<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>4</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=4&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Front Matter</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>i</ppf>
<ppl>viii</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.4.1.i</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.4.1.i</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>4</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=4&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Effect of Health Insurance Coverage on the Use of Medical Services</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Michael</gnm><snm>Anderson</snm><aff>U CA, Berkeley</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Carlos</gnm><snm>Dobkin</snm><aff>U CA, Santa Cruz</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Tal</gnm><snm>Gross</snm><aff>Columbia U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1</ppf>
<ppl>27</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Substantial uncertainty exists regarding the causal effect of health
insurance on the utilization of care. We exploit a sharp change in insurance coverage rates that results from young adults "aging out" of their parents' insurance plans to estimate the effect of insurance coverage on the utilization of emergency department (ED) and inpatient services. Aging out results in an abrupt 5 to 8 percentage point reduction in the probability of having health insurance. We find that
uninsured status leads to a 40 percent reduction in ED visits and a 61 percent reduction in inpatient hospital admissions. (JEL G22, I11, I18)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.4.1.1</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.4.1.1</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2010-0243_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/app/2010-0243_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>4</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=4&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Regulation, Ownership, and Costs: A Historical Perspective from Indian Railways</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Dan</gnm><snm>Bogart</snm><aff>U CA, Irvine</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Latika</gnm><snm>Chaudhary</snm><aff>Scripps College</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>28</ppf>
<ppl>57</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper studies the relationship between operational costs and state ownership in Indian railways between 1874 and 1912. We find the move to state ownership significantly decreased working expenses. The cost declines are not driven by anticipation effects, changes in reporting standards, or long run trends. Rather, the evidence suggests the colonial Government of India reduced operational costs by cutting labor costs. Our surprising results can be explained by the undemocratic colonial nature of the Government of India, a fiscal system heavily reliant on railways for revenues, and a regulatory environment under private ownership that weakened incentives to lower costs. (JEL L32, L51, L92, N45, N75, O18, R41)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.4.1.28</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.4.1.28</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2010-0178_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>4</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=4&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Green Infrastructure: The Effects of Urban Rail Transit on Air Quality</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Yihsu</gnm><snm>Chen</snm><aff>U CA, Merced</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Alexander</gnm><snm>Whalley</snm><aff>U CA, Merced</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>58</ppf>
<ppl>97</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The transportation sector is a major source of air pollution worldwide, yet little is known about the effects of transportation infrastructure on air quality. This paper quantifies the effects of one major type of transportation infrastructure--urban rail transit--on air quality using the sharp discontinuity in ridership on opening day of a new rail transit system in Taipei. We find that the opening of the Metro reduced air pollution from one key tailpipe pollutant, carbon monoxide, by 5 to 15 percent. Little evidence that the opening of the Metro affected ground level ozone pollution is found however. (JEL L92, Q53, R41, R53)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.4.1.58</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.4.1.58</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2010-0083_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/app/2010-0083_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>4</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=4&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Sacred Cars? Cost-Effective Regulation of Stationary and Nonstationary Pollution Sources</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Meredith</gnm><snm>Fowlie</snm><aff>U CA, Berkeley</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Christopher R.</gnm><snm>Knittel</snm><aff>MIT</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Catherine</gnm><snm>Wolfram</snm><aff>U CA, Berkeley</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>98</ppf>
<ppl>126</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>For political and practical reasons, environmental regulations sometimes treat point-source polluters, such as power plants, differently from mobile-source polluters, such as vehicles. This paper measures the extent of this regulatory asymmetry in the case of nitrogen oxides (NO<sub>x</sub>), the most recalcitrant criteria air pollutant in the United States. We find significant differences in marginal abatement costs across source types: the marginal cost of reducing NO<sub>x</sub> from cars is less than half the marginal cost of reducing NO<sub>x</sub> from power plants. Our results measure the possible efficiency gains and distributional implications associated with increasing the sectoral scope of environmental regulations.(JEL Q53, Q58, R41)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.4.1.98</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.4.1.98</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2010-0058_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/app/2010-0058_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>4</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=4&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Do Strikes Kill? Evidence from New York State</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Jonathan</gnm><snm>Gruber</snm><aff>MIT</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Samuel A.</gnm><snm>Kleiner</snm><aff>Cornell U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>127</ppf>
