Replication data for: Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 X 2 Games: Comment
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Christoph Brunner; Colin F. Camerer; Jacob K. Goeree
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Brunner, Christoph, Camerer, Colin F., and Goeree, Jacob K. Replication data for: Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 X 2 Games: Comment. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112403V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura (2008) recently reported laboratory results for completely mixed 2 X 2 games used to compare Nash equilibrium with four other stationary concepts: quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium. We reanalyze their data, correct some errors, and find that Nash clearly fits worst while the four other concepts perform about equally well. We also report new analysis of other previous experiments that illustrate the importance of the loss aversion hardwired into impulse balance equilibrium: when the other non-Nash concepts are augmented with loss aversion, they outperform impulse balance equilibrium.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
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