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Project Citation: 

Pagano, Marco, and Volpin, Paolo F. Replication data for: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2005. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-06. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116060V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We analyze the political determinants of investor and employment protection. Our model predicts that proportional electoral systems are conducive to weaker investor protection and stronger employment protection than majoritarian systems. This prediction is consistent with international panel data evidence. The proportionality of the voting system is significantly and negatively correlated with shareholder protection in a panel of 45 countries, and positively correlated with employment protection in a panel of 21 OECD countries. Other political variables also affect regulatory outcomes, especially for the labor market. The origin of the legal system has some additional explanatory power only for employment protection.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
      K22 Business and Securities Law


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