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Project Citation: 

Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, Spezio, Michael, and Camerer, Colin F. Replication data for: Pinocchio’s Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth Telling and Deception in Sender-Receiver Games. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2010. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112362V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We report experiments on sender-receiver games with an incentive for senders to exaggerate. Subjects "overcommunicate" -- messages are more informative of the true state than they should be, in equilibrium. Eyetracking shows that senders look at payoffs in a way that is consistent with a level-k model. A combination of sender messages and lookup patterns predicts the true state about twice as often as predicted by equilibrium. Using these measures to infer the state would enable receiver subjects to hypothetically earn 16-21 percent more than they actually do, an economic value of 60 percent of the maximum increment. (JEL C72, C91, D82, Z13)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C72 Noncooperative Games
      C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification


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