<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7707</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7715</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-macro/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>4</vol>
<iss>4</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=MAC&volume=4&issue=4</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Journal Article</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Front Matter</ti>
<augp>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>i</ppf>
<ppl>vi</ppl>
</pp>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.4.4.i</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/mac.4.4.i</doi>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7707</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7715</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-macro/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>4</vol>
<iss>4</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=MAC&volume=4&issue=4</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>The Geography of Conflicts and Regional Trade Agreements</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Philippe</gnm><snm>Martin</snm><aff>Sciences Po, Paris</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Thierry</gnm><snm>Mayer</snm><aff>Sciences Po, Paris</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Mathias</gnm><snm>Thoenig</snm><aff>U Lausanne</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>1</ppf>
<ppl>35</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>In addition to standard trade gains, regional trade agreements (RTAs) can promote peaceful relations by increasing the opportunity cost of conflicts. Country pairs with large trade gains from RTAs and a high probability of conflict should be more likely to sign an RTA. Using data from 1950 to 2000, we show that this complementarity between economic and politics determines the geography of RTAs. We disentangle trade gains from political factors by a theory-driven empirical estimation and find that country pairs with higher frequency of past wars are more likely to sign RTAs, the more so the larger the trade gains. (JEL D72, D74, F15, N70)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.4.4.1</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/mac.4.4.1</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mac/data/2011-0041_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7707</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7715</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-macro/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>4</vol>
<iss>4</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=MAC&volume=4&issue=4</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Measuring What Employers Do about Entry Wages over the Business Cycle: A New Approach</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Pedro S.</gnm><snm>Martins</snm><aff>Queen Mary, U London</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Gary</gnm><snm>Solon</snm><aff>MI State U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Jonathan P.</gnm><snm>Thomas</snm><aff>U Edinburgh</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>36</ppf>
<ppl>55</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Rigidity in real hiring wages plays a crucial role in some recent macroeconomic models. But are hiring wages really so noncyclical? We propose using employer/employee longitudinal data to track the cyclical variation in the wages paid to workers newly hired into specific entry jobs. Illustrating the methodology with 1982-2008 data
from the Portuguese census of employers, we find real entry wages
were about 1.8 percent higher when the unemployment rate was 1 percentage point lower. Like most recent evidence on other aspects of wage cyclicality, our results suggest that the cyclical elasticity of wages is similar to that of employment. (JEL E24, E32, J31, J64)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.4.4.36</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/mac.4.4.36</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mac/data/2010-0083_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7707</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7715</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-macro/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>4</vol>
<iss>4</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=MAC&volume=4&issue=4</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Evidence on the Incidence of Wage Posting, Wage Bargaining, and On-the-Job Search</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Robert E.</gnm><snm>Hall</snm><aff>Stanford U</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Alan B.</gnm><snm>Krueger</snm><aff>Princeton U</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>56</ppf>
<ppl>67</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>Some workers bargain with prospective employers before accepting a job. Others face a posted wage as a take-it-or-leave-it opportunity. Both modes of wage determination have generated large bodies of research. We surveyed a representative sample of US workers to
inquire about the wage determination process at the time they were hired into their current or most recent jobs. A third of the respondents reported bargaining over pay before accepting their current jobs. Almost a third of workers had precise information about pay when they first met with their employers, a sign of wage posting. About 40 percent of workers were on-the-job searchers--they could
have remained at their earlier jobs at the time they accepted their current jobs, indicating a more favorable bargaining position than is held by unemployed job-seekers. About half of all workers reported that their employers had learned their pay in their earlier jobs before making the offer that led to the current job. (JEL C83, J31, J52, J64)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.4.4.56</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/mac.4.4.56</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mac/data/2011-0071_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mac/app/2011-0071_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7707</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7715</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-macro/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>4</vol>
<iss>4</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=MAC&volume=4&issue=4</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Exogenous versus Endogenous Separation</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Shigeru</gnm><snm>Fujita</snm><aff>Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Garey</gnm><snm>Ramey</snm><aff>U CA, San Diego</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>68</ppf>
<ppl>93</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper assesses how various approaches to modeling the separation
margin affect the quantitative ability of the Mortensen-Pissarides labor matching model. The model with a constant separation rate fails to produce realistic volatility and productivity responsiveness of the separation rate and worker flows. The specification with endogenous separation succeeds along these dimensions. Allowing for on-the-job search enables the model to replicate the Beveridge curve. All specifications, however, fail to generate sufficient volatility of the job finding rate. While adopting the Hagedorn-Manovskii calibration remedies this problem, the volume of job-to-job transitions in the on-the-job search specification becomes essentially zero.
