<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Jean-Marie</gnm><snm>Baland</snm><aff>U Notre-Dame de la Paix</aff></au>
<au><gnm>James A.</gnm><snm>Robinson</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1737</ppf>
<ppl>65</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Many employment relationships concede rents to workers. Depending on the
political institutions, the presence of such rents allows employers to use the
threat of withdrawing them to control their workers’ political behavior, such
as their votes in the absence of secret ballot. We examine the effects of the
introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958 on voting behavior. Before the
reforms, localities with more pervasive patron-client relationships tended to
exhibit a much stronger support for the right-wing parties, traditionally associated
with the landed oligarchy. After the reform, however, this difference across
localities completely disappeared. (JEL D72, N46, O13, O15, O17)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=1&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.1737</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20041237_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Costs of Remoteness: Evidence from German Division and Reunification</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Stephen J.</gnm><snm>Redding</snm><aff>London School of Economics</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Daniel M.</gnm><snm>Sturm</snm><aff>London School of Economics</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1766</ppf>
<ppl>97</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper exploits the division of Germany after the Second World War and
the reunification of East and West Germany in 1990 as a natural experiment
to provide evidence for the importance of market access for economic development.
In line with a standard new economic geography model, we find that,
following division, cities in West Germany close to the East-West German border
experienced a substantial decline in population growth relative to other
West German cities. We show that the model can account for the quantitative
magnitude of our findings and provide additional evidence against alternative
possible explanations. (JEL F15, N94, R12, R23)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=2&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.1766</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20050315_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20050315_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Response of Household Saving to the Large Shock of German Reunification</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Nicola</gnm><snm>Fuchs-Schundeln</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1798</ppf>
<ppl>1828</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>German reunification was a large, unexpected shock for East Germans.
Exploiting German reunification as a natural experiment, I analyze the validity
of the life-cycle consumption model. I derive three stylized features concerning
the saving behavior of East versus West Germans after reunification: (i)
East Germans have higher saving rates than West Germans; (ii) this East-West
gap is increasing in age at reunification; and (iii) for every cohort, this gap is
declining over time. I show that a comprehensive life-cycle model can replicate
these features. The precautionary saving motive is essential for the success of
the model. (JEL D14, D91, E21)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=3&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.1798</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20060121_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Demand for, and Impact of, Learning HIV Status</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Rebecca L.</gnm><snm>Thornton</snm><aff>U MI</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1829</ppf>
<ppl>63</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper evaluates an experiment in which individuals in rural Malawi
were randomly assigned monetary incentives to learn their HIV results after
being tested. Distance to the HIV results centers was also randomly assigned.
Without any incentive, 34 percent of the participants learned their HIV results.
However, even the smallest incentive doubled that share. Using the randomly
assigned incentives and distance from results centers as instruments for the
knowledge of HIV status, sexually active HIV-positive individuals who learned
their results are three times more likely to purchase condoms two months later
than sexually active HIV-positive individuals who did not learn their results;
however, HIV-positive individuals who learned their results purchase only two
additional condoms than those who did not. There is no significant effect of
learning HIV-negative status on the purchase of condoms. (JEL I12, O15)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=4&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.1829</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20060732_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Does Job Corps Work? Impact Findings from the National Job Corps Study</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Peter Z.</gnm><snm>Schochet</snm><aff>Mathematica Policy Research, Inc, Princeton, NJ</aff></au>
<au><gnm>John</gnm><snm>Burghardt</snm><aff>Mathematica Policy Research, Inc, Princeton, NJ</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Sheena</gnm><snm>McConnell</snm><aff>Mathematica Policy Research, Inc, Princeton, NJ</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1864</ppf>
<ppl>86</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper presents findings from an experimental evaluation of Job Corps, the
nation’s largest training program for disadvantaged youths. The study uses survey
data collected over four years and tax data over nine years on a nationwide
sample of 15,400 treatments and controls. The Job Corps model has promise;
program participation increases educational attainment, reduces criminal
activity, and increases earnings for several postprogram years. Based on tax
data, however, the earnings gains were not sustained except for the oldest participants.
