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Project Citation: 

Clark, Robert, and Houde, Jean-François. Replication data for: Collusion with Asymmetric Retailers: Evidence from a Gasoline Price-Fixing Case. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114410V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We point out a fundamental difficulty of successfully colluding in retail markets with heterogeneous firms, and characterize the mechanism recent gasoline cartels in Canada used to sustain collusion. Heterogeneity in cost and network size necessitates arrangements whereby participants split the market unequally to favor stronger players. We characterize empirically the strategy and transfer mechanism using court documents containing summaries and extracts of conversations between participants. The mechanism implements transfers based on adjustment delays during price changes. We estimate that these delays can translate into substantial transfers and provide examples in which they can substantially reduce deviation frequency.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      K21 Antitrust Law
      L12 Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
      L71 Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels
      L81 Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce


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