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Project Citation: 

Besley, Timothy, and Persson, Torsten. Replication data for: The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113314V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes. This paper develops a framework where "policy choices" in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past investments in legal and fiscal capacity. It studies the economic and political determinants of such investments, demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity are typically complements. The results show that, among other things, common interest public goods, such as fighting external wars, as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions, are conducive to building state capacity. Some correlations in cross-country data are consistent with the theory. (JEL D72, E62, H11, H20, P14)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
      E62 Fiscal Policy
      H11 Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
      H20 Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
      P14 Capitalist Systems: Property Rights


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