Replication data for: Early Admissions at Selective Colleges
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Christopher Avery; Jonathan Levin
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
---|---|---|---|
LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/11/2019 11:08:AM |
ReadMe.doc | application/msword | 25.5 KB | 10/11/2019 11:08:AM |
analysis.do | text/plain | 16 KB | 10/11/2019 11:08:AM |
detailed-description-of-data.doc | application/msword | 63.5 KB | 10/11/2019 11:08:AM |
Project Citation:
Avery, Christopher, and Levin, Jonathan. Replication data for: Early Admissions at Selective Colleges. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2010. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112383V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
Early admissions are widely used by selective colleges and universities. We identify some basic facts about early admissions policies, including the admissions advantage enjoyed by early applicants and patterns in application behavior, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches these facts. The key feature of the model is that colleges want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, and early admissions programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm. (JEL C78, I23)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
View help for JEL Classification
C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
I23 Higher Education; Research Institutions
C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
I23 Higher Education; Research Institutions
Related Publications
Published Versions
Report a Problem
Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.
This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.