<ppl>57</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Hospitals now represent one of the largest union sectors of the US economy, and there is particular concern about the impact of strikes on patient welfare. We analyze the effects of nurses' strikes in hospitals on patient outcomes in New York State. Controlling for hospital specific heterogeneity, the results show that nurses' strikes increase in-hospital mortality by 18.3 percent and 30-day readmission by 5.7 percent for patients admitted during a strike, with little change in patient demographics, disease severity or treatment intensity. The
results suggest that hospitals functioning during nurses' strikes do so
at a lower quality of patient care. (JEL H75, I11, I12, J52)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.4.1.127</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.4.1.127</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2010-0221_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>4</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=4&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Inertia and Overwithholding: Explaining the Prevalence of Income Tax Refunds</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Damon</gnm><snm>Jones</snm><aff>U Chicago</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>158</ppf>
<ppl>85</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Over three-quarters of US taxpayers receive income tax refunds, which are effectively zero-interest loans to the government. Previous explanations include precautionary and/or forced savings motives. I present evidence on a third explanation: inertia. I find that following a change in tax liability, prepayments are only adjusted by 29 percent of the tax change after one year and 61 percent after three years. Adjustment increases with income and experience, and for EITC
recipients, I rule out adjustment greater than 2 percent. Thus, policies
affecting default-withholding rules are no longer neutral decisions, but rather, may affect consumption smoothing, particularly for low-income taxpayers. (JEL D14, H24, K34)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.4.1.158</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.4.1.158</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2010-0025_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/app/2010-0025_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>4</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=4&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Will There Be Blood? Incentives and Displacement Effects in Pro-social Behavior</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Nicola</gnm><snm>Lacetera</snm><aff>U Toronto</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Mario</gnm><snm>Macis</snm><aff>Johns Hopkins U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Robert</gnm><snm>Slonim</snm><aff>U Sydney</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>186</ppf>
<ppl>223</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We present evidence from nearly 14,000 American Red Cross blood drives and from a natural field experiment showing that economic incentives have a positive effect on blood donations without increasing the fraction of donors who are ineligible to donate. The effect increases with the incentive's economic value. However, a substantial proportion of the increase in donations is explained by donors leaving neighboring drives without incentives to attend drives with incentives; this displacement also increases with the economic value of the incentive. We conclude that extrinsic incentives stimulate prosocial
behavior, but unless displacement effects are considered, the effect may be overestimated. (JEL D64, H41, I12)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.4.1.186</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.4.1.186</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2011-0037_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/app/2011-0037_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>4</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=4&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Income Taxes, Compensating Differentials, and Occupational Choice: How Taxes Distort the Wage-Amenity Decision</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>David</gnm><snm>Powell</snm><aff>RAND, Santa Monica, CA</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Hui</gnm><snm>Shan</snm><aff>Goldman Sachs</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>224</ppf>
<ppl>47</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>The link between taxes and occupational choices is central for understanding the welfare impacts of income taxes. Just as taxes distort the labor-leisure decision, they may also distort the wage-amenity decision. Yet, there have been few studies on the full response along this margin. When tax rates increase, workers favor jobs with lower wages and more amenities. We introduce a two-step methodology which uses compensating differentials to characterize the tax elasticity of occupational choice. We estimate a significant compensated elasticity of 0.03, implying that a 10 percent increase in the net-oftax rate causes workers to change to a 0.3 percent higher wage job. (JEL H24, H31, J22, J24, J31)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.4.1.224</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.4.1.224</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2010-0115_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


