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Project Citation: 

Lockwood, Ben, and Porcelli, Francesco. Replication data for: Incentive Schemes for Local Government: Theory and Evidence from Comprehensive Performance Assessment in England. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-13. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114831V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary This paper studies Comprehensive Performance Assessment, an explicit incentive scheme for local government in England. Motivated by a theoretical political agency model, we predict that CPA should increase service quality and local taxation, but have an ambiguous effect on the efficiency of service provision. We test these predictions using Welsh local governments as a control group: CPA increased the property tax, and our index of service quality, but had no significant effect on efficiency overall. There is evidence of a heterogenous effect of CPA: it impacted more on councils where electoral competition was initially weak, in line with our theory.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      H71 State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
      H72 State and Local Budget and Expenditures
      H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
      H76 State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories
      R51 Finance in Urban and Rural Economies


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