Replication data for: Group Size and Incentives to Contribute: A Natural Experiment at Chinese Wikipedia
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang; Feng Zhu
Version: View help for Version V1
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AER-2009_0165.R1_data | 10/11/2019 03:53:PM | ||
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/11/2019 11:53:AM |
Project Citation:
Zhang, Xiaoquan (Michael), and Zhu, Feng. Replication data for: Group Size and Incentives to Contribute: A Natural Experiment at Chinese Wikipedia. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112440V1
Project Description
Summary:
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The literature on the private provision of public goods suggests an inverse relationship between incentives to contribute and group size. We find, however, that after an exogenous reduction of group size at Chinese Wikipedia, the nonblocked contributors decrease their contributions by 42.8 percent on average. We attribute the cause to social effects: contributors receive social benefits that increase with both the amount of their contributions and group size, and the shrinking group size weakens these social benefits. Consistent with our explanation, we find that the more contributors value social benefits, the more they reduce their contributions after the block. (JEL H41, L17, L82)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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H41 Public Goods
L17 Open Source Products and Markets
L82 Entertainment; Media
H41 Public Goods
L17 Open Source Products and Markets
L82 Entertainment; Media
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