Replication data for: Stakes Matter in Ultimatum Games
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Steffen Andersen; Seda Ertaç; Uri Gneezy; Moshe Hoffman; John A. List
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Andersen, Steffen, Ertaç, Seda, Gneezy, Uri, Hoffman, Moshe, and List, John A. Replication data for: Stakes Matter in Ultimatum Games. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112485V1
Project Description
Summary:
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One of the most robust findings in experimental economics is that individuals in one-shot ultimatum games reject unfair offers. Puzzlingly, rejections have been found robust to substantial increases in stakes. By using a novel experimental design that elicits frequent low offers and uses much larger stakes than in the literature, we are able to examine stakes' effects over ranges of data that are heretofore unexplored. Our main result is that proportionally equivalent offers are less likely to be rejected with high stakes. In fact, our paper is the first to present evidence that as stakes increase, rejection rates approach zero. (JEL: C72, C78, C91)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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C72 Noncooperative Games
C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
C72 Noncooperative Games
C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
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