<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>August 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Front Matter</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>i</ppf>
<ppl>viii</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.3.i</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.3.i</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>August 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>After Midnight: A Regression Discontinuity Design in Length of Postpartum Hospital Stays</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Douglas</gnm><snm>Almond</snm><aff>Columbia U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Joseph J.</gnm><snm>Doyle</snm><aff>MIT</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1</ppf>
<ppl>34</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Estimates of moral hazard in health insurance markets can be confounded by adverse selection. This paper considers a plausibly exogenous source of variation in insurance coverage for childbirth in California. We find that additional health insurance coverage induces substantial extensions in length of hospital stay for mother and newborn. However, remaining in the hospital longer has no effect on readmissions or mortality, and the estimates are precise. Our results suggest that for uncomplicated births, minimum insurance mandates incur substantial costs without detectable health benefits. (JEL D82, G22, I12, I18, J13)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.3.1</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.3.1</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2010-0190_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/app/2010-0190_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>August 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Public-Place Smoking Laws and Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS)</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Christopher</gnm><snm>Carpenter</snm><aff>U CA, Irvine</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Sabina</gnm><snm>Postolek</snm><aff>Queen's U, Kingston</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Casey</gnm><snm>Warman</snm><aff>Queen's U, Kingston</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>35</ppf>
<ppl>61</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Public-place smoking restrictions are the most important non-price tobacco control measures worldwide, yet surprisingly little is known about their effects on exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). We study these laws in Canada using data with questions about respondents' ETS exposure in public and private places. In fixed effects models we find these laws had no effects on smoking but induced large and statistically significant reductions in public-place ETS exposure, especially in bars and restaurants. We do not find significant evidence of ETS displacement to private homes. Our results indicate wide latitude for health improvements from banning smoking in public places. (JEL D12, H75, I12, I18, Q51)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.3.35</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.3.35</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2010-0117_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/app/2010-0117_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>August 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A's from Zzzz's? The Causal Effect of School Start Time on the Academic Achievement of Adolescents</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Scott E.</gnm><snm>Carrell</snm><aff>U CA, Davis</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Teny</gnm><snm>Maghakian</snm><aff>U CA, Davis</aff></au>
<au><gnm>James E.</gnm><snm>West</snm><aff>US Air Force Academy</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>62</ppf>
<ppl>81</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Recent sleep research finds that many adolescents are sleep-deprived because of both early school start times and changing sleep patterns during the teen years. This study identifies the causal effect of school start time on academic achievement by using two policy changes
in the daily schedule at the US Air Force Academy along with the randomized placement of freshman students to courses and instructors. Results show that starting the school day 50 minutes later has a significant positive effect on student achievement, which is roughly
equivalent to raising teacher quality by one standard deviation. (JEL I23, J13)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.3.62</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.3.62</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2010-0072_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>August 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Government Form and Public Spending: Theory and Evidence from US Municipalities</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Stephen</gnm><snm>Coate</snm><aff>Cornell U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Brian</gnm><snm>Knight</snm><aff>Brown U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>82</ppf>
<ppl>112</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>There are two main forms of government in US cities: council-manager and mayor-council. This paper develops a theory of fiscal policy determination under these two forms. The theory predicts that expected public spending will be lower under mayor-council but that either form of government could be favored by a majority of citizens. The latter prediction means that the theory is consistent with the coexistence of both government forms. Support for the former prediction is found in both a cross-sectional analysis and a panel analysis of changes in government form. (JEL H11, H72, R51)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.3.82</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.3.82</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2010-0006_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>August 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Trade Effects of Endogenous Preferential Trade Agreements</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Peter</gnm><snm>Egger</snm><aff>ETH Zurich and U Nottingham</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Mario</gnm><snm>Larch</snm><aff>U Bayreuth and CESifo, Munich</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Kevin E.</gnm><snm>Staub</snm><aff>U Zurich</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Rainer</gnm><snm>Winkelmann</snm><aff>U Zurich and CESifo, Munich</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>113</ppf>
<ppl>43</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Structural new trade theory models have never been used to evaluate and quantify the role of preferential trade agreement (PTA) membership for trade in a way which is consistent with general equilibrium. Apart from filling this gap, the present paper aims at delivering an empirical model which takes into account both that PTA membership is endogenous and that the world matrix of bilateral trade flows
contains numerous zero entries. These features are treated in an encompassing way by means of (possibly two-part) Poisson pseudomaximum likelihood estimation with endogenous binary indicator variables in the empirical model. (JEL F11, F13, F15)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.3.113</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.3.113</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2009-0168_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>August 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Electoral Rules and Politicians' Behavior: A Micro Test</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Stefano</gnm><snm>Gagliarducci</snm><aff>U Rome "Tor Vergata"</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Tommaso</gnm><snm>Nannicini</snm><aff>Bocconi U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Paolo</gnm><snm>Naticchioni</snm><aff>U Cassino</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>144</ppf>
<ppl>74</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Theory predicts that the majoritarian electoral system should produce more targeted redistribution and lower rents than proportional representation. We test these predictions using data on the Italian House of Representatives, and address the nonrandom selection into different systems exploiting one feature of the two-tier elections between 1994-2001: candidates could run for both the majoritarian and proportional tier, but if they won in both they had to accept the majoritarian seat. Focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin,
we find that majoritarian representatives put forward more bills
targeted at their constituency and show lower absenteeism rates than their proportional colleagues. (JEL D72)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.3.144</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.3.144</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2009-0116_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/app/2009-0116_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>August 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Do Child Tax Benefits Affect the Well-Being of Children? Evidence from Canadian Child Benefit Expansions</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Kevin</gnm><snm>Milligan</snm><aff>U British Columbia</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Mark</gnm><snm>Stabile</snm><aff>U Toronto</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>175</ppf>
<ppl>205</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We exploit changes in child benefits in Canada to study the impact of family income on child and family well-being. Using variation in child benefits across province, time, and family type, we study outcomes spanning test scores, mental health, physical health, and deprivation measures. The findings suggest that child benefit programs had significant positive effects on test scores, maternal health, and mental health, among other measures. We find strong and interesting differences in the effects of benefits by child sex: benefits have stronger effects on educational outcomes and physical health for boys, and on mental health outcomes for girls. (JEL I12, I31, I38, J13)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.3.175</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.3.175</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2008-0178_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>3</iss>
<cd>August 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=3</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Implementing Anti-discrimination Policies in Statistical Profiling Models</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Devin G.</gnm><snm>Pope</snm><aff>U Chicago</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Justin R.</gnm><snm>Sydnor</snm><aff>U WI</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>206</ppf>
<ppl>31</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>How should statistical models used for assigning prices or eligibility be implemented when there is concern about discrimination? In many settings, factors such as race, gender, and age are prohibited. However, the use of variables that correlate with these omitted characteristics (e.g., zip codes, credit scores) is often contentious. We provide a framework to address these issues and propose a method that can eliminate proxy effects while maintaining predictive accuracy
relative to an approach that restricts the use of contentious variables outright. We illustrate the value of our proposed method using data from the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services system. (JEL C53, J15, J65, J71)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.3.206</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.3.206</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2009-0106_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


 