Replication data for: Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination—Large-Scale Experimental Evidence
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Francesco Feri; Bernd Irlenbusch; Matthias Sutter
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Feri, Francesco, Irlenbusch, Bernd, and Sutter, Matthias. Replication data for: Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination—Large-Scale Experimental Evidence. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2010. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112376V1
Project Description
Summary:
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The need for efficient coordination is ubiquitous in organizations and industries. The literature on the determinants of efficient coordination has focused on individual decision making so far. In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. We present a series of coordination experiments with a total of 1,101 participants. We find that teams of three subjects each coordinate much more efficiently than individuals. This finding adds one important cornerstone to the recent literature on the conditions for successful coordination. We explain the differences between individuals and teams using the experience weighted attraction learning model. (JEL C71, C91, D23, D83, M54 )
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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C71 Cooperative Games
C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
D23 Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
M54 Personnel Economics: Labor Management
C71 Cooperative Games
C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
D23 Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
M54 Personnel Economics: Labor Management
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