(JEL E24, J41, J64)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.4.4.68</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/mac.4.4.68</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mac/data/2011-0236_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7707</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7715</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-macro/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>4</vol>
<iss>4</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=MAC&volume=4&issue=4</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Home Equity Lending and Retail Spending: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Texas</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Chadi S.</gnm><snm>Abdallah</snm><aff>Miami U OH</aff></au>
<au><gnm>William D.</gnm><snm>Lastrapes</snm><aff>U GA</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>94</ppf>
<ppl>125</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>We estimate how spending in Texas responded to a 1997 constitutional amendment that relaxed severe restrictions on home equity lending.
We use this event as a natural experiment to estimate the importance
of credit constraints. If households are credit-constrained, such an increase in credit availability will increase their spending. We find that Texas retail sales at the county and state levels increased significantly
after the amendment, lending support to the credit-constraint hypothesis. We confirm these findings and refine our interpretation of the estimated aggregate-level responses using household-level data on home equity loans. (JEL D14, E21, G21, G28)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.4.4.94</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/mac.4.4.94</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mac/data/2011-0027_data.zip</dataset>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7707</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7715</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-macro/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>4</vol>
<iss>4</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=MAC&volume=4&issue=4</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Why Are Target Interest Rate Changes So Persistent?</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Olivier</gnm><snm>Coibion</snm><aff>IMF and U TX</aff></au>
<au><gnm>Yuriy</gnm><snm>Gorodnichenko</snm><aff>U CA, Berkeley</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>126</ppf>
<ppl>62</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>While the degree of policy inertia in central banks' reaction functions
is a central ingredient in theoretical and empirical monetary economics, the source of the observed policy inertia in the United States is controversial, with tests of competing hypotheses, such as interest-smoothing and persistent-shocks, being inconclusive. This paper employs real time data; nested specifications with flexible time series structures; narratives; interest rate forecasts of the Fed,
financial markets, and professional forecasters; and instrumental variables to discriminate between competing explanations of policy inertia. The evidence strongly favors the interest-smoothing explanation and thus can help resolve a key puzzle in monetary economics. (JEL C53, E43, E47, E52, E58)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.4.4.126</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/mac.4.4.126</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mac/data/2011-0185_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mac/app/2011-0185_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


<head>
<pubinfo>
<pubnm>American Economic Association</pubnm>
<publoc>Nashville, TN</publoc>
</pubinfo>
<jrninfo>
<issn>1945-7707</issn>
<issn_online>1945-7715</issn_online>
<jrnti>American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics</jrnti>
<jrnurl>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-macro/</jrnurl>
</jrninfo>
<issinfo>
<vol>4</vol>
<iss>4</iss>
<cd>October 2012</cd>
<iss_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/issue.php?journal=MAC&volume=4&issue=4</iss_url>
</issinfo>
<docty>Articles</docty>
<artinfo>
<ti>Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection</ti>
<augp>
<au><gnm>Pavel</gnm><snm>Sevcik</snm><aff>U Quebec, Montreal</aff></au>
</augp>
<pp>
<ppf>163</ppf>
<ppl>97</ppl>
</pp>
<ab>This paper studies the joint dynamics of investor protection and economic
development in a political economy model with capital accumulation and occupational choice. Less investor protection implies higher costs of external financing for entrepreneurs. This excludes poorer agents from entrepreneurship, increasing the profits of the remaining entrepreneurs. The main determinants of investor protection policy preferences are the agent's net worth and the expected
return from entrepreneurship. When the policy is chosen by the simple majority rule, the model generates several implications consistent with the observed variation of investor protection over time and across countries. (JEL D72, E22, E32, G18, G38, J24, L26)</ab>
<art_url>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.4.4.163</art_url>
<doi>10.1257/mac.4.4.163</doi>
<dataset>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mac/data/2011-0058_data.zip</dataset>
<addt_matl_link>http://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mac/app/2011-0058_app.pdf</addtl_matl_link>
</artinfo>
</head>


