Replication data for: Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation?
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) George-Levi Gayle; Robert A. Miller
Version: View help for Version V1
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LICENSE.txt | text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/12/2019 05:58:AM |
PiM.dta | application/octet-stream | 231.7 KB | 10/12/2019 05:58:AM |
Readme.txt | text/plain | 815 bytes | 10/12/2019 05:58:AM |
forsum2.dta | application/octet-stream | 643.8 KB | 10/12/2019 05:58:AM |
olds.dta | application/octet-stream | 758.5 KB | 10/12/2019 05:58:AM |
pool_prelim1.dta | application/octet-stream | 24.9 MB | 10/12/2019 05:58:AM |
summaries_olds_news_g.do | text/plain | 12 KB | 10/12/2019 05:58:AM |
Project Citation:
Gayle, George-Levi, and Miller, Robert A. Replication data for: Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation? Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113332V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We estimate a principal-agent model of moral hazard with longitudinal data
on firms and managerial compensation over two disjoint periods spanning 60
years to investigate increased value and variability in managerial compensation.
We find exogenous growth in firm size largely explains these secular
trends in compensation. In our framework, exogenous firm size works through
two channels. First, conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers
are magnified in large firms, so optimal compensation plans are now more
closely linked to insider wealth. Second, the market for managers has become
more differentiated, increasing the premium paid to managers of large versus
small firms. (JEL D82, L25, M12, M52)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
L25 Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
M12 Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
M52 Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
L25 Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
M12 Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
M52 Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
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