<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Accounting for the Growth of MNC-Based Trade Using a Structural Model of U.S. MNCs</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Susan E.</gnm><snm>Feinberg</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Michael P.</gnm><snm>Keane</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1515</ppf>
<ppl>1558</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>In recent decades, U.S. foreign trade grew much faster than GDP, but there is no
consensus why. Notably lacking is an understanding of the role of multinational
corporations (MNCs), which mediate over half of world trade. We use Bureau of
Economic Analysis data on U.S. MNCs to study the rapid growth of MNC-based
trade from 1983 to 1996. Using a model of U.S. MNCs and Canadian affiliates, we
decompose this growth by source. Tariff reductions can largely explain increases in
arms-length MNC-based trade. But intra-firm trade growth is attributed mostly to
?technical change.? We present additional evidence suggesting just-in-time production
facilitated intra-firm trade. (JEL F13, F14, F23)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=6&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1515</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20031095_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Inherited Control and Firm Performance</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Francisco</gnm><snm>P&eacute;rez-Gonz&aacute;lez</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1559</ppf>
<ppl>1588</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>I use data from chief executive officer (CEO) successions to examine the impact of
inherited control on firms? performance. I find that firms where incoming CEOs are
related to the departing CEO, to a founder, or to a large shareholder by either blood
or marriage underperform in terms of operating profitability and market-to-book
ratios, relative to firms that promote unrelated CEOs. Consistent with wasteful
nepotism, lower performance is prominent in firms that appoint family CEOs who
did not attend ?selective? undergraduate institutions. Overall, the evidence indicates
that nepotism hurts performance by limiting the scope of labor market
competition. (JEL G32, G34, L25, M13)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=7&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1559</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20020615_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Estimating the Effects of Global Patent Protection in Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of Quinolones in India</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Shubham</gnm><snm>Chaudhuri</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Pinelopi K.</gnm><snm>Goldberg</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Panle</gnm><snm>Gia</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1477</ppf>
<ppl>1514</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Under the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, the World
Trade Organization members are required to enforce product patents for pharmaceuticals.
In this paper we empirically investigate the welfare effects of this
requirement on developing countries using data for the fluoroquinolones subsegment
of the systemic anti-bacterials segment of the Indian pharmaceuticals market.
Our results suggest that concerns about the potential adverse welfare effects of
TRIPS may have some basis. We estimate that the withdrawal of all domestic
products in this subsegment is associated with substantial welfare losses to the
Indian economy, even in the presence of price regulation. The overwhelming portion
of this welfare loss derives from the loss of consumer welfare. (JEL F13, L65, O34)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=5&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1477</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20031330_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Drew</gnm><snm>Fudenberg</snm></au>
<au><gnm>David K.</gnm><snm>Levine</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1449</ppf>
<ppl>1476</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We propose that a simple ?dual-self? model gives a unified explanation for several
empirical regularities, including the apparent time inconsistency that has motivated
models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and Rabin?s paradox of risk aversion in the
large and small. The model also implies that self-control costs imply excess delay,
as in the O?Donoghue and Rabin models of quasi-hyperbolic utility, and it explains
experimental evidence that increased cognitive load makes temptations harder to
resist. The base version of our model is consistent with the Gul-Pesendorfer axioms,
but we argue that these axioms must be relaxed to account for the effect of cognitive
load. (JEL D11, D81)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=4&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1449</doi>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20050971_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Are Technology Improvements Contractionary?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Susanto</gnm><snm>Basu</snm></au>
<au><gnm>John G.</gnm><snm>Fernald</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Miles S.</gnm><snm>Kimball</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1418</ppf>
<ppl>1448</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Yes. We construct a measure of aggregate technology change, controlling for
aggregation effects, varying utilization of capital and labor, nonconstant returns,
and imperfect competition. On impact, when technology improves, input use and
nonresidential investment fall sharply. Output changes little. With a lag of several
years, inputs and investment return to normal and output rises strongly. The
standard one-sector real-business-cycle model is not consistent with this evidence.
