<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Fact-Free Learning</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Enriqueta</gnm><snm>Aragones</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Itzhak</gnm><snm>Gilboa</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Andrew</gnm><snm>Postlewaite</snm></au>
<au><gnm>David</gnm><snm>Schmeidler</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1355</ppf>
<ppl>1368</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>People may be surprised to notice certain regularities that hold in existing knowledge they have had for some time. That is, they may learn without getting new factual information. We argue that this can be partly explained by computational complexity. We show that, given a knowledge base, finding a small set of variables that obtain a certain value of R2 is computationally hard, in the sense that this term is used in computer science. We discuss some of the implications of this result and of fact-free learning in general. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=1&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014308</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Contracting on Time</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Sergei</gnm><snm>Guriev</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Dmitriy</gnm><snm>Kvasov</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1369</ppf>
<ppl>1385</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The paper shows how time considerations, especially those concerning contract duration, affect incomplete contract theory. Time is not only a dimension along which the relationship unfolds, but also a continuous verifiable variable that can be included in contracts. We consider a bilateral trade setting where contracting, investment, trade, and renegotiation take place in continuous time. We show that efficient investment can be induced either through a sequence of constantly renegotiated fixed-term contracts; or through a renegotiation-proof "evergreen" contract&mdash;a perpetual contract that allows unilateral termination with advance notice. We provide a detailed analysis of properties of optimal contracts. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=2&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014452</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A Model of Positive Self-Image in Subjective Assessments</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Lu&iacute;s</gnm><snm>Santos-Pinto</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Joel</gnm><snm>Sobel</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1386</ppf>
<ppl>1402</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper suggests a mechanism that describes individuals' positive self-image in subjective assessments of their relative abilities. The mechanism assumes individuals have heterogeneous production functions that determine ability as a function of multiple skills; make skill-enhancing investments with the goal of maximizing their ability; and make ability comparisons using their own production function. Within this framework, the paper provides conditions under which there is positive self-image. Positive self-image is increasing in the ease of the task, the number of different skills needed for the task, and the variability of production technologies in the population. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=3&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014245</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Herding and Contrarian Behavior in Financial Markets: An Internet Experiment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Mathias</gnm><snm>Drehmann</snm></au>
<au><gnm>J&ouml;rg</gnm><snm>Oechssler</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Andreas</gnm><snm>Roider</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1403</ppf>
<ppl>1426</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We report results of an Internet experiment designed to test the theory of informational cascades in financial markets (Christopher Avery and Peter Zemsky, 1998). More than 6,400 subjects, including a subsample of 267 consultants from an international consulting firm, participated in the experiment. We find that the presence of a flexible market price prevents herding. The presence of contrarian behavior distorts prices, however, and even after 20 decisions, convergence to the fundamental value is rare. We also report some interesting differences with respect to subjects' fields of study. Reassuringly, the behavior of the consultants turns out to be not significantly different from that of the remaining subjects. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=4&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014317</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_data_20030466.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_app_20030466.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Herd Behavior in a Laboratory Financial Market</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Marco</gnm><snm>Cipriani</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Antonio</gnm><snm>Guarino</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1427</ppf>
<ppl>1443</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We study herd behavior in a laboratory financial market. Subjects receive private information on the fundamental value of an asset and trade it in sequence with a market maker. The market maker updates the asset price according to the history of trades. Theory predicts that agents should never herd. Our experimental results are in line with this prediction. Nevertheless, we observe a phenomenon not accounted for by the theory. In some cases, subjects decide not to use their private information and choose not to trade. In other cases, they ignore their private information to trade against the market (contrarian behavior). </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=5&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014443</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_data_20030357.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_app_20030357.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Services as Experience Goods: An Empirical Examination of Consumer Learning in Automobile Insurance</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Mark</gnm><snm>Israel</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1444</ppf>
<ppl>1463</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Theoretical work on experience goods sets out three empirical questions. How accurate is information at initial purchase? How rapidly do consumers learn from product experiences? And how much impact does learning have on purchase decisions? I answer these questions for the case of automobile insurance, using a panel of 18,595 consumers from one firm. My principal findings are: patterns of consumer departures following claims point to learning; consumers enter the firm overly optimistic about its quality and are generally disappointed by experience; and the impact of learning is mitigated by the slow arrival of claims and the development of lock-in. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=6&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014335</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_data_20030751.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A Spatial Theory of Trade</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Esteban</gnm><snm>Rossi-Hansberg</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1464</ppf>
