<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Free Markets and Fettered Consumers</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Daniel</gnm><snm>McFadden</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>5</ppf>
<ppl>29</ppl>
</pp>
<ab> </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=1&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157542</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Money in a Theory of Banking</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Douglas W.</gnm><snm>Diamond</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Raghuram G.</gnm><snm>Rajan</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>30</ppf>
<ppl>53</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We examine the role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy. In economies where banks use real demand deposits to finance their lending, fluctuations in the timing of production can force banks to scramble for real liquidity, or even fail, which can greatly affect lending and aggregate output. The adverse effect on output can be reduced if banks finance with nominal deposits. Nominal deposits also open a "financial liquidity" channel for monetary policy to affect real activity. The banking system may be better off, however, issuing real deposits (e.g., foreign exchange denominated) under some circumstances. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=2&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157759</doi>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/mar06_app_20030982.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Were There Regime Switches in U.S. Monetary Policy?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Christopher A.</gnm><snm>Sims</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Tao</gnm><snm>Zha</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>54</ppf>
<ppl>81</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>A multivariate regime-switching model for monetary policy is confronted with U.S. data. The best fit allows time variation in disturbance variances only. With coefficients allowed to change, the best fit is with change only in the monetary policy rule and there are three estimated regimes corresponding roughly to periods when most observers believe that monetary policy actually differed. But the differences among regimes are not large enough to account for the rise, then decline, in inflation of the 1970s and 1980s. Our estimates imply monetary targeting was central in the early 1980s, but also important sporadically in the 1970s. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=3&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157678</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/mar06_data_20040391.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Odious Debt</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Seema</gnm><snm>Jayachandran</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Michael</gnm><snm>Kremer</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>82</ppf>
<ppl>92</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Trade sanctions are often criticized as ineffective because they create incentives for evasion or as harmful to the target country's population. Loan sanctions, in contrast, could be self-enforcing and could protect the population from being saddled with "odious debt" run up by looting or repressive dictators. Governments could impose loan sanctions by instituting legal changes that prevent seizure of countries' assets for nonrepayment of debt incurred after sanctions were imposed. This would reduce creditors' incentives to lend to sanctioned regimes. Restricting sanctions to cover only loans made after the sanction was imposed would help avoid time-consistency problems. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=4&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157696</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Advertising Content</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Simon P.</gnm><snm>Anderson</snm></au>
<au><gnm>R&eacute;gis</gnm><snm>Renault</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>93</ppf>
<ppl>113</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Empirical evidence suggests that most advertisements contain little direct information. Many do not mention prices. We analyze a monopoly firm's choice of advertising content and the information disclosed to consumers. The firm advertises only product information, price information, or both, and prefers to convey only limited product information if possible. It is socially harmful to force it to provide full information if it has sufficient ability to parse the information imparted, nor does it help to restrict the information voluntarily provided. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=5&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157632</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient Coordination in Large Groups</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Roberto A.</gnm><snm>Weber</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>114</ppf>
<ppl>126</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Previous experiments using the minimum-effort coordination game reveal a striking regularity&mdash;large groups never coordinate efficiently. Given the frequency with which large real-world groups, such as firms, face similarly difficult coordination problems, this poses an important question: Why do we observe large, successfully coordinated groups in the real world when they are so difficult to create in the laboratory? This paper presents one reason. The experiments show that, even though efficient coordination does not occur in groups that start off large, efficiently coordinated large groups can be "grown." By starting with small groups that find it easier to coordinate, we can add entrants&mdash;who are aware of the group's history&mdash;to create efficiently coordinated large groups. This represents the first experimental demonstration of large groups tacitly coordinated at high levels of efficiency. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=6&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157588</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/mar06_data_20020652.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>An Alternative Test of Racial Prejudice in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Shamena</gnm><snm>Anwar</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Hanming</gnm><snm>Fang</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>127</ppf>
