Replication data for: Electoral Rules and Politicians' Behavior: A Micro Test

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
AEJ_DATA_CODES			10/13/2019 06:49:AM
LICENSE.txt	text/plain	14.6 KB	10/13/2019 02:49:AM

Project Citation:

Gagliarducci, Stefano, Nannicini, Tommaso, and Naticchioni, Paolo. Replication data for: Electoral Rules and Politicians’ Behavior: A Micro Test. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-13. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114763V1

Project Description

Summary: Theory predicts that the majoritarian electoral system should produce more targeted redistribution and lower rents than proportional representation. We test these predictions using data on the Italian House of Representatives, and address the nonrandom selection into different systems exploiting one feature of the two-tier elections between 1994-2001: candidates could run for both the majoritarian and proportional tier, but if they won in both they had to accept the majoritarian seat. Focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin, we find that majoritarian representatives put forward more bills targeted at their constituency and show lower absenteeism rates than their proportional colleagues. (JEL D72)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

Related Publications

Download this project

Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-13]

Export Metadata

Dublin Core

DDI 2.5

Report a Problem

Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.

This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.