<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=1&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Editor's Note</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Alan J.</gnm><snm>Auerbach</snm><aff>U CA, Berkeley</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>iii</ppf>
<ppl>iii</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.1.1.iii</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.1.1.iii</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=1&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Optimal Tax Design and Enforcement with an Informal Sector</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Robin</gnm><snm>Boadway</snm><aff>Queen's U, Kingston</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Motohiro</gnm><snm>Sato</snm><aff>Hitotsubashi U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1</ppf>
<ppl>27</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>An optimal commodity tax approach is taken to compare trade taxes
and VATs when some commodities are produced informally. Trade
taxes apply to all imports and exports, including intermediate goods,
while the VAT applies only to sales by the formal sector and imports.
The VAT achieves production efficiency within the formal sector,
but, unlike trade taxes, cannot indirectly tax profits. Making the size
of the informal sector endogenous in each regime is potentially decisive.
The ability of the government to change the size of the informal
sector through costly enforcement may also tip the balance in favor
of the VAT. (JEL E26, H21, H25)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.1.1.1</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.1.1.1</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=1&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Jan K.</gnm><snm>Brueckner</snm><aff>U CA, Irvine</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Harris</gnm><snm>Selod</snm><aff>World Bank and CREST</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>28</ppf>
<ppl>51</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting,
reflecting the view that squatters and formal residents compete for
land within a city. The key implication is that squatters "squeeze"
the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The
squatter organizer ensures that squeezing is not too severe, since
otherwise, the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction
by landowners. Because eviction is absent in equilibrium, the model
differs from previous analytical frameworks, where eviction occurs
with some probability. It also facilitates a general equilibrium analysis
of squatter formalization policies. (JEL O15, Q15, R14)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.1.1.28</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.1.1.28</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=1&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Technology's Edge: The Educational Benefits of Computer-Aided Instruction</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Lisa</gnm><snm>Barrow</snm><aff>Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Lisa</gnm><snm>Markman</snm><aff>Princeton U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Cecilia Elena</gnm><snm>Rouse</snm><aff>Princeton U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>52</ppf>
<ppl>74</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We present results from a randomized study of a well-defined use of
computers in schools, a popular instructional computer program for
pre-algebra and algebra. We primarily assess the program using a
test designed to target pre-algebra and algebra skills. Students randomly
assigned to computer-aided instruction score significantly
higher on a pre-algebra and algebra test than students randomly
assigned to traditional instruction. We hypothesize that this effectiveness
arises from increased individualized instruction as the effects
appear larger for students in larger classes and in classes with high
student absentee rates. (JEL H75, I21)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.1.1.52</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.1.1.52</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2007-0082_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=1&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Housing, Health, and Happiness</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Matias D.</gnm><snm>Cattaneo</snm><aff>U MI</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Sebastian</gnm><snm>Galiani</snm><aff>Washington U in St Louis</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Paul J.</gnm><snm>Gertler</snm><aff>U CA, Berkeley</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Sebastian</gnm><snm>Martinez</snm><aff>World Bank</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Rocio</gnm><snm>Titiunik</snm><aff>U CA, Berkeley</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>75</ppf>
<ppl>105</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We investigate the impact of a large-scale Mexican program to
replace dirt floors with cement floors on child health and adult happiness.
We find that replacing dirt floors with cement significantly
improves the health of young children measured by decreases in the
incidence of parasitic infestations, diarrhea, and the prevalence of
anemia, and an improvement in children's cognitive development.
Additionally, we find significant improvements in adult welfare measured
by increased satisfaction with their housing and quality of life,
as well as by lower scores on depression and perceived stress scales.