<ppl>151</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We propose a simple model of trooper behavior to design empirical tests for whether troopers of different races are monolithic in their search behavior, and whether they exhibit relative racial prejudice in motor vehicle searches. Our test of relative racial prejudice provides a partial solution to the well-known infra-marginality and omitted-variables problems associated with outcome tests. When applied to a unique dataset from Florida, our tests soundly reject the hypothesis that troopers of different races are monolithic in their search behavior, but the tests fail to reject the hypothesis that troopers of different races do not exhibit relative racial prejudice. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=7&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157579</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/mar06_data_20040597.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Estimating Average and Local Average Treatment Effects of Education when Compulsory Schooling Laws Really Matter</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Philip</gnm><snm>Oreopoulos</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>152</ppf>
<ppl>175</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The change to the minimum school-leaving age in the United Kingdom from 14 to 15 had a powerful and immediate effect that redirected almost half the population of 14-year-olds in the mid-twentieth century to stay in school for one more year. The magnitude of this impact provides a rare opportunity to (a) estimate local average treatment effects (LATE) of high school that come close to population average treatment effects (ATE); and (b) estimate returns to education using a regression discontinuity design instead of previous estimates that rely on difference-in-differences methodology or relatively weak instruments. Comparing LATE estimates for the United States and Canada, where very few students were affected by compulsory school laws, to the United Kingdom estimates provides a test as to whether instrumental variables (IV) returns to schooling often exceed ordinary least squares (OLS) because gains are high only for small and peculiar groups among the more general population. I find, instead, that the benefits from compulsory schooling are very large whether these laws have an impact on a majority or minority of those exposed. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=8&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157641</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/mar06_data_20030407.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Long-Term Impact of Military Service on Health: Evidence from World War II and Korean War Veterans</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Kelly</gnm><snm>Bedard</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Olivier</gnm><snm>Desch&ecirc;nes</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>176</ppf>
<ppl>194</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>During the World War II and Korean War era, the U.S. military freely distributed cigarettes to overseas personnel and provided low-cost tobacco products on domestic military bases. In fact, even today the military continues to sell subsidized tobacco products on its bases. Using a variety of instrumental variables approaches to deal with nonrandom selection into the military and into smoking, we provide substantial evidence that cohorts with higher military participation rates subsequently suffered more premature mortality. More importantly, we show that a large fraction, 35 to 79 percent, of the excess veteran deaths due to heart disease and lung cancer are attributable to military-induced smoking. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=9&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157731</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/mar06_data_20040429.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Evolution of Managerial Expertise: How Corporate Culture Can Run Amok</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Dan</gnm><snm>Bernhardt</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Eric</gnm><snm>Hughson</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Edward</gnm><snm>Kutsoati</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>195</ppf>
<ppl>221</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper investigates how noisy evaluation of worker skills affects human capital investments and hiring. Individuals distort investments toward skills that most managers can evaluate. Dynamically, when workers become managers, managerial expertise can become increasingly skewed over time, raising investment distortions and reducing output. If firms select managerial expertise strategically, efficient investments can be retrieved when (a) identifying whether workers' skills matter more than distinguishing among skilled workers, and (b) initial investment distortions are small. Otherwise, such strategic design worsens long-run outcomes. Finally, we determine when short-run affirmative action policies are effective. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=10&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157669</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Why Beauty Matters</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Markus M.</gnm><snm>Mobius</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Tanya S.</gnm><snm>Rosenblat</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>222</ppf>
<ppl>235</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We decompose the beauty premium in an experimental labor market where "employers" determine wages of "workers" who perform a maze-solving task. This task requires a true skill which we show to be unaffected by physical attractiveness. We find a sizable beauty premium and can identify three transmission channels: (a) physically attractive workers are more confident and higher confidence increases wages; (b) for a given level of confidence, physically attractive workers are (wrongly) considered more able by employers; (c) controlling for worker confidence, physically attractive workers have oral skills (such as communication and social skills) that raise their wages when they interact with employers. Our methodology can be adopted to study the sources of discriminatory pay differentials in other settings. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=11&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157515</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/mar06_data_20030963.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Wealth Concentration in a Developing Economy: Paris and France, 1807&ndash;1994</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Thomas</gnm><snm>Piketty</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Gilles</gnm><snm>Postel-Vinay</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Jean-Laurent</gnm><snm>Rosenthal</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>236</ppf>