Nonetheless, Job Corps is the only federal training program that has
been shown to increase earnings for this population. (JEL I28, I38, J13, J24)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=5&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.1864</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20060076_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Consumption Inequality and Partial Insurance</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Richard</gnm><snm>Blundell</snm><aff>U College London and Institute for Fiscal Studies</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Luigi</gnm><snm>Pistaferri</snm><aff>Stanford U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Ian</gnm><snm>Preston</snm><aff>U College London and Institute for Fiscal Studies</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1887</ppf>
<ppl>1921</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper examines the link between income and consumption inequality. We
create panel data on consumption for the Panel Study of Income Dynamics using
an imputation procedure based on food demand estimates from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey. We document a disjuncture between income and consumption
inequality over the 1980s and show that it can be explained by changes in
the persistence of income shocks. We find some partial insurance of permanent
shocks, especially for the college educated and those near retirement. We
find full insurance of transitory shocks except among poor households. Taxes,
transfers, and family labor supply play an important role in insuring permanent
shocks. (JEL D12, D31, D91, E21)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=6&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.1887</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20050545_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20050545_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Liquidity and Insurance for the Unemployed</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Robert</gnm><snm>Shimer</snm><aff>U Chicago</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Ivan</gnm><snm>Werning</snm><aff>MIT</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1922</ppf>
<ppl>42</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We study unemployment insurance for workers who sequentially sample job
opportunities. We focus on the optimal timing of benefits and the desirability
of allowing borrowing and saving. When workers have constant absolute risk
aversion, a simple policy is optimal: a constant benefit during unemployment,
a constant tax during employment, and free access to a riskless asset. With
constant relative risk aversion, optimal policy involves nearly constant benefits;
more elaborate policies offer minuscule welfare gains. We highlight two
distinct policy roles: ensuring workers have sufficient liquidity to smooth their
consumption; and providing unemployment subsidies to insure against uncertain
spell duration. (JEL J65)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=7&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.1922</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Ricardo J.</gnm><snm>Caballero</snm><aff>MIT</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Takeo</gnm><snm>Hoshi</snm><aff>U CA, San Diego and Tokyo Center for Economic Research</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Anil K.</gnm><snm>Kashyap</snm><aff>U Chicago and Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1943</ppf>
<ppl>77</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Large Japanese banks often engaged in sham loan restructurings that kept credit
flowing to otherwise insolvent borrowers (which we call zombies). We examine
the implications of suppressing the normal competitive process whereby the
zombies would shed workers and lose market share. The congestion created
by the zombies reduces the profits for healthy firms, which discourages their
entry and investment. We confirm that zombie-dominated industries exhibit
more depressed job creation and destruction, and lower productivity. We present
firm-level regressions showing that the increase in zombies depressed the
investment and employment growth of non-zombies and widened the productivity
gap between zombies and non-zombies. (JEL G21, G32, L25)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=8&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.1943</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20060307_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory of Offshoring</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Gene M.</gnm><snm>Grossman</snm><aff>Princeton U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Esteban</gnm><snm>Rossi-Hansberg</snm><aff>Princeton U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1978</ppf>
<ppl>97</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We propose a theory of the global production process that focuses on tradeable
tasks, and use it to study how falling costs of offshoring affect factor prices in
the source country. We identify a productivity effect of task trade that benefits
the factor whose tasks are more easily moved offshore. In the light of this effect,
reductions in the cost of trading tasks can generate shared gains for all domestic
factors, in contrast to the distributional conflict that typically results from
reductions in the cost of trading goods. (JEL F11, F16)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=9&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.1978</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Pricing-to-Market, Trade Costs, and International Relative Prices</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Andrew</gnm><snm>Atkeson</snm><aff>UCLA</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Ariel</gnm><snm>Burstein</snm><aff>UCLA</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1998</ppf>
<ppl>2031</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>International relative prices across industrialized countries show large and systematic
deviations from relative purchasing power parity. We embed a model of
imperfect competition and variable markups in a quantitative model of international
trade. We find that when our model is parameterized to match salient
features of the data on international trade and market structure in the United
States, it can reproduce deviations from relative purchasing power parity similar
to those observed in the data because firms choose to price-to-market. We
then examine how pricing-to-market depends on the presence of international
trade costs and various features of market structure. (JEL F12, F14, F31)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=10&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.1998</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20060638_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Optimal Tariffs and Market Power: The Evidence</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Christian</gnm><snm>Broda</snm><aff>U Chicago</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Nuno</gnm><snm>Limao</snm><aff>U MD</aff></au>
<au><gnm>David E.</gnm><snm>Weinstein</snm><aff>Columbia U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2032</ppf>
