Replication data for: Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation?

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) George-Levi Gayle; Robert A. Miller

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 10/12/2019 05:58:AM
PiM.dta application/octet-stream 231.7 KB 10/12/2019 05:58:AM
Readme.txt text/plain 815 bytes 10/12/2019 05:58:AM
forsum2.dta application/octet-stream 643.8 KB 10/12/2019 05:58:AM
olds.dta application/octet-stream 758.5 KB 10/12/2019 05:58:AM
pool_prelim1.dta application/octet-stream 24.9 MB 10/12/2019 05:58:AM
summaries_olds_news_g.do text/plain 12 KB 10/12/2019 05:58:AM

Project Citation: 

Gayle, George-Levi, and Miller, Robert A. Replication data for: Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation? Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113332V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We estimate a principal-agent model of moral hazard with longitudinal data on firms and managerial compensation over two disjoint periods spanning 60 years to investigate increased value and variability in managerial compensation. We find exogenous growth in firm size largely explains these secular trends in compensation. In our framework, exogenous firm size works through two channels. First, conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers are magnified in large firms, so optimal compensation plans are now more closely linked to insider wealth. Second, the market for managers has become more differentiated, increasing the premium paid to managers of large versus small firms. (JEL D82, L25, M12, M52)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      L25 Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
      M12 Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
      M52 Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects


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V1 [2019-10-12]

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