<ppl>256</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Using large samples of estate tax returns, we construct new series on wealth concentration in Paris and France from 1807 to 1994. Inequality increased until 1914 because industrial and financial estates grew dramatically. Then, adverse shocks, rather than a Kuznets-type process, led to a massive decline in inequality. The very high wealth concentration prior to 1914 benefited retired individuals living off capital income (rentiers) rather than entrepreneurs. The very rich were in their seventies and eighties, whereas they had been in their fifties a half century earlier and would be so again after World War II. Our results shed new light on ongoing debates about wealth inequality and growth. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=12&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157614</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/mar06_data_20040432.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Joan</gnm><snm>Esteban</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Debraj</gnm><snm>Ray</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>257</ppf>
<ppl>279</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper describes how wealth inequality may distort public resource allocation. A government seeks to allocate limited resources to productive sectors, but sectoral productivity is privately known by agents with vested interests in those sectors. They lobby the government for preferential treatment. The government&mdash;even if it honestly seeks to maximize economic efficiency&mdash;may be confounded by the possibility that both high wealth and true economic desirability create loud lobbies. Broadly speaking, both poorer economies and unequal economies display greater public misallocation. The paper warns against the conventional wisdom that this is so because such governments are more "corrupt." </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=13&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157533</doi>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/mar06_app_20040037.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Putting Risk in Its Proper Place</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Louis</gnm><snm>Eeckhoudt</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Harris</gnm><snm>Schlesinger</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>280</ppf>
<ppl>289</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper examines preferences toward particular classes of lottery pairs. We show how such concepts as prudence and temperance can be fully characterized by a preference relation over these lotteries. If preferences are defined in an expected-utility framework with differentiable utility, the direction of preference for a particular class of lottery pairs is equivalent to signing the nth derivative of the utility function. What makes our characterization appealing is its simplicity, which seems particularly amenable to experimentation. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=14&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157777</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Economic Conditions Early in Life and Individual Mortality</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Gerard J.</gnm><snm>van den Berg</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Maarten</gnm><snm>Lindeboom</snm></au>
<au><gnm>France</gnm><snm>Portrait</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>290</ppf>
<ppl>302</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We analyze the effect of economic conditions early in life on individual mortality rate later in life, using business cycle conditions early in life as an exogenous indicator. Individual records from Dutch registers of birth, marriage, and death, covering a window of unprecedented size (1912-2000) are merged with historical data on macroeconomic and health indicators. We correct for secular changes over time and other mortality determinants. We nonparametrically compare those born in a recession to those born in the preceding boom, and we estimate duration models where the individual's mortality rate depends on current conditions, conditions early in life, age individual characteristics, including individual socio-economic indicators, and interaction terms. The results indicate a significant negative effect of economic conditions early in life on individual mortality rates at all ages. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=15&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157740</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/mar06_data_20040207.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Can Rational Expectations Sticky-Price Models Explain Inflation Dynamics?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Jeremy</gnm><snm>Rudd</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Karl</gnm><snm>Whelan</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>303</ppf>
<ppl>320</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The canonical inflation specification in sticky-price rational expectations models (the new-Keynesian Phillips curve) is often criticized for failing to account for the dependence of inflation on its own lags. In response, many studies employ a "hybrid" specification in which inflation depends on its lagged and expected future values, together with a driving variable such as the output gap. We consider some simple tests of the hybrid model that are derived from its closed form. We find that the hybrid model describes inflation dynamics poorly, and find little empirical evidence for the type of rational, forward-looking behavior that the model implies. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=16&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157560</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/mar06_data_20030889.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>On the Workings of a Cartel: Evidence from the Norwegian Cement Industry</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Lars-Hendrik</gnm><snm>R&ouml;ller</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Frode</gnm><snm>Steen</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>321</ppf>
