Replication data for: Cooperation among Strangers under the Shadow of the Future
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Gabriele Camera; Marco Casari
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
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LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/12/2019 05:37:AM |
basicstats.do | text/plain | 5.9 KB | 10/12/2019 05:37:AM |
privatem14.dta | application/octet-stream | 8.2 KB | 10/12/2019 05:37:AM |
privatem14.txt | text/plain | 16.1 KB | 10/12/2019 05:37:AM |
privatemonitoring_large_economies14.do | text/plain | 995 bytes | 10/12/2019 05:37:AM |
probit_table4.do | text/plain | 27.2 KB | 10/12/2019 05:37:AM |
readme_for_dataset.pdf | application/pdf | 7 KB | 10/12/2019 05:37:AM |
strangerdata.dta | application/octet-stream | 396.6 KB | 10/12/2019 05:37:AM |
strangerdata.txt | text/plain | 752.6 KB | 10/12/2019 05:37:AM |
variable_list_n14.pdf | application/pdf | 6.1 KB | 10/12/2019 05:37:AM |
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Project Citation:
Camera, Gabriele, and Casari, Marco. Replication data for: Cooperation among Strangers under the Shadow of the Future. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113310V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We study the emergence of norms of cooperation in experimental economies
populated by strangers interacting indefinitely. Can these economies achieve
full efficiency even without formal enforcement institutions? Which institutions
for monitoring and enforcement facilitate cooperation? Finally, what classes of
strategies do subjects employ? We find that, first, cooperation can be sustained
even in anonymous settings; second, some type of monitoring and punishment
institutions significantly promote cooperation; and, third, subjects mostly
employ strategies that are selective in punishment. (JEL C71, C73, D12, Z13)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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C71 Cooperative Games
C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
C71 Cooperative Games
C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
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