<ppl>65</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We find that prior to World Trade Organization membership, countries set
import tariffs 9 percentage points higher on inelastically supplied imports
relative to those supplied elastically. The magnitude of this effect is similar to
the size of average tariffs in these countries, and market power explains more of
the tariff variation than a commonly used political economy variable. Moreover,
US trade restrictions not covered by the WTO are significantly higher on goods
where the United States has more market power. We find strong evidence that
these importers have market power and use it in setting noncooperative trade
policy. (JEL F12, F13)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=11&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.2032</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20060147_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Stocks as Lotteries: The Implications of Probability Weighting for Security Prices</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Nicholas</gnm><snm>Barberis</snm><aff>Yale U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Ming</gnm><snm>Huang</snm><aff>Cornell U and Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2066</ppf>
<ppl>2100</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We study the asset pricing implications of Tversky and Kahneman's (1992)
cumulative prospect theory, with a particular focus on its probability weighting
component. Our main result, derived from a novel equilibrium with nonunique
global optima, is that, in contrast to the prediction of a standard expected utility
model, a security's own skewness can be priced: a positively skewed security
can be "overpriced" and can earn a negative average excess return. We argue
that our analysis offers a unifying way of thinking about a number of seemingly
unrelated financial phenomena. (JEL D81, G11, G12)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=12&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.2066</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Trend Inflation, Indexation, and Inflation Persistence in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Timothy</gnm><snm>Cogley</snm><aff>U CA, Davis</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Argia M.</gnm><snm>Sbordone</snm><aff>Federal Reserve Bank of New York</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2101</ppf>
<ppl>26</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Purely forward-looking versions of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC)
generate too little inflation persistence. Some authors add ad hoc backwardlooking
terms to address this shortcoming. We hypothesize that inflation persistence
results mainly from variation in the long-run trend component of
inflation, which we attribute to shifts in monetary policy. We derive a version of
the NKPC that incorporates a time-varying inflation trend and examine whether
it explains the dynamics of inflation. When drift in trend inflation is taken into
account, a purely forward-looking version of the model fits the data well, and
there is no need for backward-looking components. (JEL E12, E31, E52)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=13&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.2101</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20050242_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Contextual Inference in Markets: On the Informational Content of Product Lines</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Emir</gnm><snm>Kamenica</snm><aff>U Chicago</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2127</ppf>
<ppl>49</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Context can influence decisions. This malleability of choice is usually invoked
as evidence that people do not maximize stable preference orderings. In a market
equilibrium, however, context conveys payoff-relevant information to consumers.
Consequently, these consumers rationally violate naïve formulations
of standard choice theoretic principles. I identify informational asymmetries
under which apparently anomalous behaviors, namely the compromise effect
and choice overload, arise as market equilibria. Firms respond to consumers’
contextual inference; in case of the compromise effect, a firm may introduce
premium loss leaders (expensive goods of overly high quality that increase the
demand for other goods). (JEL D11, D83, M31)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=14&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.2127</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Conversations among Competitors</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Jeremy C.</gnm><snm>Stein</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2150</ppf>
<ppl>62</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>I develop a model of bilateral conversations in which players honestly exchange ideas with their competitors. The key to incentive compatibility is complementarity in the information structure: a player can generate a new insight only if he has access to his counterpart’s previous thoughts on a topic.  I then examine a social network in which A has a conversation with B, then B has a conversation with C, and so on.  Relatively underdeveloped ideas can travel long distances over the network. More valuable ideas, by contrast, tend to remain localized among small groups of agents.  (JEL D83)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=15&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.2150</doi>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20071005_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Effect of Credit Constraints on the College Drop-Out Decision: A Direct Approach Using a New Panel Study</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Ralph</gnm><snm>Stinebrickner</snm><aff>Berea College</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Todd</gnm><snm>Stinebrickner</snm><aff>U Western Ontario</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2163</ppf>
<ppl>84</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>A serious difficulty in determining the importance of credit constraints in education arises because standard data sources do not provide a direct way of identifying which students are credit constrained. This paper differentiates itself from previous work by taking a direct approach, made possible by unique longitudinal data from the Berea Panel Study. The results from our study of Berea College students suggest that, while credit constraints likely play an important role in the drop-out decisions of some students, the large majority of attrition of students from low-income families should be primarily attributed to reasons other than credit constraints. (JEL I21, I22)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=16&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.2163</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20060347_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20060347_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>On the Salience of Ethnic Conflict</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Joan</gnm><snm>Esteban</snm><aff>CSIC</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Debraj</gnm><snm>Ray</snm><aff>NYU</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2185</ppf>
