Replication data for: Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Tilman Börgers; Ingemar Cox; Martin Pesendorfer; Vaclav Petricek
Version: View help for Version V1
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| DataSet | 10/12/2019 11:36:PM | ||
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Project Citation:
Börgers, Tilman, Cox, Ingemar, Pesendorfer, Martin, and Petricek, Vaclav. Replication data for: Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114412V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This paper presents a game theoretic analysis of the generalized
second-price auction that the company Overture operated in 2004
to sell sponsored search listings on search engines. We construct a
model that embodies few prior assumptions about parameters, and
we present results that indicate that this model has under quite general
assumptions a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. We then analyze
bid data assuming that advertisers choose Nash equilibrium bids. We
offer preliminary conclusions about advertisers' true willingness to
bid for sponsored search listings. We find that advertisers' true willingness
to bid is multi-dimensional and decreasing in listing position.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D44 Auctions
L86 Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
M31 Marketing
M37 Advertising
D44 Auctions
L86 Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
M31 Marketing
M37 Advertising
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