Replication data for: Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Attila Ambrus; Ben Greiner
Version: View help for Version V1
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AER-2010-1123_data | 10/19/2021 01:43:PM | ||
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/11/2019 02:02:PM |
Project Citation:
Ambrus, Attila, and Greiner, Ben. Replication data for: Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2012. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112568V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This paper experimentally investigates the effects of a costly punishment option on cooperation and social welfare in long, finitely
repeated public good contribution games. In a perfect monitoring
environment, increasing the severity of the potential punishment
monotonically increases average net payoffs. In a more realistic
imperfect monitoring environment, we find a U-shaped relationship.
Access to a standard punishment technology in this setting significantly decreases net payoffs, even in the long run. Access to a severe punishment technology leads to roughly the same payoffs as with no punishment option, as the benefits of increased cooperation offset the social costs of punishing. (JEL C92, H41, K42)
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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imperfect monitoring;
public good game
JEL Classification:
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C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
H41 Public Goods
K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
H41 Public Goods
K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Universe:
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people
Data Type(s):
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experimental data
Methodology
Data Source:
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collected by authors in laboratory experiment
Unit(s) of Observation:
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subjects,
groups,
Related Publications
Published Versions
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