<ppl>2202</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>A classical theme in social analysis views economic class divisions as the main cause of social conflict. Yet many, if not most of the conflicts we observe today appear to be ethnic in nature. It appears that the "vertical" nature of class divisions is often dominated by the "horizontal" antagonisms across groups delineated by noneconomic markers. This paper highlights the perverse synergy of economic inequality within ethnic groups, and its role in the salience of ethnic conflict. In a model of group formation which allows both class and ethnic groupings to emerge, we show that ethnic, as opposed to class, conflict  may be focal, and precisely in the presence of economic inequality. (JEL D72, D74)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=17&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.2185</doi>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20070003_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Adi</gnm><snm>Brender</snm><aff>Bank of Israel</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Allan</gnm><snm>Drazen</snm><aff>U MD</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2203</ppf>
<ppl>20</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We test whether good economic conditions and expansionary fiscal policy help incumbents get reelected in a large panel of democracies. We find no evidence that deficits help reelection in any group of countries independent of income level, level of democracy, or government or electoral system. In developed countries and old democracies, deficits in election years or over the term of office reduce reelection probabilities. Higher growth rates over the term raise reelection probabilities only in developing countries and new democracies. Low inflation is rewarded by voters only in developed countries. These effects are both statistically significant and quite substantial quantitatively.  (JEL D72, E62, H62, O47)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=18&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.2203</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20060492_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20060492_app.zip</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Changes in the Consumption, Income, and Well-Being of Single Mother Headed Families</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Bruce D.</gnm><snm>Meyer</snm><aff>U Chicago</aff></au>
<au><gnm>James X.</gnm><snm>Sullivan</snm><aff>U Notre Dame</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2221</ppf>
<ppl>41</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We investigate well-being changes for single mother headed families targeted by recent tax and welfare reforms. Measured income changes sharply differ from consumption changes. We examine disaggregated consumption, time use, and health insurance coverage. Increases in housing and transportation spending mostly account for the rise in consumption in the bottom quintiles. We find modest improvement in housing quality, but the evidence is less strong at the very bottom. The consumption of nonmarket time for those in the bottom half of the consumption distribution falls sharply, indicating a loss in utility for those families if nonmarket time is valued above $3 per hour.  (JEL D12, I31, I32, J12, J16)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=19&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.2221</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20060064_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20060064_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Impact of Nearly Universal Insurance Coverage on Health Care Utilization: Evidence from Medicare</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>David</gnm><snm>Card</snm><aff>U CA, Berkeley</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Carlos</gnm><snm>Dobkin</snm><aff>U CA, Santa Cruz</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Nicole</gnm><snm>Maestas</snm><aff>RAND Corporation</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2242</ppf>
<ppl>58</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The onset of Medicare eligibility at age 65 leads to sharp changes in the health insurance coverage of the US population. These changes lead to increases in the use of medical services, with a pattern of gains across socioeconomic groups that varies by type of service. While routine doctor visits increase more for groups that previously lacked insurance, hospital admissions for relatively expensive procedures like bypass surgery and joint replacement increase more for previously insured groups that are more likely to have supplementary coverage after 65, reflecting the relative generosity of their combined insurance package under Medicare. (JEL I11, I18)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=20&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.2242</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20051296_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20051296_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Can Hepatitis B Mothers Account for the Number of Missing Women? Evidence from Three Million Newborns in Taiwan</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Ming-Jen</gnm><snm>Lin</snm><aff>National Taiwan U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Ming-Ching</gnm><snm>Luoh</snm><aff>National Taiwan U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>2259</ppf>
<ppl>73</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The "missing women" phenomenon in many Asian countries has previously been regarded as the result of son preference. However, some studies have argued half of the missing women can be explained by infection with Hepatitis B virus (HBV). We demonstrate that the probability of having a male birth is only slightly higher for HBV mothers than for mothers without HBV. The sex ratio at birth rises for the higher birth order and that in families where the first two children are female. Our findings suggest that HBV status has little impact on the missing women phenomenon.  (JEL I12, J16)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=21&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.2259</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec08/20061050_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>98</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2008</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&issue_date=December 2008</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Front Matter</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>i</ppf>
<ppl>i</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The front matter for the December 2008 issue contains the table of contents as well as information on Oliver E. Williamson, Distinguished Fellow, 2007.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=98&issue=5&article=0&issue_date=December 2008</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.98.5.i</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>



