesian
model where the parameters of the policy rule follow a Markov-switching process. We show that although their condition rules out a subset of indeterminate equilibria, it does not establish uniqueness of the fundamental equilibrium. We discuss the differences between indeterminate fundamental equilibria included by Davig and Leeper's condition and fundamental equilibria that their condition misses. (E12, E31, E43, E52)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.608</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.608</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Generalizing the Taylor Principle: Reply</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Troy</gnm><snm>Davig</snm><aff>Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Eric M.</gnm><snm>Leeper</snm><aff>IN U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>618</ppf>
<ppl>24</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2009) (FWZ) show that a new Keynesian model with regime-switching monetary policy can support multiple solutions, appearing to contradict findings in Davig and Leeper (2007) (DL). The explanation is straightforward: FWZ derive solutions using a model that differs from the one to which the DL conditions apply. The FWZ solutions also require that the exogenous driving process is a function of private and policy parameters. This undermines the sharp distinctions among "deep parameters" typical of optimizing models and makes it difficult to ascribe economic interpretations to FWZ's additional solutions. (E12, E31, E43, E52)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.618</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.618</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>All-or-Nothing Monitoring: Comment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Bo</gnm><snm>Chen</snm><aff>Southern Methodist U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>625</ppf>
<ppl>27</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Zhao (2008) presents an interesting "all-or-nothing monitoring" result for a multitask moral hazard agency problem with partial effort observation. We argue that the optimal contract based on the non-verifiable observation of the agent's effort in Zhao (2008) can be regarded as a limitation on the incentive schemes available to the principal. I then propose some arguably more appropriate approaches for analyzing such agency problems. (D82, D86, M54)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.625</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.625</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Betrayal Aversion: Evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States: Comment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Gary E.</gnm><snm>Bolton</snm><aff>PA State U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Axel</gnm><snm>Ockenfels</snm><aff>U Cologne</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>628</ppf>
<ppl>33</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>In a series of binary choice problems, we investigate how a chooser's risk taking changes when others share in their personal risk, either equally or unequally. We find that when the safe option yields inequality, the risky option is taken significantly more often. On the other hand, the inequality resulting from the risky choice does not affect risk taking. We also find that choosers tend to be less risk-averse in a one-person context compared to when the risk also affects the payoff of another. (C72, D81, Z13)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.628</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.628</doi>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar2010/20081034_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>100</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2010</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=AER&volume=100&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Excellence in Refereeing Award</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>634</ppf>
<ppl>635</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.634</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.100.1.634</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