<ppl>1491</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The equilibrium relationship between trade and the spatial distribution of economic activity is fundamental to the analysis of national and regional trade patterns, as well as to the effect of trade frictions. We study this relationship using a trade model with a continuum of regions, transport costs, and agglomeration effects caused by production externalities. We analyze the equilibrium specialization and trade patterns for different levels of transport costs and externality parameters. Understanding trade via the distribution of economic activity in space naturally rationalizes the evidence on border effects and the "gravity equation." </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=7&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014371</doi>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_app_20030648.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Macroeconomics of Child Labor Regulation</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Matthias</gnm><snm>Doepke</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Fabrizio</gnm><snm>Zilibotti</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1492</ppf>
<ppl>1524</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We develop a positive theory of the adoption of child labor laws. Workers who compete with children in the labor market support a child labor ban, unless their own working children provide a large fraction of family income. Fertility decisions lock agents into specific political preferences, and multiple steady states can arise. The introduction of child labor laws can be triggered by skill-biased technological change, which induces parents to choose smaller families. The theory can account for the observation that, in Britain, regulations were first introduced after a period of rising wage inequality, and coincided with rapid fertility decline. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=8&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014425</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_data_20040076.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>How Do Hospitals Respond to Price Changes?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Leemore S.</gnm><snm>Dafny</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1525</ppf>
<ppl>1547</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper examines hospital responses to changes in diagnosis-specific prices by exploiting a 1988 policy reform that generated large price changes for 43 percent of Medicare admissions. I find hospitals responded primarily by "upcoding" patients to diagnosis codes with the largest price increases. This response was particularly strong among for-profit hospitals. I find little evidence hospitals increased the volume of admissions differentially for diagnoses subject to the largest price increases, despite the financial incentive to do so. Neither did they increase intensity or quality of care in these diagnoses, suggesting hospitals do not compete for patients at the diagnosis level. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=9&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014236</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_data_20031197.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Alan D.</gnm><snm>Morrison</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Lucy</gnm><snm>White</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1548</ppf>
<ppl>1572</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We analyze a general equilibrium model in which there is both adverse selection of, and moral hazard by, banks. The regulator can screen banks prior to giving them a licence, audit them ex post to learn the success probability of their projects, and impose capital adequacy requirements. Capital requirements combat moral hazard when the regulator has a strong screening reputation, and they otherwise substitute for screening ability. Crises of confidence can occur only in the latter case, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the appropriate policy response may be to tighten capital requirements to improve the quality of surviving banks. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=10&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014254</doi>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_app_20040380.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Annuities and Individual Welfare</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Thomas</gnm><snm>Davidoff</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Jeffrey R.</gnm><snm>Brown</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Peter A.</gnm><snm>Diamond</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1573</ppf>
<ppl>1590</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Advancing annuity demand theory, we present sufficient conditions for the optimality of full annuitization under market completeness which are substantially less restrictive than those used by Menahem E. Yaari (1965). We examine demand with market incompleteness, finding that positive annuitization remains optimal widely, but complete annuitization does not. How uninsured medical expenses affect demand for illiquid annuities depends critically on the timing of the risk. A new set of calculations with optimal consumption trajectories very different from available annuity income streams still shows a preference for considerable annuitization, suggesting that limited annuity purchases are plausibly due to psychological or behavioral biases. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=11&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014281</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_data_20030535.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Pedro Dal</gnm><snm>B&oacute;</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1591</ppf>
<ppl>1604</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>While there is an extensive literature on the theory of infinitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how "the shadow of the future" affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. I simulate infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games in the lab with a random continuation rule. The experimental design represents an improvement over the existing literature by including sessions with finite repeated games as controls and a large number of players per session (which allows for learning without contagion effects). I find that the shadow of the future matters not only by significantly reducing opportunistic behavior, but also because its impact closely follows theoretical predictions. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=12&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014434</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_data_20030568.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_app_20030568.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Tax-Motivated Trading by Individual Investors</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Zoran</gnm><snm>Ivkovi&#263;</snm></au>
<au><gnm>James</gnm><snm>Poterba</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Scott</gnm><snm>Weisbenner</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1605</ppf>