<ppl>338</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Using data on prices, production, and exports, we are able to identify marginal costs as well as the effectiveness of the Norwegian cement industry cartel. We find that our marginal cost estimates are very much in line with the detailed cost accounting data. We show that the cement cartel has been ineffective because the sharing rule induces "overproduction" and exporting below marginal costs. It is consumers -- not firms -- who benefit from the sharing rule. The ineffectiveness of the cartel was becoming so large that domestic welfare of a merger to monopoly would be positive around 1968, which is when the merger actually took place! We also show that competition would have resulted in even higher welfare gains over the entire sample. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=17&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157713</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/mar06_data_20030677.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Benefit-Cost in a Benevolent Society</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Theodore C.</gnm><snm>Bergstrom</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>339</ppf>
<ppl>351</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>How should benefit-cost analysis account for the value that benevolent individuals place on others' enjoyment of public goods? When adding up the benefits to be compared with costs, should we sum the private valuations, the altruistic valuations, or something else? This paper argues that private valuations are appropriate if concern for the well-being of others respects their private preferences. The discussion has implications for family decision-making, welfare economics, and the design of applied contingent valuation studies. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=18&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157623</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Do Technological Improvements in the Manufacturing Sector Raise or Lower Employment?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Yongsung</gnm><snm>Chang</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Jay H.</gnm><snm>Hong</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>352</ppf>
<ppl>368</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We find that technology's effect on employment varies greatly across manufacturing industries. Some industries exhibit a temporary reduction in employment in response to a permanent increase in TFP, whereas many more industries exhibit an employment increase in response to a permanent TFP shock. This raises serious questions about existing work that finds a labor productivity shock has a strong negative effect on employment. There are tantalizing and interesting differences between TFP and labor productivity. We argue that TFP is a more natural measure of technology because labor productivity reflects shifts in the input mix as well as in technology. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=19&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157687</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/mar06_data_20030462.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Politically Connected Firms</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Mara</gnm><snm>Faccio</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>369</ppf>
<ppl>386</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Examination of firms in 47 countries shows a widespread overlap of controlling shareholders and top officers who are connected with national parliaments or governments, particularly in countries with higher levels of corruption, with barriers to foreign investment, and with more transparent systems. Connections are diminished when regulations set more limits on official behavior. Additionally, I show that the announcement of a new political connection results in a significant increase in value. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=20&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157704</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/mar06_data_20031166.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/mar06_app_20031166.zip</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Persistent Distortionary Policies with Asymmetric Information</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Matthew F.</gnm><snm>Mitchell</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Andrea</gnm><snm>Moro</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>387</ppf>
<ppl>393</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Why are distortionary policies used when seemingly Pareto improvements exist? According to a standard textbook argument, a Pareto improvement can be obtained by eliminating the distortions, compensating the losers with a lump sum transfer, and redistributing the gains that are left over. We relax the assumption that winners know the losses suffered by the losers and show that the informationally efficient method of compensating losers may involve the use of seemingly inefficient (but informationally efficient) distortionary policies. The risk of overcompensating losers may make distortions informationally efficient, as there are points on the Pareto frontier where distortions are used. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=21&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157605</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>National Treatment in the GATT</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Henrik</gnm><snm>Horn</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>394</ppf>
<ppl>404</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The National Treatment (NT) clause is the first-line defense in the GATT (and in most other trade agreements) against opportunistic exploitation of the inevitable incompleteness of the agreement. This paper examines the role of NT as it applies to internal taxation under the GATT. It is shown that despite severely restricting the freedom to set internal taxes, NT may improve government welfare, but it will not completely solve the incomplete contract problem it is meant to remedy. Furthermore, it requires a high degree of economic sophistication on behalf of trade negotiators in order for this beneficial effect to materialize. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=22&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157768</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Do Labor Issues Matter in the Determination of U.S. Trade Policy? An Empirical Reevaluation</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Xenia</gnm><snm>Matschke</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Shane M.</gnm><snm>Sherlund</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>405</ppf>