The evidence is consistent, however, with simple sticky-price models, which predict
the results we find: when technology improves, inputs and investment generally fall
in the short run, and output itself may also fall. (JEL E22, E32, O33)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=3&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1418</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20040577_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20040577_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Quantitative Aggregate Economics</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Finn E.</gnm><snm>Kydland</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1373</ppf>
<ppl>1383</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=1&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1373</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Assessing the Impact of a School Subsidy Program in Mexico: Using a Social Experiment to Validate a Dynamic Behavioral Model of Child Schooling and Fertility</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Petra E.</gnm><snm>Todd</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Kenneth I.</gnm><snm>Wolpin</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1384</ppf>
<ppl>1417</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper uses data from a randomized social experiment in Mexico to estimate
and validate a dynamic behavioral model of parental decisions about fertility and
child schooling, to evaluate the effects of the PROGRESA school subsidy program,
and to perform a variety of counterfactual experiments of policy alternatives. Our
method of validation estimates the model without using post-program data and then
compares the model?s predictions about program impacts to the experimental
impact estimates. The results show that the model?s predicted program impacts
track the experimental results. Our analysis of counterfactual policies reveals an
alternative subsidy schedule that would induce a greater impact on average school
attainment at similar cost to the existing program.</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=2&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1384</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20031016_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Comment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Ernst</gnm><snm>Fehr</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Michael</gnm><snm>Naef</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Klaus M.</gnm><snm>Schmidt</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1912</ppf>
<ppl>1917</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=26&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1912</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20030873_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Reply</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Dirk</gnm><snm>Engelmann</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Martin</gnm><snm>Strobel</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1918</ppf>
<ppl>1923</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=27&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1918</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Does European Unemployment Prop Up American Wages? National Labor Markets and Global Trade: Comment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>J&uuml;rgen</gnm><snm>Meckl</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1924</ppf>
<ppl>1930</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=28&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1924</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Empathy or Antipathy? The Impact of Diversity</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Johanne</gnm><snm>Boisjoly</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Greg J.</gnm><snm>Duncan</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Michael</gnm><snm>Kremer</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Dan M.</gnm><snm>Levy</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Jacque</gnm><snm>Eccles</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1890</ppf>
<ppl>1905</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Mixing across racial and ethnic lines could spur understanding or inflame tensions between groups. We find that white students at a large state university randomly assigned African American roommates in their first year were more likely to endorse affirmative action and view a diverse student body as essential for a high-quality education. They were also more likely to say they have more personal contact with, and interact more comfortably with, members of minority groups. Although sample sizes are too small to provide definitive evidence, these results suggest students become more empathetic with the social groups to which their roommates belong. (JEL I28, J15, J18, Z13) </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=24&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1890</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20040819_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Declining Volatility in the U.S. Automobile Industry</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Valerie A.</gnm><snm>Ramey</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Daniel J.</gnm><snm>Vine</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1876</ppf>
<ppl>1889</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Dramatic changes in the volatility of output occurred in the U.S. auto industry in the early 1980s. Namely, output volatility declined, the covariance of inventory investment and sales grew more negative, and adjustments to production schedules, which in earlier decades stemmed primarily from plants hiring and laying off workers, were more often accomplished with changes in average hours per worker after the mid- 1980s. Using a linear quadratic inventory model with intensive and extensive labor adjustments, we show how all of these changes could have stemmed from one underlying factor?a decline in the persistence of motor vehicle sales. (JEL G31, L25, L62, M11)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=23&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1876</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20040244_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20040244_app.zip</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>How Special Is the Special Relationship? Using the Impact of U.S. R&amp;D Spillovers on U.K. Firms as a Test of Technology Sourcing</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Rachel</gnm><snm>Griffith</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Rupert</gnm><snm>Harrison</snm></au>
<au><gnm>John</gnm><snm>Van Reenen</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1859</ppf>
<ppl>1875</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We examine the "technology sourcing" hypothesis that foreign research labs located in the U.S. tap into U.S. R&D spillovers and improve home country productivity. We show that U.K. firms that established a high proportion of inventors based in the U.S. by 1990 benefited disproportionately from the growth of U.S. R&D stock over the next ten years. We estimate that U.S. R&D during the 1990s was associated with 5 percent higher Total Factor Productivity for U.K. manufacturing firms in 2000 (about $13 billion), with the majority of benefits accruing to firms with an innovative presence in the U.S. (JEL F23, O32, O33)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=22&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1859</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20040910_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20040910_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Japanese Saving Rate</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Kaiji</gnm><snm>Chen</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Ay&#351;e</gnm><snm>&#304;mrohoro&#287;lu</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Selahattin</gnm><snm>&#304;mrohoro&#287;lu</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1850</ppf>
<ppl>1858</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Despite much work, economists have not been able to quantitatively account for the differences in the Japanese and U.S. saving rates after World War II. In this paper, we show that the use of actual Japanese total factor productivity growth rates in a standard growth model generates saving rates that are reasonably similar to the Japanese data between 1956 and 2000. (JEL E21, E22, O41, O47)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=21&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1850</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20050105_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Phased-In Tax Cuts and Economic Activity</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Christopher L.</gnm><snm>House</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Matthew D.</gnm><snm>Shapiro</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1835</ppf>
