Name File Type Size Last Modified
LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 12/06/2019 10:43:AM
dataguide.pdf application/pdf 30.7 KB 12/06/2019 10:43:AM
datashadow.dta application/octet-stream 3.6 MB 12/06/2019 10:43:AM
dice.txt text/plain 427 bytes 12/06/2019 10:43:AM
maketable.do text/plain 2.9 KB 12/06/2019 10:43:AM

Project Citation: 

Bó, Pedro Dal. Replication data for: Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2005. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-06. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116074V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary While there is an extensive literature on the theory of infinitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how "the shadow of the future" affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. I simulate infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games in the lab with a random continuation rule. The experimental design represents an improvement over the existing literature by including sessions with finite repeated games as controls and a large number of players per session (which allows for learning without contagion effects). I find that the shadow of the future matters not only by significantly reducing opportunistic behavior, but also because its impact closely follows theoretical predictions.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C71 Cooperative Games
      C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games


Related Publications

Published Versions

Export Metadata

Report a Problem

Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.

This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.