(JEL I12, I31, J13, O15)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.1.1.75</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.1.1.75</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2007-0024_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=1&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Greenhouse Gas Reductions under Low Carbon Fuel Standards?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Stephen P.</gnm><snm>Holland</snm><aff>U NC, Greensboro</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Jonathan E.</gnm><snm>Hughes</snm><aff>Institute of Transportation Studies, U CA, Davis</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Christopher R.</gnm><snm>Knittel</snm><aff>U CA, Davis</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>106</ppf>
<ppl>46</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>A low carbon fuel standard (LCFS) seeks to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by limiting the carbon intensity of fuels. We show this
decreases high carbon fuel production but increases low carbon fuel
production, possibly increasing net carbon emissions. The LCFS
cannot be efficient, and the best LCFS may be nonbinding. We simulate
a national LCFS on gasoline and ethanol. For a broad parameter
range, emissions decrease, energy prices increase, abatement
costs are large ($80–$760 billion annually), and average abatement
costs are large ($307–$2,272 per CO2 metric ton). A cost effective
policy has much lower average abatement costs ($60–$868). (JEL
Q54, Q58)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.1.1.106</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.1.1.106</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-policy/data/2007-0021_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-policy/app/2007-0021_app.zip</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=1&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>An Empirical Framework for Large-Scale Policy Analysis, with an Application to School Finance Reform in Michigan</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Maria Marta</gnm><snm>Ferreyra</snm><aff>Carnegie Mellon U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>147</ppf>
<ppl>80</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>In this paper, I develop an empirical framework for the analysis
of large-scale policies, and apply it to study the effects of school
finance reform on the Detroit metropolitan area. Exploiting school
finance reform in Michigan in 1994, I estimate a general equilibrium
model of multiple jurisdictions with 1990 data from Detroit, predict
the 2000 equilibrium, and compare this prediction with 2000 data to
validate the model. I conduct counterfactual simulations using the
estimates. According to my analysis, feasible revenue-based reforms
that ensure spending equity or adequacy have little impact on school
quality or household demographics in Detroit. (JEL H75, I22)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.1.1.147</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.1.1.147</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2007-0019_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/app/2007-0019_app.zip</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=1&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Domestic Effects of the Foreign Activities of US Multinationals</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Mihir A.</gnm><snm>Desai</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>C. Fritz</gnm><snm>Foley</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>James R.</gnm><snm>Hines</snm><aff>U MI</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>181</ppf>
<ppl>203</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Do firms investing abroad simultaneously reduce their domestic
activity? This paper analyzes the relationship between the domestic
and foreign operations of US manufacturing firms between 1982 and
2004 by instrumenting for changes in foreign operations with GDP
growth rates of the foreign countries in which they invest. Estimates
produced using this instrument indicate that 10 percent greater
foreign investment is associated with 2.6 percent greater domestic
investment, and 10 percent greater foreign employee compensation
is associated with 3.7 percent greater domestic employee compensation.
These results do not support the popular notion that expansions
abroad reduce a firm's domestic activity, instead suggesting
the opposite. (JEL F23, H25, L25)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.1.1.181</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.1.1.181</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/pol/data/2007-0031_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=1&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Details Matter: The Impact of Presentation and Information on the Take-Up of Financial Incentives for Retirement Saving</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Emmanuel</gnm><snm>Saez</snm><aff>U CA, Berkeley</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>204</ppf>
<ppl>28</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We examine the effects of presentation and information on the take-up
of financial subsidies for retirement saving in a large randomized
experiment carried out with H&R Block. The subsidies raise take-up
and contributions with larger effects when the subsidy is characterized
as a matching contribution rather than an equivalent-value tax
credit (or cash back), and when filers are informed before the tax
season about the subsidy. The results imply that both pure incentives
and the presentation of those incentives affect consumer choices.
(JEL D14, H24, H31, J26)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.1.1.204</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.1.1.204</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-policy/data/2007-0046_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=1&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Who Misvotes? The Effect of Differential Cognition Costs on Election Outcomes</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Kelly</gnm><snm>Shue</snm><aff>Harvard U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Erzo F. P.</gnm><snm>Luttmer</snm><aff>Harvard U and IZA</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>229</ppf>
<ppl>57</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>If voters have negligible cognition costs, ballot layout should not
affect election outcomes. We explore deviations from rational voting
using quasi-random variation in candidate name placement on
ballots from the 2003 California recall election. We find that minor
candidates' vote shares almost double when their names are adjacent
to the names of major candidates. All else equal, vote share gains
are larger in precincts with higher percentages of poorly educated,
poor, or third-party voters. A major candidate that disproportionally
attracts voters from such precincts faces an electoral disadvantage.
We also explore which voting technology platforms and brands mitigate
misvoting. (JEL D72)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.1.1.229</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.1.1.229</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-policy/data/2007-0065_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=1&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Altruism and the Child Cycle of Alumni Donations</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Jonathan</gnm><snm>Meer</snm><aff>Stanford U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Harvey S.</gnm><snm>Rosen</snm><aff>Princeton U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>258</ppf>
<ppl>86</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We study alumni contributions to an anonymous research university.
If alumni believe donations will increase the likelihood of their
child's admission, and if this belief helps motivate their giving, then
the pattern of giving should vary systematically with the ages of their
children, whether the children ultimately apply to the university, and
the admissions outcome. We call this pattern the child cycle of alumni
giving. The evidence is consistent with the child-cycle pattern. Thus,
while altruism drives some giving, the hope for a reciprocal benefit
also plays a role. We compute rough estimates of the proportion of
giving due to selfish motives. (JEL D91, D64, I21)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.1.1.258</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.1.1.258</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-policy/data/2007-0081_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=1&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>AEJ: Economic Policy Annual Report Statistics</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Jonathan</gnm><snm>Meer</snm><aff>Stanford U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Harvey S.</gnm><snm>Rosen</snm><aff>Princeton U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>287</ppf>
<ppl>287</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.1.1.87</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.1.1.87</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7731</issn>
<issn_online>1945-774X</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-pol/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>1</vol>
<iss>1</iss>
<cd>February 2009</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=POL&volume=1&issue=1</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Front Matter</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>i</ppf>
<ppl>ii</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.1.1.i</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/pol.1.1.i</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


