Replication data for: The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Philippe Gagnepain; Marc Ivaldi; David Martimort
Version: View help for Version V1
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MS-AER-2010-1108-Gagnepain-Ivaldi-Martimort-Data-and-Programs | 10/19/2021 01:58:PM | ||
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/11/2019 03:15:PM |
Project Citation:
Gagnepain, Philippe, Ivaldi, Marc, and Martimort, David. Replication data for: The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112676V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Contract theory claims that renegotiation prevents attainment of
the efficient solution that could be obtained under full commitment.
Assessing the cost of renegotiation remains an open issue from an
empirical viewpoint. We fit a structural principal-agent model with
renegotiation on a set of contracts for urban transport services. The
model captures two important features of the industry as only two
types of contracts are used (fixed price and cost-plus) and subsidies
are greater following a cost-plus contract than following a fixed price
one. We conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment
would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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Transport operators
JEL Classification:
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D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
L51 Economics of Regulation
L92 Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
R42 Transportation Economics: Government and Private Investment Analysis; Road Maintenance, Transportation Planning
R48 Transportation Economics: Government Pricing and Policy
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
L51 Economics of Regulation
L92 Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
R42 Transportation Economics: Government and Private Investment Analysis; Road Maintenance, Transportation Planning
R48 Transportation Economics: Government Pricing and Policy
Geographic Coverage:
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France
Time Period(s):
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1987 – 2002
Data Type(s):
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administrative records data;
observational data
Methodology
Data Source:
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Survey conducted by the Centre d'Etude et de Recherche du Transport Urbain (CERTU, Lyon) with the support of the Groupement des Autorites Responsables du Transport (GART, Paris).
Unit(s) of Observation:
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Operator - year,
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