<ppl>1849</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to analyze and quantify the aggregate effects of the timing of tax rate changes enacted in 2001 (which called for successive rate reductions through 2006) and 2003 (which made immediate tax rate cuts scheduled for 2004 and 2006). The phased-in nature contributed to the slow recovery from the 2001 recession, while the elimination of the phase-in helped explain the increase in economic activity in 2003. The simulations suggest while the tax policy was a drag on the
economy in 2001 and 2002, it increased economic growth in 2003, once phase-ins were eliminated. (JEL D58, E32, E62, H24, H25, O41)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=20&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1835</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20040257_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A New Method of Estimating Risk Aversion</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Raj</gnm><snm>Chetty</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1821</ppf>
<ppl>1834</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>I show existing evidence on labor supply behavior places an upper bound on risk aversion in the expected utility model. I derive a formula for the coefficient of relative risk aversion (&#947;) in terms of the ratio of the income elasticity of labor supply to wage elasticity and degree of complementarity between consumption and labor. I bound the degree of complementarity using data on consumption choices when labor supply varies across states. Using labor supply elasticity estimates, I find a mean estimate of &#947; &#8776; 1, then show generating &#947; > 2 requires that wage increases cause sharper labor supply reductions. (JEL D81 J22 )</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=19&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1821</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Child Labor and the Labor Supply of Other Household Members: Evidence from 1920 America</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Marco</gnm><snm>Manacorda</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1788</ppf>
<ppl>1801</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper exploits the variation in the legal minimum working age across states in 1920 America in order to identify households' labor supply responses to exogenous changes in children's labor force participation. Using micro data on urban households from the U.S. Census, I find evidence that as a child moves to the labor market his siblings are less likely to work and more likely to attend school. I find no significant effect on parents' labor supply. (JEL J13, J22, K31, N32)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=17&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1788</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20031208_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Justin</gnm><snm>Wolfers</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1802</ppf>
<ppl>1820</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Applying the Coase Theorem to marital bargaining suggests that shifting from consent to unilateral divorce laws will not affect divorce rates. I show that existing evidence suggesting large effects of divorce laws on divorce rates reflect a failure to explicitly model the dynamic response of divorce rates to a shock to the legal regime. When accounting for these dynamics, I find that unilateral divorce spiked following the adoption of unilateral divorce laws, but that this rise largely reversed itself within a decade. Overall, these changes in family law explain very little of the rise in divorce over the past half-century. (JEL C78, J12)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=18&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1802</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20030906_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Self-Fulfilling Currency Crises: The Role of Interest Rates</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Christian</gnm><snm>Hellwig</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Arijit</gnm><snm>Mukherji</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Aleh</gnm><snm>Tsyvinski</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1769</ppf>
<ppl>1787</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We develop a model of currency crises, in which traders are heterogeneously
informed, and interest rates are endogenously determined in a noisy rational
expectations equilibrium. In our model, multiple equilibria result from distinct roles
an interest rate plays in determining domestic asset market allocations and the
devaluation outcome. Except for special cases, this finding is not affected by the
introduction of noisy private signals. We conclude that the global games results on
equilibrium uniqueness do not apply to market-based models of currency crises.
(JEL D84, E43, F32)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=16&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1769</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Miguel A.</gnm><snm>Costa-Gomes</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Vincent P.</gnm><snm>Crawford</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1737</ppf>
<ppl>1768</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper reports an experiment that elicits subjects? initial responses to 16
dominance-solvable two-person guessing games. The structure is publicly announced
except for varying payoff parameters, to which subjects are given free
access. Varying the parameters allows very strong separation of the behavior
implied by leading decision rules. Subjects? decisions and searches show that most
subjects understood the games and sought to maximize payoffs, but many had
simplified models of others? decisions that led to systematic deviations from equilibrium.
The predictable component of their deviations is well explained by a
structural nonequilibrium model of initial responses based on level-k thinking. (JEL
C72, C92, D83)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=15&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1737</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20041028_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20041028_app.zip</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Crises and Prices: Information Aggregation, Multiplicity, and Volatility</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>George-Marios</gnm><snm>Angeletos</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Iv&aacute;n</gnm><snm>Werning</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1720</ppf>
<ppl>1736</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Crises are volatile times when endogenous sources of information are closely
monitored. We study the role of information in crises by introducing a financial
market in a coordination game with imperfect information. The asset price aggregates
dispersed private information acting as a public noisy signal. In contrast to
the case with exogenous information, our main result is that uniqueness may not
obtain as a perturbation from perfect information: multiplicity is ensured with small
noise. In addition, we show that: (a) multiplicity may emerge in the financial price
itself; (b) less noise may contribute toward nonfundamental volatility even when the
equilibrium is unique; and (c) similar results obtain for a model where individuals
observe one another?s actions, highlighting the importance of endogenous information
more generally. (JEL D53, D82, D83)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=14&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1720</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Storable Good Monopoly: The Role of Commitment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Paolo</gnm><snm>Dudine</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Igal</gnm><snm>Hendel</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Alessandro</gnm><snm>Lizzeri</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1706</ppf>
<ppl>1719</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We study dynamic monopoly pricing of storable goods in an environment where
demand changes over time. The literature on durables has focused on incentives to
delay purchases. Our analysis focuses on a different intertemporal demand incentive.