<ppl>1630</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We analyze stock trades made by individuals holding stock in both taxable and tax-deferred accounts. By comparing trades across these two types of accounts, we uncover a capital gains lock-in effect in taxable accounts. The lock-in effect is more pronounced for large stock transactions and for stocks held for at least 12 months. Over shorter horizons, the disposition effect outweighs the lock-in effect. Comparison of loss realizations in taxable and tax-deferred accounts yields evidence of tax-loss selling throughout the year. Effective accrual tax rates for stocks that experience substantial appreciation are substantially below the statutory tax rate on long-term gains. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=13&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014461</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_data_20040061.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>On the Irrelevance of Input Prices for Make-or-Buy Decisions</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>David E. M</gnm><snm>Sappington</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1631</ppf>
<ppl>1638</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper demonstrates that input prices need not reflect the costs of an efficient incumbent supplier in order to induce entrants to implement efficient make-or-buy decisions. Because of strategic downstream considerations, entrants may always undertake efficient make-or-buy decisions, regardless of the prices at which they are authorized to buy key inputs from incumbent suppliers. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=14&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014344</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Estimating the Value of Proposal Power</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Brian</gnm><snm>Knight</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1639</ppf>
<ppl>1652</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper investigates the role of proposal power in the allocation of transportation projects across U.S. congressional districts in 1991 and 1998. The evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of legislative bargaining models: members with proposal power &mdash; those sitting on the transportation authorization committee &mdash; secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives. Support for the quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power is more mixed. I then empirically address several alternative models of legislative behavior, including partisan models, informational roles for committees, models with appropriations committees, and theories of committees as preference outliers. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=15&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014290</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_data_20020836.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Human Capital Formation, Life Expectancy, and the Process of Development</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Matteo</gnm><snm>Cervellati</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Uwe</gnm><snm>Sunde</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1653</ppf>
<ppl>1672</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We provide a unified theory of the transition in income, life expectancy, education, and population size from a nondeveloped environment to sustained growth. Individuals optimally trade off the time cost of education with its lifetime returns. Initially, low longevity implies a prohibitive cost for human capital formation for most individuals. A positive feedback loop between human capital and increasing longevity, triggered by endogenous skill-biased technological progress, eventually provides sufficient returns for widespread education. The transition is not based on scale effects and induces population growth despite unchanged fertility. A simulation illustrates that the dynamics fit historical data patterns. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=16&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014380</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_data_20030573.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Impact of Outsourcing to China on Hong Kong's Labor Market</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Chang-Tai</gnm><snm>Hsieh</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Keong T.</gnm><snm>Woo</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1673</ppf>
<ppl>1687</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We measure the impact of China's decision to open its economy in 1980 on outsourcing from Hong Kong and the relative demand for less-skilled workers. We show that the relative demand for skilled workers in Hong Kong increased at the same time outsourcing to China began to increase. The reallocation of workers from manufacturing to "outsourcing services" can account for 15 percent, and increased utilization of skilled workers within manufacturing industries for 30 percent, of the aggregate relative demand shift. In addition, the rate of skill upgrading has been greater in manufacturing industries that have seen a greater degree of outsourcing to China. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=17&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014272</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_data_20050074.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict Financial Decisions</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Dean S.</gnm><snm>Karlan</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1688</ppf>
<ppl>1699</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Questions remain as to whether results from experimental economics are generalizable to real decisions in nonlaboratory settings. Furthermore, questions persist about whether social capital helps mitigate information asymmetries in credit markets. I examine whether behavior in two laboratory games, Trust and a Public Goods, predicts loan repayments to a Peruvian group-lending microfinance program. Since this program relies on social capital to enforce repayment, this tests the external validity of the games. Individuals identified as "trustworthy" by the Trust Game are indeed less likely to default on their loans. No similar support is found for the game's identification of "trusting" individuals. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=18&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014407</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_data_20030833.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Manufacturer Liability for Harms Caused by Consumers to Others</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Bruce</gnm><snm>Hay</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Kathryn E.</gnm><snm>Spier</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1700</ppf>
<ppl>1711</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Should the manufacturer of a product be held legally responsible when a consumer, while using the product, harms someone else? We show that if consumers have deep pockets, then manufacturer liability is not desirable. If homogeneous consumers have limited assets, then the best rule is "residual-manufacturer liability" where the manufacturer pays the shortfall in damages not paid by the consumer. Residual-manufacturer liability distorts the market quantity when consumers' willingness to pay is correlated with their propensity to cause harm. It distorts product safety when consumers differ in their wealth levels. In both cases, consumer-only liability may be preferred. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=19&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014416</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Are Banks Really Special? New Evidence from the FDIC-Induced Failure of Healthy Banks</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Adam B.</gnm><snm>Ashcraft</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1712</ppf>
