<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Front Matter</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>i</ppf>
<ppl>ii</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.1.i</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.1.i</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Cabals of a Few or the Confusion of a Multitude: The Institutional Trade-Off between Representation and Governance</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Leah</gnm><snm>Brooks</snm><aff>U Toronto</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Justin</gnm><snm>Phillips</snm><aff>Columbia U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Maxim</gnm><snm>Sinitsyn</snm><aff>McGill U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1</ppf>
<ppl>24</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Our model illustrates how political institutions trade off between the competing goals of representation and governance, where governance is the responsiveness of an institution to a single pivotal voter. We use exogenous variation from the 30-year history of the federal Community Development Block Grant program to identify this trade-off. Cities with more representative governments&#8212;those with larger city councils&#8212;use more grant funds to supplement city revenues rather than implementing tax cuts, thereby moving policy further away from the governance ideal. In sum, more representative government is not without cost. (JEL D72, H71, R50)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.1.1</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.1.1</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2009-0135_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/app/2009-0135_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Effect of Classmate Characteristics on Post-secondary Outcomes: Evidence from the Add Health</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Robert</gnm><snm>Bifulco</snm><aff>Syracuse U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Jason M.</gnm><snm>Fletcher</snm><aff>Yale U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Stephen L.</gnm><snm>Ross</snm><aff>U CT</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>25</ppf>
<ppl>53</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper uses a within-school/across-cohort design to present new evidence of the effects of high school classmate characteristics on a wide range of post-secondary outcomes. We find that increases in the percent of classmates with college-educated mothers decreases
the likelihood of dropping out and increases the likelihood of attending
college, despite showing no impact on a range of in-school achievement, attitudes, and behaviors. The percent of students from disadvantaged minority groups does not show any effects on post-secondary outcomes, but is associated with students reporting less
caring student-teacher relationships and increased prevalence of some undesirable student behaviors during high school. (JEL I21, J13, J15)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.1.25</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.1.25</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2009-0108_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Transfer Program Complexity and the Take-Up of Social Benefits</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Henrik Jacobsen</gnm><snm>Kleven</snm><aff>London School of Economics and Political Science</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Wojciech</gnm><snm>Kopczuk</snm><aff>Columbia U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>54</ppf>
<ppl>90</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We model complexity in social programs as a by-product of the screening process. While a more rigorous screening process may improve targeting efficiency, the associated complexity is costly to applicants and induces incomplete take-up. We integrate the study of take-up with the study of rejection (Type I) and award (Type II)
errors, and characterize optimal programs when policy makers choose screening intensity (and complexity), an eligibility rule, and a benefit level. Consistent with many real-world programs, optimal programs feature high complexity, incomplete take-up, classification errors of both Type I and II and, in some cases, "excessive" benefits. (JEL D04, D82, H23, I18, I38)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.1.54</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.1.54</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Calorie Posting in Chain Restaurants</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Bryan</gnm><snm>Bollinger</snm><aff>Stanford U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Phillip</gnm><snm>Leslie</snm><aff>Stanford U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Alan</gnm><snm>Sorensen</snm><aff>Stanford U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>91</ppf>
<ppl>128</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We study the impact of mandatory calorie posting on consumers' purchase decisions using detailed data from Starbucks. We find that average calories per transaction fall by 6 percent. The effect is almost entirely related to changes in consumers' food choices&#8212;there is almost no change in purchases of beverage calories. There is no impact on Starbucks profit on average, and for the subset of stores
located close to their competitor Dunkin Donuts, the effect of calorie
posting is actually to increase Starbucks revenue. Survey evidence
and analysis of commuters suggests the mechanism for the effect is a combination of learning and salience. (JEL D12, D18, D83, L83)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.1.91</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.1.91</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2010-0011_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>How Effective Are Public Policies to Increase Health Insurance Coverage among Young Adults?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Phillip B.</gnm><snm>Levine</snm><aff>Wellesley College</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Robin</gnm><snm>McKnight</snm><aff>Wellesley College</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Samantha</gnm><snm>Heep</snm><aff>Wellesley College</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>129</ppf>
<ppl>56</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper assesses the impact of policies to increase insurance coverage
for young adults. The introduction of SCHIP in 1997 enabled low-income teens up to age 19 to gain access to public health insurance. More recent policies enabled young adults between the ages of
19 and (typically) 24 to remain covered under their parents' health insurance. We use the discrete break in coverage at age 19 to evaluate the impact of SCHIP, and quasi-experimental variation to evaluate the impact of "extended parental coverage" laws. Our results
suggest that both types of policies were effective at increasing health insurance coverage. (JEL G22, H75, I18, J13)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.1.129</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.1.129</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2009-0099_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Culture, Context, and the Taste for Redistribution</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Erzo F. P.</gnm><snm>Luttmer</snm><aff>Dartmouth College</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Monica</gnm><snm>Singhal</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>157</ppf>
<ppl>79</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Is culture an important determinant of preferences for redistribution? To separate culture from the economic and institutional environment ("context"), we relate immigrants' redistributive preferences to the average preference in their birth countries. We find a strong positive relationship that is robust to rich controls for economic factors and cannot easily be explained by selective migration. This effect
is as large as that of own household income and appears stronger for those less assimilated into the destination country. Immigrants from high-preference countries are more likely to vote for more pro-redistribution parties. The effect of culture persists strongly into the
second generation. (JEL H23, Z13)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.1.157</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.1.157</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2009-0159_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/app/2009-0159_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>3</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2011</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=3&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Payment Choice, Image Motivation and Contributions to Charity: Evidence from a Field Experiment</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Adriaan R.</gnm><snm>Soetevent</snm><aff>U Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>180</ppf>
<ppl>205</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper examines the impact of payment choice on charitable giving
with a door-to-door fund-raising field experiment. Respondents can donate cash only, use debit only, or have both options. Cash donations have lower visibility vis-&agrave;-vis solicitors than debit card donations. When debit replaces cash, participation drops by 87 percent. Conditional on participation, donors in the Debit-only treatment give more than donors in Cash-only. In Cash&Debit, almost all
donors prefer cash; participation decreases compared to Cash-only. Physical attractiveness of both female and male solicitors increases contributions. Solicitor self-confidence has a negative impact. (JEL D14, D64, L31)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.3.1.180</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.3.1.180</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2009-0047_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


 