The key force on the consumer side is advance purchases or stockpiling. In the
case of storable goods, the stockpiling motive has recently been documented
empirically. We show that, in this environment, if the monopolist cannot commit,
then prices are higher in all periods, and social welfare is lower, than in the case
in which the monopolist can commit. This is in contrast with the analysis in the
literature on the Coase conjecture. (JEL D21, D42, L12)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=13&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1706</doi>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20050522_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>In the Right Place at the Wrong Time: The Role of Firms and Luck in Young Workers</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Till</gnm><snm>von Wachter</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Stefan</gnm><snm>Bender</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1679</ppf>
<ppl>1705</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We examine administrative data on young German workers and their employers to
study the long-term effects of an early career job loss. To account for nonrandom
sorting of workers into firms with different turnover rates and for selective job
mobility, we use changes over time in firm- and age-specific labor demand as an
instrument for displacement. We find that wage losses of young job losers are
initially 15 percent, but drop to zero within five years. Only workers leaving very
large establishments suffer persistent losses. A comparison of estimators implies
that initial sorting, negative selection, and voluntary job mobility biases ordinary
least squares estimates toward finding permanent negative effects of early displacements.
(JEL J13, J23, J24, J62, J63, M53)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=12&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1679</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20040969_data.pdf</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20040969_app.zip</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Incentives and Prosocial Behavior</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Roland</gnm><snm>B&eacute;nabou</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Jean</gnm><snm>Tirole</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1652</ppf>
<ppl>1678</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual
altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or
punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive
for which good deeds are performed, and this ?overjustification effect? can induce
a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We
also identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and, more
generally, those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which we
show depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputational
concern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and how
monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shown
to potentially reduce social welfare. (JEL D11, D64, D82, Z13)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=11&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1652</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Globalization and Emerging Markets: With or Without Crash?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Philippe</gnm><snm>Martin</snm></au>
<au><gnm>H&eacute;l&egrave;ne</gnm><snm>Rey</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1631</ppf>
<ppl>1651</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We analyze the effects of financial and trade globalization on the likelihood of
financial crashes in emerging markets. While trade globalization always makes
crashes less likely, financial globalization may make them more likely, especially
when trade costs are high. Pessimistic expectations can be self-fulfilling and lead to
a collapse in demand for goods and assets. Such a crash comes with a current
account reversal and drops in income and investment. Lower-income countries are
more prone to such demand-based financial crises. A quantitative evaluation shows
our model is consistent with the main stylized facts of financial crashes in emerging
markets. (JEL F12, F32, F37, F41, O16)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=10&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1631</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20020553_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Hidden Costs of Control</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Armin</gnm><snm>Falk</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Michael</gnm><snm>Kosfeld</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1611</ppf>
<ppl>1630</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We analyze the consequences of control on motivation in an experimental principalagent
game, where the principal can control the agent by implementing a minimum
performance requirement before the agent chooses a productive activity. Our
results show that control entails hidden costs since most agents reduce their
performance as a response to the principal?s controlling decision. Overall, the effect
of control on the principal?s payoff is nonmonotonic. When asked for their emotional
perception of control, most agents who react negatively say that they perceive
the controlling decision as a signal of distrust and a limitation of their choice
autonomy. (JEL D82, Z13)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=9&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1611</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20040599_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20040599_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Household Expenditure and the Income Tax Rebates of 2001</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>David S.</gnm><snm>Johnson</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Jonathan A.</gnm><snm>Parker</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Nicholas S.</gnm><snm>Souleles</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1589</ppf>
<ppl>1610</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Using questions expressly added to the Consumer Expenditure Survey, we estimate
the change in consumption expenditures caused by the 2001 federal income tax
rebates and test the permanent income hypothesis. We exploit the unique, randomized
timing of rebate receipt across households. Households spent 20 to 40 percent
of their rebates on nondurable goods during the three-month period in which their
rebates arrived, and roughly two-thirds of their rebates cumulatively during this
period and the subsequent three-month period. The implied effects on aggregate
consumption demand are substantial. Consistent with liquidity constraints, responses
are larger for households with low liquid wealth or low income. (JEL D12,
D91, E21, E62, H24, H31)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=8&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1589</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20040878_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&issue_date=December 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Shorter Papers</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Comment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Gary E</gnm><snm>Bolton</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Axel</gnm><snm>Ockenfels</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1906</ppf>
<ppl>1911</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=5&article=25&issue_date=December 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/aer.96.5.1906</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec06/20031020_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


