Replication data for: The Structure of Tariffs and Long-Term Growth
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Nathan Nunn; Daniel Trefler
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Nunn, Nathan, and Trefler, Daniel. Replication data for: The Structure of Tariffs and Long-Term Growth. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2010. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114183V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We show that the "skill bias" of a country's tariff structure is positively
correlated with long-term per capita GDP growth. Testing for causal mechanisms, we find evidence consistent with the existence of real benefits from tariffs focused in skill-intensive industries. However, this only accounts for a quarter of the total correlation
between skill-biased tariffs and growth. Turning to alternative explanations, we extend the standard Grossman-Helpman "protection-for-
sale" model and show how the skill bias of tariffs can reflect the extent of domestic rent-seeking activities in the economy. We provide evidence that the remaining variation is explained by this endogeneity. (JEL D72, F13, F43, O17, O19, O24, O47)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
F13 Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
F43 Economic Growth of Open Economies
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
O19 International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
O24 Development Planning and Policy: Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy
O47 Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
F13 Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
F43 Economic Growth of Open Economies
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
O19 International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
O24 Development Planning and Policy: Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy
O47 Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence
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