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Project Citation: 

Friedman, Daniel, and Oprea, Ryan. Replication data for: A Continuous Dilemma. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2012. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112495V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We study prisoners' dilemmas played in continuous time with flow payoffs accumulated over 60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation is about 90 percent. Control sessions with repeated matchings over eight subperiods achieve less than half as much cooperation, and cooperation rates approach zero in one-shot sessions. In follow-up sessions with a variable number of subperiods, cooperation rates increase nearly linearly as the grid size decreases, and, with one-second subperiods, they approach continuous levels. Our data support a strand of theory that explains how capacity to respond rapidly stabilizes cooperation and destabilizes defection in the prisoner's dilemma. (JEL C72, C78, C91)

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms Continuous Time; Repeated Games; Prisoner's Dilemma
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C72 Noncooperative Games
      C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
      C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) experimental data

Methodology

Data Source:  View help for Data Source Laboratory experiment, collected at the UC Santa Cruz LEEPS lab.
Unit(s) of Observation:  View help for Unit(s) of Observation Individual subject decisions,

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