<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>May 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Front Matter</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>i</ppf>
<ppl>iv</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.2.i</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.2.i</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>May 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Alberto</gnm><snm>Alesina</snm><aff>Harvard U and IGIER</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Andrea</gnm><snm>Ichino</snm><aff>U Bologna</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Loukas</gnm><snm>Karabarbounis</snm><aff>U Chicago</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1</ppf>
<ppl>40</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Gender-based taxation (GBT ) satisfies Ramsey's rule because it taxes at a lower rate the more elastic labor supply of women. We study GBT in a model in which labor elasticities emerge endogenously from intrahousehold bargaining. We explore the cases of
superior bargaining power for men, higher male wages, and higher female home productivity. In all cases, men commit to a career in the market, take less home duties than women, and have lower labor supply elasticity. When society resolves its distributional concerns efficiently with gender-specific lump sum transfers, GBT with higher marginal tax rates on (single and married) men is optimal. (JEL D13, H21, H24, J16, J22)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.2.1</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.2.1</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>May 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Manipulation of Social Program Eligibility</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Adriana</gnm><snm>Camacho</snm><aff>U Los Andes</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Emily</gnm><snm>Conover</snm><aff>Hamilton College</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>41</ppf>
<ppl>65</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We document how manipulation of a targeting system for social welfare
programs evolves over time. First, there was strategic behavior of some local politicians in the timing of the household interviews around local elections. Then, there was corrupt behavior with the sudden emergence of a sharp discontinuity in the score density, exactly at the eligibility threshold, which coincided with the release of the score algorithm to local officials. The discontinuity at the
threshold is larger where mayoral elections are more competitive. While cultural forces are surely relevant for corruption, our results also highlight the importance of information and incentives. (JEL D72, I32, I38, O15, O17).</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.2.41</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.2.41</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2010-0061_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/app/2010-0061_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>May 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Identifying the Aggregate Productivity Effects of Entry and Size Restrictions: An Empirical Analysis of License Reform in India</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>A. V.</gnm><snm>Chari</snm><aff>Cornell U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>66</ppf>
<ppl>96</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Distortions in the allocation of resources between heterogeneous producers have the potential to generate large reductions in aggregate
productivity, a point that has been stressed by recent studies. There
is, however, little direct empirical evidence from actual policy experiments
on the magnitude of these effects. This paper proposes a simple methodology that empirically identifies the separate effects of entry and size restrictions on aggregate productivity, and uses it to analyse the impact of a policy reform in India. (JEL L11, L24, O14, O47)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.2.66</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.2.66</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2010-0009_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>May 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>No Child Left Behind: Subsidized Child Care and Children's Long-Run Outcomes</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Tarjei</gnm><snm>Havnes</snm><aff>U Oslo</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Magne</gnm><snm>Mogstad</snm><aff>Statistics Norway</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>97</ppf>
<ppl>129</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Many developed countries are currently considering a move toward subsidized, widely accessible child care or preschool. However, studies on how large-scale provision of child care affects child development are scarce, and focused on short-run outcomes. We analyze a large-scale expansion of subsidized child care in Norway, addressing the impact on children's long-run outcomes. Our precise and robust difference-in-differences estimates show that subsidized child
care had strong positive effects on children's educational attainment and labor market participation, and also reduced welfare dependency. Subsample analyses indicate that girls and children with low-educated mothers benefit the most from child care. (JEL J13, J16)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.2.97</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.2.97</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2010-0121_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/app/2010-0121_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>May 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The End of Court-Ordered Desegregation</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Byron</gnm><snm>Lutz</snm><aff>Federal Reserve Board</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>130</ppf>
<ppl>68</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>In response to three Supreme Court rulings in the early 1990s, numerous court-ordered desegregation plans have been terminated. Using a unique dataset and an event study research design, this
paper explores the impact of these terminations. The results suggest that termination produces a moderate increase in racial segregation. Outside of the south, dismissal also increases the rate at which black students drop out of school and attend private school. In the south, in contrast, there is no change in the school attendance patterns of blacks. Finally, evidence is presented that whites re-enter dismissed districts in large numbers in the south. (JEL H75, I21, I28, J15, K10)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.2.130</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.2.130</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2009-0149_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/app/2009-0149_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>May 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Immigration and the Neighborhood</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Albert</gnm><snm>Saiz</snm><aff>U PA</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Susan</gnm><snm>Wachter</snm><aff>U PA</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>169</ppf>
<ppl>88</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Within metropolitan areas, neighborhoods of growing immigrant settlement are becoming relatively less desirable to natives. We deploy
a geographic diffusion model to instrument for the growth of immigrant
density in a neighborhood. Our approach deals explicitly with potential unobservable shocks that may be correlated with proximity to immigrant enclaves. The evidence is consistent with a causal interpretation of an impact from growing immigrant density to native flight and relatively slower housing value appreciation. Further evidence indicates that these results are driven more by the demand for residential segregation based on ethnicity and education than by foreignness per se. (JEL I20, J11, J15, R23, Z13)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.2.169</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.2.169</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2009-0191_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/app/2009-0191_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>2</iss>
<cd>May 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=2</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Surprising Incidence of Tax Credits for the Toyota Prius</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>James M.</gnm><snm>Sallee</snm><aff>U Chicago</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>189</ppf>
<ppl>219</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper estimates the incidence of tax incentives for the Toyota Prius. Transaction microdata indicate that both federal and state incentives were fully captured by consumers. This is surprising because Toyota faced a binding production constraint, which suggests that they could have appropriated the gains. The paper proffers an explanation based on an intertemporal link in pricing that stems
from search frictions, which has the unconventional implication that
statutory burden influenced economic burden. The paper develops a bounding estimator to account for endogenous selection into preferential tax regimes that may be useful in other contexts. (JEL H22, H24, L11, L62)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.2.189</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.2.189</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2009-0075_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/app/2009-0075_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


 