Replication data for: Violence and Risk Preference: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Michael Callen; Mohammad Isaqzadeh; James D. Long; Charles Sprenger
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Callen, Michael, Isaqzadeh, Mohammad, Long, James D., and Sprenger, Charles. Replication data for: Violence and Risk Preference: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2014. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112721V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We investigate the relationship between violence and economic risk
preferences in Afghanistan combining: (i) a two-part experimental
procedure identifying risk preferences, violations of Expected Utility,
and specific preferences for certainty; (ii) controlled recollection of
fear based on established methods from psychology; and (iii) administrative
violence data from precisely geocoded military records. We
document a specific preference for certainty in violation of Expected
Utility. The preference for certainty, which we term a Certainty
Premium, is exacerbated by the combination of violent exposure
and controlled fearful recollections. The results have implications
for risk taking and are potentially actionable for policymakers and
marketers.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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A12 Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
A12 Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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