<ppl>1730</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Recent bank failures are followed by significant and permanent negative declines in real county income. These declines are larger for small failures than for large failures per dollar of assets, are larger for bank failures than thrift failures, and are larger for bank closures than assisted mergers. More interestingly, the failure of even healthy banks has significant and permanent negative effects on economic activity. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=20&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014326</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_data_20031175.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Martin</gnm><snm>Dufwenberg</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Tobias</gnm><snm>Lindqvist</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Evan</gnm><snm>Moore</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1731</ppf>
<ppl>1737</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We investigate the occurrence of bubble-crash pricing patterns in laboratory financial markets with a mixture of experienced and inexperienced traders. We find that even with a minority of experienced traders, bubbles are substantially abated. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=21&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014362</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_data_20030703.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_app_20030703.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Does Increasing Women's Schooling Raise the Schooling of the Next Generation? Comment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Kate L.</gnm><snm>Antonovics</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Arthur S.</gnm><snm>Goldberger</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1738</ppf>
<ppl>1744</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>"Does increasing women's schooling raise the schooling of the next generation?" is the question posed by Jere R. Behrman and Mark R. Rosenzweig (2002). Their answer to the question is no. In fact, they conclude that raising women's schooling may lower the schooling of the next generation. We show that Behrman and Rosenzweig's results are not robust to alternative coding schemes and sample selection rules, and argue that their policy inference may be misguided. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=22&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014353</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_data_20030732.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Does Increasing Women's Schooling Raise the Schooling of the Next Generation? Reply</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Jere R.</gnm><snm>Behrman</snm></au>
<au><gnm>Mark R.</gnm><snm>Rosenzweig</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1745</ppf>
<ppl>1751</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We reassess the empirical robustness of the empirical findings in Jere R. Berhman and Mark R. Rosenzweig (2002) using new information on schooling which was collected and coded independently of codings carried out by both Kate Antonovics and Arthur Goldberger, and Berhmamn and Rosenzweig. We conclude that the independently coded data and the codings by Antonovics and Goldberger provide additional support for Behrman and Rosenzweig's original results showing that the positive cross-sectional relationship between a mother's schooling and her child's schooling is not robust to controls for unmeasured, intergenerationally correlated endowments, while the positive effect of paternal schooling is robust. </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=23&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014263</doi>
<dataset>http://www.e-aer.org/data/dec05_data_20040682.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>95</vol>
<iss>5</iss>
<cd>December 2005</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&issue_date=December 2005</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Savers-Spenders Theory of Fiscal Policy: Corrigendum</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>N. Gregory</gnm><snm>Mankiw</snm></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1752</ppf>
<ppl>1752</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=95&issue=5&article=24&issue_date=December 2005</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282805775014399</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&issue_date=June 2003</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Auditors' Report/Audited Financial Statements      </ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1018</ppf>
<ppl>1025</ppl>
</pp>
<ab> </ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=93&issue=3&article=31&issue_date=June 2003</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282803322157250</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


b.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>92</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>May 2002</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=92&issue=2&issue_date=May 2002</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Case Against Intellectual Property </ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Michele</gnm><snm>Boldrin</snm><aff>Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455</aff></au>
<au><gnm>David</gnm><snm>Levine</snm><aff>Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90024</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>209</ppf>
<ppl>212</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=92&issue=2&article=38&issue_date=May 2002</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282802320189267</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>92</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>May 2002</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=92&issue=2&issue_date=May 2002</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>When Should We Use Intellectual Property Rights? </ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Paul</gnm><snm>Romer</snm><aff>Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94035</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>213</ppf>
<ppl>216</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=92&issue=2&article=39&issue_date=May 2002</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282802320189276</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>92</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>May 2002</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=92&issue=2&issue_date=May 2002</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>On the Supply of Creative Work: Evidence from the Movies </ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Kai-Lung</gnm><snm>Hui</snm><aff>School of Computing, National University of Singapore, 3 Science Drive 2, Singapore 117543, Singapore</aff></au>
<au><gnm> I. P. L.</gnm><snm>Png</snm><aff>School of Computing, National University of Singapore, 3 Science Drive 2, Singapore 117543, Singapore</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>217</ppf>
<ppl>220</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/article_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=92&issue=2&article=40&issue_date=May 2002</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/000282802320189285</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>0002-8282</issn>
<jrnti>American Economic Review</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>92</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>May 2002</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles/issue_detail.php?journal=AER&volume=92&issue=2&issue_date=May 2002</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>150 Years of Patent Protection </ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Josh</gnm><snm>L