<ppl>421</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Some recent empirical studies, motivated by Grossman and Helpman's (1994) "protection-for-sale" model, suggest that very few factors (none of them labor related) determine trade protection. This paper reexamines the roles that labor issues play in the determination of trade policy. We introduce collective bargaining, differences in inter industry labor mobility, and trade union lobbying into the protection-for-sale model, and show that the equilibrium protection rate in our model depends upon these labor market variables. We test our model predictions using data from U.S. manufacturing and find that labor market considerations do seem to matter for U.S. trade policy. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=23&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157524</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/mar06_data_20031143.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Patrick W.</gnm><snm>Schmitz</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>422</ppf>
<ppl>434</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The property rights approach to the theory of the firm suggests that ownership structures are chosen in order to provide ex ante investment incentives, while bargaining is ex post efficient. In contrast, transaction cost economics emphasizes ex post inefficiencies. In the present paper, a party may invest and acquire private information about the default payoff that it can realize on its own. Inefficient rent seeking can overturn prominent implications of the property rights theory. In particular, ownership by party B may be optimal, even though only the indispensable party A makes an investment decision. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=24&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157722</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The New York Times and the Market for Local Newspapers</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Lisa M.</gnm><snm>George</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Joel</gnm><snm>Waldfogel</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>435</ppf>
<ppl>447</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Recent technological advances have dramatically lowered the cost of transmitting information over large distances. In the late 1990s, the New York Times implemented a national distribution strategy, expanding delivery in over 100 cities. Using cross-sectional and longitudinal data on local newspaper circulation, Times penetration, and local newspapers characteristics, we find that as Times circulation grows in a market, local newspaper circulation declines among college-educated readers. Local newspapers reposition toward local and away from national coverage, raising circulation among individuals without a degree. Availability of national newspapers in local markets changes the relationship between local preferences and local products. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=25&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157551</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Social Value of Public Information: Comment: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro-Transparency, Not Con</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Lars E. O.</gnm><snm>Svensson</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>448</ppf>
<ppl>452</ppl>
</pp>
<ab> </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=26&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157650</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro-Transparency, Not Con: Reply</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Stephen</gnm><snm>Morris</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Hyun Song</gnm><snm>Shin</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Hui</gnm><snm>Tong</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>453</ppf>
<ppl>455</ppl>
</pp>
<ab> </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=27&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157597</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>96</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>March 2006</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&issue_date=March 2006</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>International Protection of Intellectual Property: Corrigendum</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Gene M.</gnm><snm>Grossman</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Edwin L.-C.</gnm><snm>Lai</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>456</ppf>
<ppl>456</ppl>
</pp>
<ab> </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=96&issue=1&article=28&issue_date=March 2006</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282806776157506</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


AER&volume=95&issue=2&issue_date=May 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>An Investigation of the Effects of Alcohol Consumption and Alcohol Policies on Youth Risky Sexual Behaviors</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Sara</gnm><snm>Markowitz</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Robert</gnm><snm>Kaestner</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Michael</gnm><snm>Grossman</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>263</ppf>
<ppl>266</ppl>
</pp>
<ab> </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=2&article=49&issue_date=May 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805774669899</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>May 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=2&issue_date=May 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Heavy Alcohol Use and the Commission of Nuisance Crime: Evidence from Underage Drunk Driving Laws</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Christopher S.</gnm><snm>Carpenter</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>267</ppf>
<ppl>272</ppl>
</pp>
<ab> </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=2&article=50&issue_date=May 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805774670220</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>May 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=2&issue_date=May 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Are Alcohol Tax Hikes Fully Passed Through to Prices? Evidence from Alaska</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Donald S.</gnm><snm>Kenkel</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>273</ppf>
<ppl>277</ppl>
</pp>
<ab> </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=2&article=51&issue_date=May 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805774670284</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>May 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_det